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ABSTRACT 
Flying a high-technology fighter with high stakes and under high g-force is not only an 
issue of skilled psychomotor performance but also of real-time decision-making involving 
situation awareness, choice amongst alternatives, time pressure and risk assessment. 
There is no aeronautical decision-making (ADM) training program for military pilots in 
existence neither in the R. O. C. Air Force nor around the world, although academic 
research had recognized the training needs for aeronautical decision-making. This 
research consists of three studies described in six chapters to develop an effective solution 
for ADM problems in order to improve military pilots' decision-making in a dynamic and 
time-limited tactical environment. 
The first chapter is an executive summary comprised by three studies. The second 
chapter identified ADM training needs by applied the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS). Without good analysis it is impossible to identify 
precisely the training needs and the nature of the training content required for improving 
pilots' performance. The third chapter examined five ADM training mnemonics in six 
different decision-making scenarios for developing an ADM training program. There are 
many ADM mnemonics available. However, there was lack of empirical research 
investigating the efficiency of those ADM mnemonics in the real-time tactical 
environment. The fourth chapter evaluates the effectiveness of ADM training program by 
simulator trials and pencil and paper trials. The fifth chapter is overall discussion, 
followed by the final chapter containing conclusions and recommendations. 
This research demonstrated that ADM training program did improve pilots' in-flight 
decision-making performance. Improvements in pilots' situation assessment and risk 
management were obtained, but these were traded-off for response time. To improve the 
quality of pilots' decision-making, the ADM training program needs to be coordinated 
with real-time simulator scenarios training. The findings have demonstrated that the 
ADM training program significantly improved pilots' situation assessment and risk 
management. However, it still needs to be established if these performance gains 
continue to be evident at a later date during actual operations. 
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To improve flight safety, the Republic of China (R. O. C. ) Air Force Headquarters 
investigates the pattern of mishaps annually. The findings are that military aviation 
accidents attributable solely to mechanical failure have decreased markedly but those 
attributable to human error have declined at a much slower rate and remain the primary 
cause of accidents. The role of human error in aviation accidents is a topic of much 
scientific debate. There are a number of perspectives for describing and analyzing human 
errors, each based on different assumptions about their nature and the underlying causal 
factors of the human contribution in the sequence of events leading up to an accident. For 
example, Dekker (2001 a) has proposed that human errors are systematically connected to 
features of operators' tools and tasks, and error has its roots in the surrounding system. 
The question of human or system failure alone demonstrates an oversimplified belief in 
the roots of failure. The important issue in a human factors investigation is to understand 
why pilots' actions made sense to them at the time the accident happened (Dekker, 2002). 
Earlier work by Feggetter (1991) similarly suggested that the role of psychologists who 
investigate accidents is to collect and make a detailed examination of the large amounts of 
information associated with human errors and to gain a complete understanding of the 
surrounding circumstances. To this end many human factors accident analysis 
frameworks, taxonomies and analysis strategies have been devised over the years (e. g. 
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Diehl, 1989; Feggetter, 1991; Harle; 1995; Hollnagel, 1998; Hunter & Baker, 2000; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Prince and Salas (1993) point to the great variability in the nature of the tactical tasks 
confronting a military pilot. Military pilots make important decisions often using 
ambiguous information, while under great risk and with very little time. Therefore, 
decision aids and training are required to provide these pilots with the necessary skills to 
make quick situation assessments. The topic of aeronautical decision-making (ADM) has 
assumed a prominent place in current prescriptions for human factors training in aviation. 
This stems from the finding reported by Jensen and Benel (1977) that the majority of fatal 
crashes were attributable to decision errors rather than perceptual or action errors. 
Military pilots must perform a wide array of tasks. Their primary task is to intercept 
enemy aircraft, attack tactical targets, deliver weapons, troops, or equipment, so flying 
frequently becomes a secondary task (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). Operating a high- 
technology fighter aircraft with high stakes and under high g-force is not only an issue of 
skilled psychomotor performance but also real-time decision-making involving situation 
awareness, choice amongst alternatives and assessment of risk within a limited-time frame 
(Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). However, aeronautical decision-making has traditionally 
been viewed as a by-product of flying experience. Only relatively recently has it been 
regarded as a potential flight-training requirement (Buch & Diehl, 1984). 
The model of training development known as Instructional System Development (ISD) 
adopts what is known as a systems perspective, where training development is viewed as 
a system that attempts to achieve a particular goal. One of the most well known ISD 
models is the IPISD (Interservice Procedures for Instructional System Development) 
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model developed by Branson et al. (1975) for training in the U. S. military. The aim of 
this approach is to provide a generic context-free framework for the development of good 
training programs. From the perspective of cognitive skills acquisition it is suggested that 
training will be more effective the greater the extent that the skill required to perform the 
task can be faithfully reproduced during the training program. This is why the analysis of 
the task/skill is so important. The contents of such a training program can be identified by 
either task analysis or by the analysis of performance deficiencies in a real or simulated 
situation. The focus of the training program has to be both specific and exact so that the 
training can achieve the training objectives. 
There have been many aeronautical decision-making (ADM) theoretical frameworks and 
ADM training mnemonics discussed in recent years. Most of the research has been based 
on different perspectives of human information process and has resulted in different 
strategies for tackling the problem of pilots' decision-making errors. However, there is a 
lack of empirical research investigating the efficiency of these ADM mnemonics in the 
real-time tactical environments. Only recently has decision-making been examined as a 
potential flight-training requirement in the civil aviation. Research suggests that 
aeronautical decision-making can be improved with training (Cohen, 1993; Endsley, 
1995a; Drillings & Serfaty, 1997; Klein, 1993b; O'Hare, 2003; Orasanu & Fischer, 1997; 
Wagg & Bell, 1997). 
The main goal of this research is to develop an effective ADM training program to reduce 
the number of fatal accidents and incidents related to poor in-flight decision-making by 
military pilots. There are a series of three studies in this research. Study-1 identifies 
ADM training needs from the results obtained by the application of the Human Factors 
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Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Study-2 identifies the best ADM 
mnemonic for application in different tactical situations. Study-3 evaluates the efficacy of a 
short ADM training program for military pilots designed as part of this study. 
1.2 Identification of ADM Training Needs by HFACS 
Without accurate analysis, it is not possible to identify the ADM training needs and 
develop the content of training programs required for preventing aviation accidents. 
HFACS is based on Reason's (1990) system-wide model of human error in which active 
failures are associated with the performance of front-line operators in complex systems 
and latent failures are characterized as inadequacies or mis-specifications which might lie 
dormant within a system for a long time and are only triggered when combined with other 
factors to breach the system's defences. In study-1, the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) has been applied to analyze 
accidents in the R. O. C. Air Force. To identify training needs the HFACS framework was 
used to analyse accidents occurring in the R. O. C. Air Force between 1978 and 2002. This was 
used to provide empirical data describing the strength and causal relationships between 
categories in adjacent levels of the HFACS to establish how human factors deficiencies in the 
organizational levels affected categories in lower levels, including pilot's decision-making. 
There were a total of 523 accidents analysed in which 1,762 human errors were 
categorised. Decision errors were involved in 223 (42.6%) of the accidents. Once the 
significant paths in the HFACS framework have been identified, the development of 
accident intervention strategies can proceed more rapidly and effectively. The results of 
this analysis showed that errors of judgment and poor ADM were commonly reported. As 
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a result it was concluded that there was a need for military pilots to be trained specifically 
in making decisions in tactical environments to improve aviation safety. However, there 
is currently no empirical research on developing effective ADM training programs for 
military pilots either in the R. O. C. Air Force or elsewhere. 
1.3 The Suitability of ADM training Mnemonics 
In study-2, five Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) mnemonic-based methods were 
evaluated in six different tactical situations for the purposes of identifying the best 
approach to form the basis of a decision-making training program. Sixty instructor pilots 
and 47 cadet pilots from the Republic of China Air Force Academy participated. 
Participants assessed the suitability of SHOR (Wohl, 1981); PASS (Maher, 1989); FOR- 
DEC (Hormann, 1995); SOAR (Oldaker, 1996); and DESIDE (Murray, 1997) in the six 
basic types of decision-making scenario described by Orasanu (1993); go/no go decisions; 
recognition-primed decisions; response selection decisions; resource management 
decisions; non-diagnostic procedural decisions, and creative problem-solving. The results 
suggested that two ADM mnemonics were suitable for covering all basic types of decision. 
SHOR was rated as being the best in time-limited and critical, urgent situations. DESIDE 
was regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which needed more 
comprehensive considerations but had time available to do so. There were qualitative 
differences in the comments regarding the suitability of the ADM mnemonics between 
instructors and cadet pilots, probably attributable to differences in hazard perception. To 
optimize training effectiveness, it was suggested that it will be necessary to deliver 
instruction in using both the SHOR and DESIDE mnemonics and to provide advice 
concerning which approach is most suitable in which tactical situations. 
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1.4 Evaluation of the Efficacy of ADM Training Program 
In study-3, forty-one fighter pilots from Republic of China Tactical Training Wing 
participated. Two ADM mnemonic methods, SHOR (Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Murray, 
1997), that could significantly improve the quality of military pilots' decision-making (Li 
& Harris, 2005a) formed the basis of an ADM training program. The contents of the 
training program included (1) an introduction to ADM theories consisting of the 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model of Rapid Decision Making (Klein, 1993a); The 
ARTFUL Decision Maker: A Framework Model for Aeronautical Decision Making 
(O'Hare, 1992); Conflict-theory Decision Making Model (Janis & Mann, 1977); Model of 
Situation Awareness in Dynamic Decision-making (Endsley, 1997); and Decision Process 
Model (Orasanu, 1995); (2) the ADM strategies encompassed in SHOR (Wohl, 1981) and 
DESIDE (Murray, 1997); (3) a case-study practicing SHOR and DESIDE in six basic 
types of scenarios including go/no go decision, recognition-primed decision, response 
selection decision, resource management decision, non-diagnostic procedural decision, 
and creative problem-solving; and (4) Debriefing: the application of ADM in military 
aviation. The ADM training program lasted approximately four hours in total. 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the ADM training program 
using a flight simulator-based experiment (evaluating the products of decision-making) 
and pencil and paper trials (evaluating the process of decision-making). The results 
strongly suggest that such a short training course can be effective in terms of improving 
pilots' skill in situation assessment and risk management. It was however observed that 
this was at the cost of a decreased speed of responding. The longer-term effectiveness of 
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such courses needs further evaluation to see if it translates into improved decision-making 
behaviour during day-to-day operations which, ultimately also results in a reduction in the 
accident rate attributable to poor decision-making. There is also a need to investigate if 
additional practice in the application of the ADM mnemonic methods in a flight simulator 
increases the speed of decision-making. Nevertheless, it is suggested that a simple, short, 
cost-effective training program in the appropriate use of ADM mnemonic methods may 
ultimately produce significant gains in flight safety. Such a course may easily be 
integrated into current CRM or simulator-based training programs. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Identification of the Requirement for Aeronautical Decision- 
making Training by Applying Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) 
2.1 Introduction 
There are two types of analysis that help to identify training needs. The first type of 
analysis is described as a conventional form of task analysis that breaks down a task into a 
series of tasks and subtasks. This type of analysis adopts a systems perspective and 
describes the tasks that have to be accomplished in a logical fashion (Kirwan & 
Ainsworth, 1992). The second type of analysis focuses on errors in task performance. 
This can be done at an intra-individual level and also at an inter-individual level whereby 
errors can be aggregated so that frequent errors can be identified, and a feedback loop is 
established between the evaluation of performance and the development of training to 
remedy any weaknesses (Patrick, 2003). This approach to analysis can take place in 
various ways. Accidents, incidents, and near misses can be analyzed, which provide a 
rich source of information for subsequent training (e. g., Reason, 1990; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2003). 
Analyses of performance errors varies in terms of the range of people sampled, the scope 
of the activities of interest, the methodologies employed, and whether performance is in a 
pencil and paper trial, a simulator or an actual aircraft. The Critical Decision Method 
developed by Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor (1989) uses retrospective interview data 
in order to identify the nature of the decision making in an accident or incident. This 
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process tracing approach has been used to analyze cognitive processes involved in 
decision making and problem solving in an applied setting. The data pertaining to pilot's 
performance relevant to training provision can be gleaned not only from analysis of actual 
accidents and near misses but also from experimental studies of performance in simulated 
situations to scrutinize the types of error so that appropriate training can be devised. 
Patrick (2003) indicated that training would be ineffective if the linkage between the 
operational and training environments is degraded in terms of the psychological demands 
imposed on the pilots. The analysis of training needs is the first step of training 
development. Without good analysis it is impossible to identify precisely the training 
needs and the nature of the training content required for improving pilots' performance. 
This study applies the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997,2001 a, 2001 b, 2001 c, 2003; Shappell and Wiegmann 2001, 
2003,2004) to identify the most frequent underlying human factors causes in military 
aviation accidents or incidents for the purpose of developing potential training solution. 
2.1.1 A review of the HFACS Framework 
HFACS is based on Reason's (1990) model of human error. Active failures which are 
associated with the performance of front-line operators in complex systems and latent 
failures which lie dormant within the system for a long time serve to combine together 
with other factors to breach a system's defences. As Reason (1997) described, complex 
systems were designed, operated, maintained, and managed by human beings, so it is not 
surprising that human decisions and actions at an organizational level are implicated in all 
accidents. Active failures of operators have a direct impact on the safety of the systems. 
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However, latent failures are spawned in the upper levels of the organization and are 
related to management and regulatory structures. 
Reason's model was extremely influential in the way that human errors were viewed in 
aviation accidents but the model did not suggest remedial solutions. Based upon Reason's 
model, Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) developed the HFACS to service such a need. 
The system was originally designed and developed as a generic human error framework 
for investigating and analyzing human error accidents in US military aviation operations 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). The same authors later demonstrated its applicability to 
the analysis of accidents in US commercial aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001 a, 
2001b) and US general aviation (Shappell & Wiegmann 2003,2004). Wiegmann & 
Shappell (2001b) claim that the HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory and 
practice by providing safety professionals with a theoretically based tool for identifying 
and classifying human errors in aviation mishaps. The system focuses on both latent and 
active failures and their inter-relationships, and by doing so it facilitates the identification 
of the underlying causes of human error. However, as aviation accidents are the result of 
a number of causes, the challenge for accident investigators is how best to identify and 
mitigate the causal sequence of events leading up to an accident. It is important to 
systematically examine the HFACS framework and identify if this framework is suitable 
to meet needs for aviation accident classification and investigation. 
HFACS examines human error in flight operations at four levels. Each higher level is 
assumed to affect the next downward level in HFACS framework. The HFACS 
framework is described diagrammatically in figure 2.1. 
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" Level-1 `Unsafe acts of operators' (active failures): This level is where the 
majority of causes in the investigation of accidents is focused. Such causes can be 
classified into the two basic categories of errors and violation. 
" Level-2 `Preconditions for unsafe acts' (latent/active failures): This level 
addresses the latent failures within the causal sequence of events as well as more 
obvious active failures. It also describes the context of substandard conditions of 
operators and the substandard practices they adopt. 
" Level-3 `Unsafe supervision' (latent failures): This level traces the causal chain of 
events producing unsafe acts up to the front-line supervisors. 
9 Level-4 `Organizational influences' (latent failures): This level encompasses the 
most elusive of latent failures, fallible decisions of upper levels of management 
which directly affect supervisory practices and which indirectly affect the actions 
of front-line operators. 
Decision errors I Skill-based errors II Perceptual errors I Violations 
Figure 2.1 The HFACS framework, each upper level would affect downward level, proposed 
by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) 
2.1.1.1 Level-1 `Unsafe acts of operators' 
The first level of `unsafe acts of operators' can be divided into two sections. Errors 
represent the mental/physical activities of an individual that fail to achieve the intended 
outcomes; violations refer to the wilful disregard for the rules and regulations that provide 
safety of flight (Reason, 1990). However, errors and violations do not provide the level of 
granularity required of most accident investigations. Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) 
expanded errors further into the four sub-categories of `skilled-based errors', `decision 
errors', `perceptual errors', and `routine and exceptional violations' (figure 2.1). The 
category of `skilled-based errors' within the context of aviation is best described as `stick- 
and-rudder' and other basic flight skills that occur without significant conscious thought. 
It also includes attention failures, memory failures, and technique errors; `decision errors' 
represent intentional behaviour that proceeds as planned but which is not suitable for the 
situation. It includes three forms which are poor choices, procedural errors, and problem- 
solving errors. Procedural decision errors (Orasanu, 1993) happen during highly 
structured tasks of the type, `if X then T. Military aviation is highly structured and as a 
result, much of a pilot's decision-making is procedural. However, not all situations have 
corresponding procedures to deal with them, therefore, many situations still require choice 
to be made among multiple response options. Sometimes, in ill-defined situations, the 
invention of a novel solution is required. `Perceptual errors' occur when sensory input is 
either degraded or unusual, as is the case with visual illusions and spatial disorientation or 
when pilots misjudge the aircraft's altitude, attitude, or airspeed. It is important to note 
that it is not the illusion or disorientation that is classified as perceptual error, rather, it is 
the pilot's erroneous response to the illusion or disorientation. 
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There are many ways to distinguish `violations'. Two distinct forms have been identified, 
routine violations tend to be habitual by nature and are often tolerated by the governing 
authority. On the other hand, exceptional violations appear as isolated departures from 
authority, and are not necessarily indicative of an individual's typical behaviour pattern, 
nor condoned by management (Reason, 1990). 
2.1.1.2 Level-2 `Preconditions for unsafe acts' 
Simply focusing on the `unsafe acts of operator', linked to the majority of accidents, is 
like focusing on a fever without understanding the underlying illness that is causing it. 
There is a need to dig deeper into why the unsafe acts occurred in the first place. 
Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) classified `preconditions for unsafe acts' into seven further 
sub-categories of `adverse mental states'; `adverse physiological states'; `physical/mental 
limitations'; `crew resource management'; `personal readiness'; `physical environment', 
and `technological environment' (figure 2.1). The category of `adverse mental states' was 
created to account for mental conditions that affect performance, such as loss of 
situational awareness, task fixation, distraction, and mental fatigue due to stress; `adverse 
physiological states' refers to those medical or physiological conditions that preclude safe 
operations, such as visual illusions, spatial disorientation, physical fatigue, and medical 
abnormalities known to affect performance; `physical/mental limitations' refers to those 
instances when operational requirements exceed the capabilities of the individual at the 
controls, such as visual limitations, insufficient reaction time, information overload, 
incompatible physical capabilities and a lack of aptitude to fly; `crew resource 
management' was created to account for occurrences of poor coordination among 
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personnel, such as coordination between and within the aircraft, as well as with ATC, 
maintenance, or other support personnel; `personal readiness' refers to when individuals 
fail to prepare physically or mentally for duty, as individuals are expected to show up for 
work ready to perform at optimal levels. A breakdown in `personal readiness' includes 
failures to adhere crew rest requirements, overexertion when off-duty, self-medicating, 
and inadequate training; `physical environment' refers to both the operational 
environment and the ambient environment, such as weather, altitude, terrain, lighting, 
vibration, and toxins in the cockpit; `technological environment' encompasses a variety of 
issues including the design of equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, 
checklist layouts, task factors and automation. 
2.1.1.3 Level-3 `Unsafe supervision' 
Level-3 in HFACS includes supervisor's influence on the condition of pilots and the 
operational environment. Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) identified four categories of 
`unsafe supervision' including `inadequate supervision'; `planned inappropriate 
operation'; `failure to correct a known problem', and `supervisory violation' (figure 2.1). 
The role of supervisors is to provide their personnel with the facilities and capability to 
succeed and to ensure the job is done safely and efficiently. The category of `inadequate 
supervision' refers to a supervisor's failure to provide professional guidance, failure to 
provide proper training, failure to track the qualifications, lack of accountability, and loss 
supervisory situational awareness; `planned inappropriate operation' was created as a 
category to account for the failures such as poor crew pairing, failure to provide adequate 
briefing time, risk outweighing benefit, and excessive workload; `failure to correct a 
known problem' refers to those instances when deficiencies among individuals, 
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equipment, training or other related safety areas are `known' to the supervisor, yet are 
allowed to continue unabated, such as a failure to correct inappropriate behaviour, failure 
to correct a safety hazard, or failure to initiate corrective actions; `supervisory violations', 
on the other hand, are reserved for those instances when existing rules and regulations are 
wilfully disregarded by supervisors, such as authorizing an unqualified crew for flight, 
failure to enforce rules and regulations, violation of procedures, and inadequate 
documentation. 
2.1.1.4 Level-4 `Organizational influences' 
The decisions of upper-level management can affect supervisory practices, as well as the 
conditions and actions of operators. However, these organizational errors often go 
unnoticed due to the lack of framework to investigate them. These elusive latent failures 
were identified by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) as `resource management'; 
`organizational climate' and `organizational process'(figure 2.1). The corporate decisions 
about resource management are based on two conflicting objectives, the goal of safety and 
the goal of on-time and cost-effective operations. The category of `resource management' 
encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision-making regarding the allocation and 
maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources (selection, training, and 
staffing), monetary assets (cost cutting, and lack of funding), equipment, and facilities 
(poor design, failure to correct design flaws, and purchasing unsuitable equipments); 
`organizational climate' refers to a broad class of variables that influence worker 
performance. An organization's culture and policies are also important factors. Culture 
really refers to the unofficial or unspoken rules, values, attitudes, beliefs, and customs of 
an organization. Organizational structure is reflected in the chain-of-command, 
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delegation of authority, communication channels, and formal accountability for action; 
`organizational process' refers to corporate decisions and rules that govern the everyday 
activities within an organization, including the establishment of standard operating 
procedures and formal methods for maintaining checks and balances between the 
workforce and management. 
2.1.1.5 Critical Review of HFACS Framework 
Beaubien and Baker (2002) have criticised the validation evidence presented for 
supporting the utility of HFACS as it has all been collected and analysed by the authors of 
the system themselves. It was suggested that further inter-rater reliability evidence would 
be desirable. Wiegmann and Shappell (2001 a) reported that the framework as a whole 
had an inter-rater reliability figure (using Cohen's Kappa) of 0.71, indicating substantial 
agreement, however no figures were reported for the individual HFACS categories. 
Also, Dekker (2003) argued that human error is systematically connected to features of 
peoples' tools and tasks, and as acknowledged more recently, their operational and 
organizational environment. Human error classification methods are used throughout 
aviation to help understand and mitigate the causes of poor human performance, however, 
many assumptions underlying error classification remain untested. For example, error is 
taken to mean different things, even within individual methods, and a close mapping is 
uncritically presumed between quantity measured (error) and the quality managed 
(safety). Further, error classifications can deepen investigative biases by merely re- 
labelling error rather than explaining it. The biggest trap in HFACS methods is the 
illusion that classification is the same as analysis. While classification systems intend to 
provide investigators more insight into the background of human error, they actually risk 
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making judgments of people instead of providing explanations of their performance 
(Dekker, 2001b, 2002, & 2003). 
2.1.2 Research Purposes 
The HFACS framework integrates six major human error perspectives, including the 
cognitive, ergonomic, behavioural, aeromedical, psychosocial, and organizational 
perspectives. To date, HFACS has been shown to be useful within the context of US 
military aviation, as both a data analysis framework and an accident investigation tool 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003). This study applies the HFACS for analyzing human 
factors accident data from the R. O. C. Air Force. The first objective was to identify areas 
for training intervention to help mitigate the instance of human error in military aviation. 
It was necessary to understand the association of human errors with pilots' tools (aircraft), 
tasks (missions), ranks (flying experience), and flight stages (environment). The second 
objective was to provide probabilities for the co-occurrence of categories across adjacent 
levels of the HFACS to establish how factors in the upper (organizational) levels in the 
framework affect categories in lower (operational) levels. Once the significant paths in 
the framework have been identified, the development of accident intervention strategies 
should proceed more rapidly and effectively. A final objective was to examine the inter- 
rater reliability of the 18 individual categories of HFACS framework. 
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Accident Data 
The data were derived from the narrative descriptions of accidents occurring in the R. O. C. 
Air Force between 1978 and 2002. The data set comprised of 523 accidents during this 
25-year period. The sample included 206 class-1 accidents (cost to repair over 65% of 
original price or crew fatality), 78 class-2 accidents (cost to repair between 35 and 65% of 
original price or crew sustained serious injury) and 239 class-3 accidents (cost to repair 
between 3-35% of original price or crewmember sustained minor injury). Fighter aircraft 
were involved in 67.5% of accidents; training aircraft in 21.6% and cargo aircraft in 10.9%. 
2.2.2 Accident Investigation in the R. O. C. Air Force 
The Aviation Safety Unit (ASU) is responsible for all R. O. C. Air Force accident 
investigations. For each accident involving a military aircraft, the 24-hour on call 
Investigator-In-Charge follows a standard procedure for conducting the investigation. 
The initial stage collects relevant information for further analysis including the accident 
classification; identification details; pilots' information; personnel involved; aircraft 
information; mission and flight details; history of flight; impact and post-impact 
information; meteorological information; radar information and transmissions to and from 
Tactical Air Traffic Control. The wreckage of the aircraft is then recovered for 
investigation by the engineering teams. The final report details the causal factors of the 
accident and contains recommendations for accident prevention. The data collected 
include: 
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9 Type of aircraft: the types of aircraft involved in accidents included fighters 
(F-16, M-2000, IDF, F-104, F-5, etc. ), cargo aircraft (B1900, C130, C123, 
C47, etc. ), and training aircraft (AT3, T34, etc. ). 
" Missions: accidents occurred when pilots' were performing missions that 
included air interception, air combat tactics, instrument flight, cross country, 
transition, surface attack, close pattern, test flight, and exercise. 
" The flight stages in which accidents occurred included: taxi before take-off, 
take-off, climb-out, flight in the operational area, decent, approach, landing 
and taxi after landing. 
9 The ranks of pilots involved in accidents comprised: cadet, lieutenant, first 
lieutenant, captain, major, and lieutenant colonel (above). 
2.2.3 Coding Process 
This study used the HFACS framework described by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003). 
Each accident report was coded independently by two investigators, an instructor pilot 
and an aviation psychologist. These investigators were trained on the HFACS framework 
together for 10 hours to ensure that they achieved a detailed and accurate understanding of 
the categories in the HFACS. The presence (coded 1) or the absence (coded 0) of each 
HFACS category was assessed in each accident report narrative. To avoid over- 
representation from any single accident, each HFACS category was counted a maximum 
of only once per accident. The count acted simply as an indicator of presence or absence 
of each of the 18 categories in a given accident. 
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2.3 Results 
A total of 523 R. O. C. Air Force accidents were analyzed including 206 (39.4%) class-1 
accidents, 78 (14.9%) class-2 accidents, and 239 (45.7%) class-3 accidents. In these 
accidents, 1,762 instances of human error were recorded within the HFACS framework. 
Initial results found that acts at the level of `unsafe acts of operators' was involved in 725 
(41.1%) of instances; the `preconditions for unsafe acts' level was as a causal factor in 
552 (31.3%) of instances; the `unsafe supervision' level was involved in 221 (12.5%) of 
instances, and the `organizational influences' level in the HFACS model was involved as 
a factor in 264 (15 %) of instances. It must be noted in the following analyses that the 
percentages quoted refer to the percentage of times that an HFACS factor was implicated 
in the sequence of events leading up to an accident. However, in most instances many 
more than just a single factor was implicated in the accident sequence, hence the 
percentages quoted sum to more than 100% across the results section as a whole. 
2.3.1 Sample Characteristics 
Fighter aircraft were involved in 353 (67.5%) accidents, training aircraft involved in 113 
(21.6%) accidents, and cargo aircraft were involved in 57 (10.9%) accidents. Cadet pilots 
were involved in 30 (5.7%) accidents, second lieutenants in 10 (1.9%) accidents, first 
lieutenants in 92 (17.6%) accidents, captains in 144 (27.5%) accidents, majors were 
involved in 148 (28.3%) accidents and lieutenant colonel (or above) were involved in 70 
(13.4%) accidents. Accidents happened during the mission of Air Interception in 44 
(8.4%) of cases, Air Combat Manoeuvre in 125 (23.9%) cases, Instrument Flight in 72 
(13.8%) cases, Cross Country in 29 (5.5%) cases, Transition Training in 45 (8.6%) cases, 
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Surface Attack in 53 (10.1%) cases, Close Pattern in 30 (5.7%) cases, Test Flight 37 
(7.1 %) cases, and Exercise in 63 (12%) cases. Accidents happened during flight phase 
of Taxi before Take-off in 36 (6.9%) cases, Take-off in 64 (12.2%) cases, Climb-off in 28 
(5.4%) cases, Operational Areas in 200 (38.2%) cases, Descending in 9 (1.7%) cases, 
Approaching 55 (10.5%) cases, Landing in 68 (13%) cases, and Taxi after Landing in 
61(11.7%) cases. 
2.3.2 Causal Factors Associated with HFACS Framework 
2.3.2.1 Causal Factors Associated with `Unsafe Acts of Operators' 
In level-1, `skill-based errors' exhibited the highest frequency of occurrence in the 
HFACS framework. These included actions such as inappropriate stick and rudder 
coordination, excessive use of flight controls, glide path not maintained, and adopting an 
improper airspeed or altitude. `Decision errors' had the second highest rate of 
observations. Instances in this category included, selecting inappropriate strategies to 
perform a mission, improper in-flight planning, making an inappropriate decision to abort 
a take-off or landing, or using improper remedial actions in an emergency. The category 
of `violations' included intentionally ignoring standard operating procedures (SOPs); 
neglecting SOPs; applying improper SOPs; and diverting from SOPs. The category of 
`Perceptual errors' exhibited the lowest frequency of occurrence. This category included 
experiencing spatial disorientation, visual illusions, making incorrect estimations of 

























Figure 2.2 Frequency and percentage of factors implicated in accidents at level-1 
`unsafe acts of operators' 
2.3.2.2 Causal Factors Associated with `Preconditions for Unsafe Acts' 
At level-2 of the HFACS framework, instances of causal factors in the `adverse mental 
states' category (the most frequent category of occurrence) included issues such as over- 
confidence, stress, loss of situational awareness, distraction, channelized attention, and 
task saturation. `Crew resource management' (CRM) issues, the next most frequent 
category, included a lack of teamwork, poor communication, failures of leadership and 
inadequate briefing. In the `physical environment' category, contributory factors included 
poor responses to factors in the environment such as, bad weather, foreign object damage 
and terrain. The category of `physical/mental limitations' included instances of visual 
limitations, information overload and a lack of experience to deal with a complex 
situation. The `technological environment' category covered issues such as equipment 
design, cockpit display interfaces, automation and checklist layout. `Personal readiness', 
which encompassed issues associated with inadequate training, self-medication, poor diet, 
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Decision errors Skilled-based Perceptual errors Violations 
(42.6%) errors (43.2%) (22.2%) (30.6%) 
and overexertion while off duty, was involved in relatively few accidents, as was 






















Figure 2.3 Frequency and percentage of factors implicated in accidents at level-2 
`precondition for unsafe acts' 
2.3.2.3 Causal Factors Associated with `Unsafe Supervision' 
The most frequently occurring category in level-3 was `inadequate supervision'. 
Contributory factors included a failure to provide proper training, adequate rest periods, a 
lack of accountability, failure to track qualifications and performance, using untrained 
supervisors and loss of situation awareness at the supervisory level. `Planned inadequate 
operations' including issues surrounding poor crew pairings, a failure to establish if risk 
outweighed benefit, excessive task/workload, and failure to provide adequate time for 
briefing, was the next most frequently occurring category at this HFACS level. In the 
category of `failure to correct a known problem', instances included failures to correct 
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tendencies, and failing to initiate corrective actions. `Supervisory violations', which 
included authorizing an unqualified crew for flight, supervisors violating procedures, 
inadequate documentation, and a wilful disregard of authority by the supervisor, was 











Figure 2.4 Frequency and percentage of factors implicated in accidents at level-3 
`unsafe supervision' 
2.3.2.4 Causal Factors Associated with `Organizational Influences' 
At level-4, `resource management', which included the selection, staffing and training of 
human resources at an organizational level, excessive cost cutting, providing unsuitable 
equipment, and a failure to remedy design flaws, was most frequently involved in 
accidents. `Organizational processes', including excessive time pressures, poor mission 
scheduling, poor incentivization, failing to set clearly defined objectives, poor risk 
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supervision (33.8%) operations (4.6%) known problem violations (1.5%) 
(2.3%) 
management programs, inadequate management checks for safety, and failing to establish 
safety programs, was the next most frequent category at this level in the HFACS 
framework. Issues surrounding the `organizational climate' including inadequacies in the 
chain of command, poor delegation of authority, inappropriate organizational customs and 





















Figure 2.5 Frequency and percentage of factors implicated in accidents at level-4 
`organizational influence' 
2.3.3 HFACS Framework Versus Demographic Variables 
2.3.3.1 HFACS Categories versus Aircraft Types 
At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', there were no significant associations with 
respect to aircraft type. At the level of `preconditions for unsafe acts', the associations of 
aircraft types with `adverse mental states', `crew resource management', and `personal 
readiness' were significant. Training aircraft pilots were over-represented in having 
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(35.2%) (0.8%) (14.5%) 
`adverse mental states' and `personal readiness' as causal factors; cargo aircraft pilots 
were over-represented in having `crew resource management' problems as the major 
causal factor. At the level of `unsafe supervision', the associations of aircraft type with 
both `inadequate supervision' and `failed to correct a known problem' were significant. 
Training aircraft were over-represented in these two categories of accidents. At the level 
of `organizational influences', the association of aircraft type with `organizational 
process' was significant. Training aircraft pilots were over-represented in the category of 
`organizational process' accidents (table 2.1 & figure 2.6). 
Table 2.1 Summary of significant associations between HFACS categories and demographic 
variables 
Significant association with HFACS categories 
HFACS Categories Type 
of aircraft 








Fail correct problem x2=20.6, df=2, p<0.00 
Plan inadequate operation 
Inadequate supervision x2=8.28, dý2, p<O. OI xz=20.2, df=8, p<0.01 x'`=34.6, df=8, p<0.00 x2=26.6, df=5, p<0.00 
Technology environment 
Physical environment 2=15.1, df5, p<0.01 
Personal readiness 2=9.58, df 2, p<0.01 x2=23.1, df=8, p<0.01 
CRM 2=8.35, df--2, p<0.01 x2=19.6, d 8, p<0.01 
Phy. /mental limitation x2=17.5, df 8, p<0.02 xz=32.5, df--5, p<0.00 
Adv. physiological state 
Adverse mental states 2=7.55, df=2, p<0.02 x2=25.7, df 8, p<O. 00 
z=18.3, df--5, p<0.00 
Violations 
Perceptual errors x212.5, df=5, p<0.02 
Skilled-based errors xz=17. l, df=8, p<0.02 x2=63.6, df--8, p<O. OO X, 
2=18.1, df=5, p<0.00 
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Figure 2.6 Frequency of HFACS categories versus aircraft types 
2.3.3.2 HFACS Categories versus Pilots' Missions 
13 trainer 
  cargo 
Q fighter 
At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', the association of mission with `skill-based 
errors' was significant. The `close pattern' mission was over-represented in the category 
of `skill-based errors'. At the level of `preconditions for unsafe acts', the association of 
mission with `personal readiness' was significant. The `close pattern' mission was also 
over-represented in the category of `personal readiness' accidents. At the level of `unsafe 
supervision', the association of mission with `inadequate supervision' was significant. 
Again, the `close pattern' mission was over-represented in the category of `inadequate 
supervision' accidents. However, at the level of `organizational influences', there was no 
significant association between mission and the categories in the HFACS framework 
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Frequency of HFACS categories versus tactical missions 
2.3.3.3 HFACS Categories versus Flight Phase 
At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', the associations of flight phase with `decision 
errors' and `skilled-based errors' were significant. The flight phase of `landing' was over- 
represented in these two categories of accident. At the level of `preconditions for unsafe 
acts', the association of flight phase with `adverse mental states' was significant, as was 
the association of flight phase with `physical/mental limitations' and with `crew resource 
management'. The flight phase of `operational area' was over-represented in these three 
categories of accidents. At the level of `unsafe supervision', the association of flight 
stages with `inadequate supervision' was significant. The flight phase of `landing' was 
over-represented in the category of `inadequate supervision' accidents. At the 
`organizational influences' level, there was no significant association between flight phase 
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Figure 2.8 Frequency of HFACS categories versus flight phase 
2.3.3.4 HFACS Categories versus Pilots' Rank 
El taxi bef. take-off 
take-off 
Q climb-off 
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landing 
Q taxi after landing 
At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', the association of a pilot's rank with `decision 
errors' was significant, as was the association of a pilot's rank with `skill-based errors' 
and with `perceptual errors'. The rank of `lieutenant' was over-represented in these three 
categories of accidents. At the level of `preconditions for unsafe acts', the association of a 
pilot's rank with `adverse mental states', `physical/mental limitation' and the `physical 
environment' were significant. The rank of `lieutenant' was over-represented in the 
categories of `adverse mental states' and `physical/mental limitation' causal factors of 
accidents. However, the rank of `lieutenant colonel above' was over-represented in the 
category of `physical environment' of accidents. At the level of `unsafe supervision', the 
association of a pilot's rank with `inadequate supervision' was significant. The rank of 
`cadet' was over-represented in the category of `inadequate supervision'. At the level of 
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`organizational influences', the association of a pilot's rank with `organizational process' 
was also significant. The rank of `cadet' was over-represented in the category of 
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Figure 2.9 Frequency of HFACS categories versus pilot's rank 
2.3.4 Association between Categories within the HFACS Framework 
Chi-square (x2) analyses of the cross-tabulations were used to assess the statistical 
strength of association between the categories in higher and lower levels of the HFACS. 
As there is no identifiable dependent or independent variable in a x, 
2 test of association 
these analyses were supplemented with further analyses using Guttmann and Kruskal's 
lambda (2) which was used to calculate the proportional reduction in error (PRE). The 
lower level categories in the HFACS were designated as being dependent upon the 
categories at the immediately higher level in the framework. A positive value for 
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Guttmann and Kruskal's lambda indicates the strength of the directional relationship with 
the higher levels in the HFACS being deemed to influence (cause) changes at the lower 
organizational levels, thus going beyond what may be deemed a simple test of co-variance 
between categories. 
2.3.4.1 The Association of Categories between `Organizational 
Influences' and `Unsafe Supervision' 
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-4 
`organizational influences' (including `resource management'; `organizational climate' 
and `organizational process') and HFACS level-3 `unsafe supervision' ('inadequate 
supervision'; `planned inappropriate operations'; `failed to correct a known problem'; and 
`supervisory violations') found that there were eight pairs of significant associations: 
`resource management' versus `inadequate supervision'; `organizational climate' versus 
`inadequate supervision'; `organizational climate' versus `failed to correct a known 
problem'; `organizational climate' versus `supervisory violations'; `organizational 
process' versus `inadequate supervision'; `organizational process' versus `planned 
inappropriate operations'; `organizational process' versus `failed to correct a known 
problem'; and `organizational process' versus `supervisory violations'. These 
relationships are summarized in table 2.2 and are described diagrammatically in figure 
2.10. Further examination of the directional PRE showed two significant associations 
between categories at level-4 and level-3; `organizational climate' versus `inadequate 
supervision' and `organizational process' versus `inadequate supervision'. 
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Indicates the category has no significant association with downward level categories 
..................... io. Indicates Chi-square significant; --. -* Indicates both Chi-square and Lambda significant 
I Level-4 
Resource Organizational climate Organizational process 
management 
Level-3 
Inadequate supervision Planed inappropriate Failed to correct a known Supervisory 
operations problem violation 
--------------- 
................ ............................ ... F 
:ý.... ........... ý... ....... ............ 
Level-2 
Adverse Adverse I Physical Crew resource Personal : Physical Technology 
mental physiological /mental management readiness environment environment 




............... '... ". . ........... ..... ..., Level-1 ...... ý ...... .................. .................... 
F Decision errors Skill-based errors Perceptual errors J Violations 
Figure 2.10 The significant association of Chi-square (x2) and Lambda (X) from `organizational 
influences' to `unsafe acts of operators' of HFACS framework. 
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Table 2.2 Chi-square test of association and Guttmann and Kruskal's Lambda summarising 
significant relationships between categories at the level of `organizational influences' 
and at the subsequent level of `unsafe supervision' 
Pearson Chi-square Lambda 
Organizational Influence Asymp. Approx 
Versus Value Df Sig Value Sig. 
Unsafe Supervision 






Organizational climate * 7.562 1 . 006 . 023 . 045 
Inadequate Supervision 




Failed to correct a known problem 





Organizational process * 91.208 1 . 000 . 282 . 000 
Inadequate Supervision 
Organizational process * 14.174 1 . 000 . 000 ns 
Planned inappropriate operations 




Failed to correct a known problem 





ns: not significant 
2.3.4.2 The Association of Categories between `Unsafe Supervision' 
and `Preconditions for Unsafe Acts' 
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-3 `unsafe 
supervision' and HFACS level-2 `preconditions for unsafe acts' (including the categories 
of `adverse mental states'; `adverse physiological states'; `physical/mental limitations'; 
6 crew resource management'; `personal readiness'; `physical environment'; and 
`technology environment') showed a further eight pairs of significant associations. These 
were `inadequate supervision' versus `adverse mental states'; `inadequate supervision' 
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versus `physical/mental limitations'; `inadequate supervision' versus `crew resource 
management'; `inadequate supervision' versus `personal readiness'; `inadequate 
supervision' versus `physical environment'; `planned inappropriate operations' versus 
`adverse mental states'; `planned inappropriate operations' versus `crew resource 
management'; and `failed to correct a known problem' versus `adverse mental states'. 
These are summarized in table 2.3 and described in figure 2.10. Further examination of 
the directional PRE found that there was a significant association between the level-3 and 
level-2 categories of `inadequate supervision' versus `crew resource management'. 
Table 2.3 Chi-square test of association and Guttmann and Kruskal's Lambda summarising 
significant relationships between categories at the level of `unsafe supervision' 
and at the subsequent level of `preconditions for unsafe acts' 
Unsafe Supervision Pearson Chi-square Lambda 
Versus Asymp. Approx 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Value df Sig. Value Sig. 




Adverse mental states 





Inadequate Supervision * 143.573 1 . 000 . 281 . 002 
Crew resource management 















Planned inappropriate operations *Crew resource 10.824 1 . 001 . 027 ns 
management 
Failed to correct a known problem * Adverse 6.958 1 . 008 . 000 ns 
mental states 
ns: not significant 
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2.3.4.3 The Association of Categories between `Precondition for 
Unsafe Acts' and `Unsafe Acts of Operators' 
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-2 
`preconditions for unsafe acts' and HFACS level-1 `unsafe acts of operators' (including 
the categories of decision errors; skill-based errors; perceptual errors; and violations) 
showed a further 16 pairs of significant associations. These were `adverse mental states' 
versus `decision errors'; `adverse mental states' versus `skill-based errors'; `adverse 
mental states' versus `perceptual errors'; `adverse mental states' versus `violations'; 
`physical/mental limitations' versus `decision errors'; `physical/mental limitations' 
versus `skill-based errors'; `physical/mental limitations' versus `perceptual errors'; `crew 
resource management' versus `decision errors'; `crew resource management' versus 
`skill-based errors'; `crew resource management' versus `perceptual errors'; `crew 
resource management' versus `violations'; `personal readiness' versus `decision errors'; 
`personal readiness' versus `skill-based errors'; `technology environment' versus 
`decision errors'; `technology environment' versus `skill-based errors'; and `technology 
environment' versus `perceptual errors'. Further examination of the directional PRE 
found that there were eight significant associations between the level-2 and level-1 
categories of `adverse mental states' versus `decision errors; `adverse mental states' 
versus `skill-based errors'; `physical/mental limitations' versus `decision errors'; 
`physical/mental limitations' versus `skill-based errors'; `crew resource management' 
versus `decision errors'; 4 crew resource management' versus `skill-based errors'; 
`personal readiness' versus `decision errors'; and `personal readiness' versus `skill-based 
errors'. These are summarized in table 2.4 and described diagrammatically in figure 2.10. 
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Table 2.4 Chi-square test of association and Guttmann and Kruskal's Lambda summarising 
significant relationships between categories at the level of `preconditions for unsafe 
acts' and at the subsequent level `unsafe acts of operators' 
Precondition for Unsafe Acts Pearson Chi-square Lambda 
Versus 





Adverse mental state * 59.226 1 . 000 . 269 . 000 
Decision errors 
Adverse mental states * 61.701 1 . 000 . 283 . 000 
Skill-based errors 
Adverse mental states * 43.730 1 . 000 . 000 ns 
Perceptual errors 
Adverse mental states * 13.025 1 . 000 . 
000 ns 
Violations 
Physical/mental limitation * Decision 50.996 1 . 000 . 211 . 000 
errors 
Physical/mental limitation * 33.051 1 . 000 . 164 . 000 
Skill-based errors 
Physical/mental limitation * Perceptual 27.401 1 . 000 . 000 ns 
errors 
Crew resource management * Decision 42.578 1 . 000 . 215 . 000 
errors 
Crew resource management * 35.423 1 . 000 . 195 . 000 
Skill-based errors 
Crew resource management * Perceptual 62.086 1 . 000 . 000 ns 
errors 
Crew resource management * Violations 19.850 1 . 
000 
. 000 ns 
Personal readiness * 10.220 1 . 001 . 058 . 015 
Decision errors 
Personal readiness * 15.181 1 . 000 . 075 . 001 
Skill-based errors 










Technology environment * Perceptual 6.982 1 . 008 . 000 ns 
errors 
ns: not significant 
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2.3.5 Inter-rater Reliability of HFACS Framework 
The inter-rater reliabilities assessed using Cohen's Kappa ranged between 0.440 and 
0.826, a range of values spanning between moderate agreement and substantial 
agreement. Fourteen HFACS categories exceeded a Kappa of 0.60 which indicates 
substantial agreement. Four categories had Kappa values between 0.40 and 0.59 
indicating moderate levels of agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Inter-rater reliabilities 
calculated as a simple percentage rate of agreement obtained reliability figures between 
72.3% and 96.4%, also indicated acceptable reliability between the raters (table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 The frequency and percentage of accident and inter-rater reliability of HFACS 
categories (ranked in terms of increasing inter-rater percentage agreement) 





occurrence Cohen's Kappa Percentage 
Agreement 
Personal readiness 2 29 0.695 72.3% 
Decision errors 1 223 0.675 81.5% 
Skilled-based errors 1 226 0.712 83.4% 
Violations 1 160 0.695 84.9% 
Perceptual errors 1 116 0.667 85.1% 
Adverse mental states 2 184 0.748 86.0% 
Resource management 4 184 0.768 86.4% 
Organizational process 4 76 0.593 87.4% 
Inadequate supervision 3 177 0.826 89.7% 
Crew resource management 2 146 0.801 89.7% 
Technology environment 2 44 0.608 89.9% 
Physical/mental limitation 2 73 0.691 90.4% 
Physical environment 2 74 0.797 92.2% 
Planned inadequate operations 3 24 0.706 94.6% 
Failed correct a known problem 3 12 0.548 95.8% 
Supervisory violation 3 8 0.694 96.2% 
Organizational climate 4 4 0.440 96.4% 
Adverse physiological states 2 2 0.441 96.4% 
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2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Causal Factors of Accidents Identified in the HFACS Framework 
At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', `skill-based errors' had the highest rate of 
occurrence (43.2%) in the HFACS framework, including actions such as inappropriate 
stick and rudder coordination, excessive use of flight controls, glide path not maintained, 
and adopting an improper airspeed or altitude. `Decision errors' had the second highest 
rate (42.6%) including instances of selecting inappropriate strategies to perform a 
mission, improper in-flight planning, making an inappropriate decision to abort a take-off 
or landing, or using improper remedial actions in an emergency. The frequency of both 
`skill-based errors' (226) and `decision errors', (223) was very similar, comprising the 
majority of instances in HFACS framework. The initial training programs for cadet pilots 
focus almost solely on factors at the skill-based level. At the present time there are no 
`decision-making' training programs in existence in the R. O. C. Air Force. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need to address the importance of aeronautical decision-making for 
military pilots. 
At the level of `preconditions for unsafe acts', `adverse mental states' had the highest rate 
of implication in accidents (35.2%) including factors such as mental fatigue, stress, over- 
confidence, distraction, poor vigilance, or poor communication. `Crew resource 
management' had the second highest rate of accidents (27.9%). Many military pilots in 
the R. O. C. Air Force feel that CRM is only applicable to civil aviation pilots. The 
findings of this investigation revealed that military aviation does need CRM but perhaps a 
modified version. Even pilots of single-seat fighters require good communication with 
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their wingman to backup each other and avoid a mid-air collision. They need to follow 
their leader (number one) to form a tactical formation to undertake a mission and they 
need to exchange information with Tactical Air Traffic Control (TATC) clearly. 
`Physical environment' had the third highest rate of accidents causal factors (14.1 %). The 
majority of these accidents involved inappropriate responses to bird strikes. This research 
suggests that current bird strike projects need to be improved. 
`Inadequate supervision' had the highest rate of accidents (33.8%) at the level of `unsafe 
supervision'. It was observed that supervisors' failure to provide proper training for crew, 
a supervisory loss of situation awareness and untrained supervisors were the major 
contributors to accidents. It is suggested that there is a need for improving the training of 
supervisors. Moreover, if `routine violations' at the level of `unsafe acts of operators' 
were condoned at the supervisory level, it reinforces the inappropriate behaviours and 
attitudes of the flight crew. Therefore, supervisors must be encouraged to perform their 
tasks appropriately and precisely. 
`Resource management' had the highest frequency of occurrence at the `organizational 
influences' level. It is important to find the weak link in the `resource management' chain 
and then to find appropriate remedial strategies, however it is also difficult to locate such 
`latent failures' at an organizational level. This study found that the major contributors to 
accidents included poor pilot selection practices and flight training; poor aircraft design, 
and failures to correct known flaws. 
Reason (1990,1997) has suggested that there is a `many to one' mapping of the 
psychological precursors of unsafe acts to the actual errors themselves, making it difficult 
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to predict which actual errors will occur as a result of which preconditions. This research, 
within the context of the HFACS framework developed by Wiegmann & Shappell (1997, 
2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2003) and Shappell & Wiegmann (2001,2003,2004) would 
however suggest that there are statistically significant associations between categories at 
organizationally higher levels and specific accident contributory factors at lower levels, 
and between latent factors and the occurrence of specific errors committed by pilots. 
2.4.2 HFACS Framework and Patterns of Military Aviation Mishaps 
There were significant associations between some specific categories of the HFACS 
framework and type of aircraft, mission, stage of flight and rank of the pilot. The results 
showed that fighters had highest frequency of accidents (342), followed by training 
aircraft (111) and cargo aircraft (56). Further analysis found that the training aircraft were 
significantly associated with the HFACS categories of `adverse mental states', `personal 
readiness', `inadequate supervision' and `organizational process'. The training aircraft 
have the highest usage in the Air Force, hence there is time pressure for maintenance, the 
checking processes for airworthiness oversight, and instructor pilots may not have time to 
provide enough training/supervision. Training aircraft are also operated by novice pilots 
who may not be ready for solo flight. Cargo aircraft were significantly associated with 
`CRM' issues because these types were operated by multi-crews, therefore, CRM was 
more relevant for these crew to perform their tasks than in a single-seat fighter. Fighters 
were generally under-represented in the HFACS categories. The possible explanation for 
this was that fighter pilots were mature pilots who performed the most demanding tasks in 
all-weathers, such as interception and air combat tactics. As a result, they were aware of 
the risks and they were experienced with a prudent attitude. 
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There was a significant association between missions and the HFACS framework in three 
categories: `skill-based errors', `personal readiness', and `inadequate supervision'. 
Further analysis found the task of `close pattern' was over-represented in these three 
categories of accidents. A possible explanation was the `close pattern' practicing of basic 
take-off and landing skills was used for training novice pilots to operate the aircraft 
safely. As the pilots were novices with limited experience and operating skills, if the 
instructor pilots did not provide proper training/supervision, sending a novice solo when 
he was not ready or had not developed the psychomotor skills, may have resulted in the 
above three HFACS categories being over represented in `close pattern' mission. 
There was a significant association between flight phase and HFACS framework in six 
categories. At the level of `unsafe acts of operators', `decision errors' and `skill-based 
errors' were significantly associated with `landing'. In the landing phase, precise 
psychomotor skills are required to control the aircraft and occasionally instant decisions 
and responses are needed. At the level of `preconditions for unsafe acts', the categories 
of `adverse mental states', `physical/mental limitation', and `crew resource management' 
were significantly associated with the phase of flying in the `operational area'. A possible 
explanation was that military tactical training, such as air combat tactics or low altitude 
tactics, places a high physical and mental demand on the pilots. Pilots needed to be aware 
of the cognitive demands while flying in the `operational area'. They are required to be in 
a heightened mental state to allow for a quick analysis of the dynamic situation followed 
by swift responses while under time pressure. They also need to have good crew resource 
management skills to deal with emergent risks and set the priorities for safety issues. At 
the level of `unsafe supervision', `inadequate supervision' was significantly associated 
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with 'landing'. This was perhaps due to the instructors in the mobile flight commanding 
centre not providing adequate supervision, providing inappropriate instruction for landing, 
or back seat instructor pilots failing to provide suitable training for trainees. 
Pilot's rank was related to flying experience. Senior officers normally have more flying 
hours than junior officers. The rank of `cadet' was significantly over-represented in the 
categories of `organizational process' and `inadequate supervision'. It was perhaps the 
junior cadet pilot's lack of experience and competence to deal with organizational 
influences that made them vulnerable. The rank of `lieutenant' was significantly 
associated with `decision errors', `skill-based errors', `perceptual errors', `adverse mental 
states', and `physical/mental limitations'. Pilots with the rank of `lieutenant' were novice 
pilots (between 200 and 500 flying hours), and at the beginning stages of conversion from 
training aircraft (AT-3) to fighters (F-16/M-2000/IDF). During this conversion period, 
there was a tendency toward having a higher accident rate. The rank of `lieutenant colonel 
(or above)' was significantly associated with `physical environment'. The explanation for 
this was probably that it was only experienced pilots whom were believed to have the 
ability and the confidence to undertake the risky tasks in adverse weather or over difficult 
terrain, so the tasks in an adverse physical environment were assigned to pilots with the 
rank of lieutenant colonel (or above). 
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2.4.3 `Organizational Influences' Affecting categories at 
Level-3 `Unsafe Supervision' 
Reason (1997) proposed that latent conditions are present in all systems and they are an 
inevitable part of organizational life. For example, resources are normally distributed 
unequally in organizations. The original decision on how to allocate resources may have 
been based on sound commercial arguments, but such inequities may create reliability or 
safety problems for someone somewhere in the system at some later point. This 
investigation showed that at level-4 `organizational influences', which included the 
categories of `resource management' (selection, training, monetary, and equipment 
resources); `organizational climate' (including chain-of-command, policies, and culture); 
and `organizational process' (including operational tempo, procedures and oversight), had 
several significant associations with categories at level-3 `inadequate supervision'. 
Furthermore, when `organizational climate' and `organizational process' were designated 
as the independent variables (i. e. the organizational factors that influence subsequent 
behaviours in the organization) and `inadequate supervision' was the dependent variable, 
the PRE was 2.3% (p<0.045) and 28.2% (p<0.000), respectively. In the current context, if 
personnel in the chain-of-command show poor discipline, fail to follow SOPs and do not 
train subordinates to cope with time pressures, the result will be an increased likelihood of 
`inadequate supervision' (at level-3). 
Orasanu and Connolly (1993) have suggested that decision-making occurs in an 
organizational context, and that the organization influences decisions directly by 
stipulating standard operating procedures, and indirectly through the organization's norms 
and culture. Reason (1990) proposed that latent conditions are present in all systems and 
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they are an inevitable part of organizational life. For example, resources are normally 
distributed unequally in organizations. The original decision on how to allocate resources 
may have been based on sound commercial arguments but such inequities may create 
reliability or safety problems for someone somewhere in the system at some later point. 
This analysis showed that at HFACS level-4, `organizational influences', all the 
categories had some association with causal factors at level-3 ('unsafe supervision'). 
However, the category of `organizational process' is the key factor at this highest 
organizational level. Poor `organizational processes' were associated with inadequacies in 
all categories at the level of `unsafe supervision' and hence indirectly were ultimately at 
the root of many operational errors resulting in accidents. Well-developed `organizational 
processes' that are consistently adhered to are key to all safety management systems. The 
commitment to safety must come from the very highest levels of the organization if it is to 
be successful in this respect (Reason, 1997). 
Both Reason (1990) and Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) hypothesized that inappropriate 
decision-making by upper-level management can adversely influence the personnel and 
practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the psychological pre-conditions 
and hence the subsequent actions of the front-line operators. This study provides 
statistical support for this hypothesized relationship. For example, the ROC Air Force is a 
task-oriented organization and would like to put all its resources and focus its full 
attention on achieving operational tasks on time with little interference from weather, 
aircraft condition, or pilots' rest period. From the Wing Commander's level, to Squadron 
Leaders and down to individual pilots, all are required to cope with pressures from time 
and the environment. As a result, it is perhaps not too surprising that the result of this 
research shows that `inadequate supervision' had a high frequency of occurrence. 
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2.4.4 `Unsafe Supervision' Affecting Categories at Level-2 
`Preconditions for Unsafe Acts' 
Both Reason (1990,1997) and Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) suggested that inappropriate 
decision-making by upper-level management can directly impact upon the personnel and 
practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the psychological pre-conditions 
and hence the subsequent actions of the front-line operators. The first stages of this 
hypothesized relationship have been demonstrated empirically in the previous section. 
Wojcik (1989) proposed that some conditions studied by psychologists and are reasonably 
well understood, such as work schedules that allow adequate sleep. However, other 
conditions related to management and organizational factors are more difficult to observe 
and quantify. At present the accident causal factors cited by investigation authorities 
usually, though not always, emphasize technology, the physical environment and the more 
immediate human factors, an emphasis partly due to the 'stop rules' of investigators when 
searching for accident causes (Rasmussen, 1988). The category of `inadequate 
supervision' was the key factor at HFACS level-3. It had many, significant statistical 
associations with categories in level-2, however, there was only one significant `causal' 
relationship observed, which was with the level-2 category of `Crew Resource 
Management'. The failure of senior officers in a supervisory position to provide guidance 
and operational doctrine to pilots was associated with many forms of psychological 
precursor that subsequently resulted in active, operational failures. With `inadequate 
supervision' as the independent variable and CRM as the dependent variable, the PRE 
was 28.1 % (p<0.002). `Inadequate supervision' also had significant associations with four 
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other level-2 categories; `adverse mental states'; `physical/mental limitations'; `personal 
readiness'; and `physical environment'. 
The failure of senior officers in a supervisory position to provide guidance and 
operational doctrine to pilots contributed to many forms of psychological precursor which 
subsequently resulted in active, operational failures. These shortcomings largely impacted 
on the people in the system, though, rather than any aspect of the technology or physical 
environment. There have been several tragedies in the R. O. C. Air Force where personnel 
at the supervisory level have provided `inadequate supervision'. For example, a flight 
leader (number 1) when leading a junior pilot (number 2) crashed in a mountains area as a 
result of a failure to provide appropriate operational doctrine and professional training. 
The accident investigation found that the factors of poor crew resource management, in 
addition to the physical/mental limitations of the junior pilot, were contributory aspects. 
Junior pilots were not considered ready for such advanced training. 
2.4.5 `Preconditions for Unsafe Acts' Affecting Categories at Level-1 
`Unsafe Acts of Operators' 
Reason (1997) suggested that human behaviour is governed by the interplay between 
psychological and situational factors, and the range of human actions is always limited by 
the local circumstances. The pre-conditions for unsafe acts are closely related to the active 
failures of the operators. These factors show Reason's classic `many to one' mapping of 
psychological precursors to active failures in all of the level-1 categories, with the 
exception of `violations' which is only closely related to two higher level categories 
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(CRM and adverse mental states) suggesting that a completely different mechanism is at 
play here. 
The category of `crew resource management' (including demonstrating a lack of 
teamwork or appropriate assertiveness, a failure to conduct an adequate briefing, showing 
poor leadership or poor communication) was the key factor at level-2. It had significant 
associations with all categories at level-1. Furthermore, it provided a 21.5% (p<0.001) 
PRE with the category of `decision errors' and 19.5% (p<0.000) PRE with the category of 
`skill-base errors'. This strongly emphasizes why military aviation needs to put more 
efforts on CRM training. Some pilots in the R. O. C. Air Force were of the opinion that 
CRM was only of benefit in civil aviation, not for single-seater fighter pilots. However, 
poor CRM was not only significantly associated with poor flying skills but was also 
significantly associated with poor decision-making. For example, there have been several 
mid-air crashes where the accident investigation concluded that poor communication and 
teamwork among pilots and ATC reduced situational awareness. As a result, pilots made 
inappropriate decisions and committed operational skill-based errors resulting in these 
catastrophes. 
The category of `adverse mental states' (including loss situational awareness, stress, 
overconfidence, task saturation, distraction, and mental fatigue) also had significant 
associations with all categories at level-1, and could provide a 26.9% (p<0.000) PRE to 
the category of `decision errors' and 28.3% (p<0.000) PRE to the category of `skill-based 
errors'. Pilots in a poor mental condition were more likely to be associated with skill and 
decision-making errors. Moreover, the categories of `physical/mental limitation' and 
`personal readiness' both had significant associations with `decision errors' and `skill- 
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based errors' at level-1 (table 3). A pilot in a poor physical or mental condition is not 
well prepared for duty. This significantly affects their psychomotor skill performance and 
decision-making in the cockpit. This is the reason why military pilots are normally 
strictly required to undertake periodic physical checks and are prohibited from self- 
medication and also why pilots undergo frequent evaluation regarding operational theories 
(SOPs) and flight performance (psychomotor) skills on the simulator. 
Some aspects, however, are almost out of the control of even the higher levels of the 
organization. It is interesting to note that the level-2 category of the `technological 
environment' (which is essentially concerned with such factors as the quality of cockpit 
interfaces) is not at all influenced by the higher managerial levels. However, it has a 
significant association with several HFACS level-1 categories. This is probably a result 
of the higher levels in the ROC Air Force chain of command having little or no influence 
on the cockpit design of their aircraft. Indeed, it is often the case in the military that those 
responsible for the design and/or procurement of large pieces of equipment are in entirely 
different organizations to the operators of these systems. Those responsible for the 
technology environment are not actually in the same management hierarchy as the people 
using it. 
2.4.6 Reliability of HFACS 
From the Cohen's Kappa results, the HFACS framework was found to have an acceptable 
level of agreement between the raters coding the data. However, the indexes of reliability 
using Cohen's Kappa and percentage of agreement between raters were occasionally 
discrepant in some categories. For example, `organizational climate' had the lowest of 
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Kappa coefficient (0.440) but had the highest percentage agreement (96.4%). `Adverse 
physiological states' had second lowest coefficient of Kappa (0.441) but had a high 
percentage agreement (also 96.4%), and `failed to correct a known problem' had a low 
coefficient of Kappa (0.548) but also had a high percentage agreement (95.8%). The 
explanation for this is two fold. These HFACS categories had very low frequencies of 
only four, two and 12, respectively. These low frequencies are unreliable and can easily 
distort the Cohen's Kappa value in such instances, actually deflating its value where there 
is actually a very high level of agreement. Cohen's Kappa also becomes unreliable when 
the vast majority of observations fall into just one of the categories and there is also a high 
percentage of agreement between raters in this category. In this instance there is a high 
percentage agreement between the raters while simultaneously the value of Cohen's 
Kappa is low, as the latter is based upon expected probabilities based upon the marginal 
observed totals (Huddlestone, 2003). 
Certain categories of accident causal factors in the HFACS were found to have lower 
reliabilities than other categories. Harris (1995) noted that certain categories of causal 
factor in the post-hoc coding of incident data were less likely to be reliably categorized by 
two independent raters than were others. The categories least likely to show high levels 
of reliability were those that required a great deal of inference (on the part of the 
assessors) when coding the data, and which also dealt with more abstract concepts, such 
as inferring a lack of situational awareness. It is notable that from the data in table 2.5, 
that with the exception of `personal readiness', all categories at level-1 in the HFACS 
system show the poorest levels of inter-rater reliability. The pre-cursors of these actions 
(level-2) and causal factors at the level of `unsafe supervision' (level-3), however, showed 
much higher levels of inter judge reliability. 
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Wiegmann and Shappell (2001 a) found that HFACS framework as a whole had an inter- 
rater reliability figure, calculated using Cohen's Kappa, of 0.71, which indicated 
substantial agreement. This research found that coefficient Kappa generally indicated 
high reliability across the majority of individual categories in the framework when applied 
to R. O. C. Air Force accidents, but that the categories in level-1 were consistently the 
factors showing low inter-rater reliability. 
2.4.7 Factors Affecting Pilots' Decision-making 
The importance of aeronautical decision-making (ADM) has been recognized as critical to 
the safe operation of aircraft, as well as accident avoidance (Jensen & Hunter, 2002). 
Dekker (2001a) suggested that human errors are systemically connected to the tools, 
tasks, operational and organizational environment of operators. It is important to clarify 
the role of decision errors in pilot's tools, tasks, experience, and operating environment in 
military aviation in order to develop effective ADM training programs for military pilots. 
It was found that pilots with the rank of `cadet' (experience) flying `training aircraft' 
(tools) practicing `close pattern' (missions) during the `landing phase' (an aspect of the 
working environment) were most likely to be involved in an accident. `Decision-errors' 
also had a significant association with the landing phase in pilots with the rank of 
lieutenant. However, there are many factors at the upper levels of the HFACS framework 
that also indirectly affect pilots making decisions. It is important to understand that junior 
pilots are very vulnerable to the decisions and supervisory practices of senior management. 
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The category of `decision-errors' has a significant association with flight phase and rank. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the higher levels affect the next downward 
level in HFACS framework (figure 2.6). This means that decision errors may be affected 
by `preconditions for unsafe acts', `unsafe supervisory', or `organizational influences'. 
This is particularly true of the category of `unsafe supervision' at level-3 of the HFACS. 
This is one of the key factors, for it not only influences the `decision errors' of pilots, but 
it also has a significant association with the type of aircraft, mission, flight phase, and 
rank of pilots. To precisely identify ADM training needs, it is necessary to look further 
into the factors underlying decision errors. 
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2.5 Summary 
This investigation has demonstrated that the HFACS framework originally developed for 
analysis of US military aviation mishaps, can also be used to analyze accident data from 
the R. O. C. Air Force. The large sample of accident and incidents in the present study has 
allowed an extensive and statistically stable analysis of the inter-relationships between the 
categories and levels in the HFACS providing empirical evidence to support its theoretical 
structure. The HFACS framework has proved to be a useful tool for accident investigation 
and it has acceptable inter-rater reliability at the level of individual categories. 
There are statistically significant associations between causal factors at higher 
organizational levels, the psychological contributory factors and the errors committed by 
pilots using HFACS. However, some care needs to be taken when interpreting the 
statistical relationships presented within HFACS. In a few categories, the frequency 
counts are small. Furthermore, the frequency counts within categories were all derived 
from accidents. It is unknown (and unknowable) how often instances within the various 
HFACS categories have occurred in day-to-day operations that have not resulted in an 
accident. Thus, the relationships between HFACS levels and categories should not be 
interpreted outside the accident causal sequence. It should also be noted that only in those 
cases where a significant x2 test of association is accompanied by a significant value for 
lambda can it be assumed that the categories in the lower levels of the HFACS were 
dependent upon the higher-level categories, as is congruent with the underpinning theory. 
To improve aviation safety, the precise identification of human errors in accidents and the 
pinpointing of human factors problems to develop effective prevention strategies are 
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imperative. This study also begins to provide an understanding, based upon empirical 
evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher levels in the organization promulgate 
throughout the R. O. C. Air Force to result in operational errors and accidents. This has not 
previously been done with data analyzed using HFACS. There are clearly defined, 
statistically-described paths that relate errors at level-1 (the operational level) with 
inadequacies at both the immediately adjacent and more remote levels in the organization. 
`Decision errors' are associated with a very high percentage (42.6%) of aircrew-related 
accidents. These also have an intimate relationship with `crew resource management' 
(level-2), and subsequently with `inadequate supervision' (level-3) and `organizational 
climate' and `organizational process' (level-4) in this research. This research draws a 
clear picture that supports Reason's (1990) model of active failure and latent conditions in 
the organization (upon which the HFACS framework is based). Fallible decisions of 
upper-level command can directly affect the middle level of supervisory practices, 
creating `preconditions for unsafe acts' and the impaired performance of pilots, leading to 
accidents. The HFACS framework can provide both a theoretical and practical 
foundation for describing the multiple components that are required for effective accident 
investigation and help to identify the training needs to remedy these weaknesses and 
develop effective accident prevention strategies. 
Connolly, Blackwell & Lester (1989) suggested that pilot's decision-making skills could 
be significantly improved through the use of judgment training materials along with 
simulator practice. There is a need for military pilots to undergo decision-making training 
to improve aviation safety. However, if such a training program is to be maximally 
effective the most appropriate decision making strategy for each decision-making scenario 
has to be identified. There are a number of strategies (often embodied in mnemonics or 
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acronyms) developed by aviation researchers and used by pilots to guide and structure in- 
flight decision-making. The common aim of these techniques is to form a systematic 
approach to decision-making that should be less affected by the human nature and should 
also reduce the cognitive work for pilots (O'Hare, 2003). Therefore, there is a need for 
evaluating the suitability of these different ADM mnemonics in different decision-making 
scenarios for developing an effective training program for military pilots under time 
pressure and high stakes tactical environment. This is the objective of the following study. 
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CHAPTER III 
An Empirical Research for the Suitability of ADM Training 
Mnemonics in Tactical Environments 
3.1 Introduction 
From 1996 to 2000, the Republic of China (R. O. C. ) Air Force converted from the 
Lockheed F- 104 to a series of new generation fighters including General Dynamics F- 16, 
Mirage 2000-5 and the self-developed IDF. To help ensure the safety of flight operation, 
R. O. C. Air Force Headquarters investigates the pattern of mishaps annually. The results 
of accident investigations showed that errors of judgment and poor in-flight decision- 
making were commonly reported. Pilots' decision errors were involved in 42.6% of 
accidents between 1978 and 2002 (Li & Harris, 2005b; see study I). However it has also 
been observed that pilots continue to make poor decisions irrespective of their flying 
experience or knowledge (O'Hare, 1992). 
Decision making performance in the aviation domain is a joint function of the features of 
the tasks and the pilots' knowledge and experience relevant to those tasks. In 
addition to carrying out tactical missions and flying the aircraft, military pilots have to 
solve unexpected and ill-defined problems often, with only incomplete information 
available and while under time pressure (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Diehl (1991a) 
found that decision errors contributed to 56% of accidents in airlines and 53% of 
accidents in military aviation between 1987 and 1989. Shappell and Wiegmann (2004) 
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found that decision errors contributed to 45% of accidents in the USAF, and 55% in the 
US Navy. 
In recent years, the focus on human error in aviation accidents has shifted away from skill 
deficiencies and toward decision-making, attitudes, supervisory factors and organizational 
culture as the primary factors (Diehl, 1991b; Jensen, 1997; & Klein, 2000). As aircraft 
have become increasingly more reliable, human performance has played a proportionately 
increasing role in the causation of accidents. This has resulted in a proliferation of human 
error frameworks and accident investigation schemes (e. g. Diehl, 1989; Feggetter, 1991; 
Harle; 1995; Hollnagel, 1998; Hunter & Baker, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Orasanu and Connolly (1993) have suggested that much decision-making occurs in an 
organizational context, and that the organization influences decisions directly by 
stipulating standard operating procedures, and indirectly, through the organization's 
norms and culture. Maurino et al. (1995) suggested that it is important to understand how 
decisions made by people at the sharp-end (pilots) are influenced by the actions of the 
people at the blunt-end of their operating worlds, the higher managerial levels in their 
organizations. However, there is little empirical work formally describing the relationship 
between organizational structures, psychological pre-cursors of accidents and the actual 
errors committed by pilots. Decision-making is a complex cognitive process and is 
affected by situational and environmental conditions (Payne, Beaman, & Johnson, 1988). 
One of the factors that negatively influences pilot's decision-making is psychological 
stress. Keinan (1987) found that under stress the range of alternatives and dimensions 
that are considered during the decision-making process is significantly restricted 
compared with normal conditions. 
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3.1.1 Decision-making in Aviation Operations 
For over 25 years the importance of aeronautical decision-making has been recognized as 
critical to the safe operation of aircraft. Jensen & Benel (1977) reported that 51 % of fatal 
general aviation accidents from 1970 through 1974 were associated with decision errors. 
More recent studies (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2004) have also found decision errors to be a 
major factor in aviation accidents. Orasanu and Fisher (1997) investigated the five 
highest performance pilots and the five lowest performance pilots, and found a tendency 
for high performance pilots to use low workload situations to make plans and collect more 
relevant information when compared with the poorer performing pilots. High 
performance pilots also demonstrated greater situation awareness. The key issues of 
pilot's decision-making are time pressure and risk. However, Mjos (2001) suggested that 
in emergent situations, uncertainty might outweigh time pressure as the key stressor 
bearing on the decision-making strategy. 
Aviation environments are often complex and different factors such as problem patterns, 
aircraft types, missions, available time, or risk may influence pilots' in-flight decision- 
making. Aeronautical knowledge, skill, and judgment have always been regarded as the 
three basic faculties that pilots must possess (Diehl, 1991b). The requisite knowledge and 
skills have been imparted in academic and flight training programs and have subsequently 
been evaluated as part of the pilot certification process. In contrast, ADM has usually 
been considered to be a trait that good pilots innately possess or an ability that is acquired 
as a by-product of flying experience (Buch & Diehl, 1984). Means, Salas Crandall and 
Jacobs (1993) pointed out that when pilots are under stress the likelihood of making 
serious errors increases and they are more likely to ignore relevant information, make 
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more risky decisions and perform with less skill. However, Zakay (1993) found that 
practice without time pressure did not enhance decision making under time constraints, 
and suggested that if decision making is likely to be required under time pressure or other 
stressful conditions, practice should also include task performance under those conditions. 
Military pilots frequently make important decisions and these may have very serious 
consequences. Some decisions are made with ambiguous information, in hostile 
environments, and with very little time available. A critical component of pilot 
proficiency is the ability to make good decisions. Decision skills might be trainable 
(Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). The early concepts of pilot decision-making were based on 
models that reflected the level of thinking in cognitive psychology. These models remain 
the underlying premise of many contemporary decision training programs in aviation 
(Kaempf & Klein, 1994). The research paradigm of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) 
has provided an alternative approach for understanding how pilots make decisions and for 
designing training interventions that will help pilots when making decisions under 
uncertain, high pressure, high stakes, and in time-limited situations (Beach & Lipshitz, 
1993; Cohen, 1993; David, 1997; Drillings & Serfaty, 1997; Endsley, 1993; Jensen, 1997; 
Jensen, Guilke & Tigner, 1997; Jensen & Hunter, 2002; Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997; Klein, 
1993a; Klein & Woods, 1993; Orasanu & Salas, 1993; Stokes, Kemper & Kite, 1997). 
3.1.2 Classical Decision-making and Naturalistic Decision-making 
in Aviation Domain 
There are two contrasting paradigms for the study of decision-making. Classical decision 
theory has focused on normative models, frequently derived from economic theories 
relevant to a management context. Naturalistic decision-making research has investigated 
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the cognitive processes that underlie how individuals actually make decisions in real 
world situations and how they use their experience and training under demanding 
conditions (Orasanu, 1991; Zsambok, 1997). Classical decision-making (CDM) theory 
has focused on normative model. In general, normative models are well suited to teach 
novices rational decision strategies, in order to prepare them for development of 
professional know-how and skill. However, for proper design of tools to support expert 
decision making, understanding the nature of expert skill and decision strategies is 
necessary (Rasmussen, 1993). 
Klein (1988) observed that decision makers in difficult situations and under time stress 
did not appear to use the classical decision-making strategies to make decisions, even 
when they were trained in that approach. There are two major approaches within CDM, 
the `preference and choice' approach and `statistical inference' approach. However, the 
CDM paradigm was criticised as being a poor description of decision-making on the flight 
deck (Duggan & Harris, 2001). However, in contrast to naturalistic decision making, 
classical decision theories have not paid much attention to the role of expertise (Klein, 
1993). Despite the recognized need, the military has no formal programs to teach its 
pilots how to make decision. The shortfall of the accepted classical decision training 
practices is that they communicate relatively simple, prescript decision formulas based on 
classical approaches. These strategies address one type of decision and do not address 
issues concerning situation awareness (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) is the study of how people use their experience to 
make decisions in a field setting (Zsambok & Klein, 1997). The field of naturalistic 
decision making (NDM) has some of its roots in the military's need to better understand 
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the human dimensions of command and control. Naturalistic decision-making research 
has investigated the cognitive processes that underlie how individuals actually make 
decisions and how they use their experience and training under demanding conditions. 
Experience affects decision making by improving the ease and accuracy of situation 
assessment, by increasing the quality of the courses of action considered by the decision 
maker, and by enabling the decision maker to construct and use a mental simulation 
(Klien, 1993). O'Hare (1992) proposed that naturalistic decision-making does indeed 
follow rather different paths to classical decision-making. There is evidence that the 
pattern-recognition processes play a significant role in decision-making in naturalistic 
situation. In fact, considerable aeronautical training is devoted to establishing 
connections between patterns of cues and appropriate responses. When a significant 
threat to the likelihood of achieving a goal is perceived and no immediately applicable 
procedures exist, then a more deliberative mode of activity is required. Naturalistic 
decision-making is characterized by 'dynamic and continually changing conditions, real- 
time reactions to these changes, ill-defined tasks, time-pressure, significant consequences 
for mistakes' (Klein & Klinger, 1991). All these characteristics are also associated with 
ADM, so the results of naturalistic decision-making studies should generate useful 
insights into the process of ADM. 
3.1.3 Decision-making Theories in Aviation 
In an emergency decisions are often made under conditions of some uncertainty and 
emergency in the aviation domain. Sometimes, decisions that are made carefully and 
logically do not achieve the expected outcome as the aviation environment is a 
continually changing in the dynamic situation. Psychologists make distinctions between 
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models of decision-making that describe what it is that people do when they engage in a 
cognitive task and what people ought to do to be an effective decision maker (Galotti, 
2002). Some aspects of the field of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) have potential to 
help researchers understand better the human dimensions of decisions in the aviation 
environment. 
3.1.3.1 Recognition-primed Decisions 
Klein (1997) observed that a decision maker does not directly compare alternatives and 
stop generating alternative options when a satisfactory decision is found. The focus is on 
understanding the situation and judging its familiarity, not on the generation of options to 
find the solution. There are four important aspects of situation assessment in the decision- 
making process; plausible goals, relevant cues, expectancies, and identifying the typical 
actions to take. Klein (2000) found that a decision maker rarely considered multiple 
options but works sequentially from the most plausible option. If a strategy has been 
found as being unsuitable, the next most plausible option would be selected. Decision 
makers use their previous experience to frame the current situation. When a pilot finds a 
good match between the current situation and past experience, then the course of action 
will be generated according to their previous experience. 
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model (Figure 3.1) proposed by Klein (1993a) 
postulates that experienced decision makers generate fewer alternatives for action. The 
simplest decision-making is where the decision maker is confronted by a situation that is 
recognized and the obvious solution is implemented. A more complex case is where the 
decision maker performs some conscious evaluation of the solution, typically using 
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imagery to uncover problems prior to carrying it out. The most complex case is where the 
decision maker evaluates the situation and finds his solution requires modification, or the 
option is judged inadequate and rejected. 
C. COMPLEX RPD STRATEGY 
Experience the situation in a Chancing Context 
A. SIMPLE MATCH 
B. DEVELOPING A COURSE OF ACTION 
Experience the situation 
Recognition has four aspects 
F, xnerience the situation 

















Figure 3.1 Recognition-primed decision model 
I Yes 
Implement 
(From A Recognition-Primed Decision Model of Rapid Decision Making, Klein, 1993 a) 
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Modify *- Will it work? 
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3.1.3.2 Recognition/Meta-cognition Decision Making Model 
The Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) decision-making model proposed by Cohen, 
Freeman and Thompson (1995) explains how experienced decision makers are able to 
exploit their experience in a domain and at the same time handle uncertainty and novelty. 
They construct and manipulate concrete, visual models of the situation, not abstract 
aggregations. Uncertainty is represented explicitly at the metacognitive level, in terms of 
incompleteness, conflict, and unreliability. Critical thinking is not always appropriate. 
The decision maker usually acts immediately unless the risk of delay is acceptable, the 
cost of an error is high, or the situation is unfamiliar or problematic in some way. 
Inexperienced decision makers do not carefully assess how much time they have before 
they must commit themselves. More experienced decision makers spend more time on 
decision making by considering the particulars of the situation more fully. 
According to Cohen, Freeman & Thompson (1995), the integration of observations into 
situation models and plans often occurs under the influence of metacognitive control 
(Figure 3.2). Meta-recognitional processes include; (a) identification of evidence- 
conclusion within the evolving situation model and plan; (b) the process of critiquing 
identifies problems in the evidence-conclusion that support the situation model or plan; (c) 
the processes of correcting the response to these problems; and (d) a high-level process 
called the `quick test' which controls the critiquing and correcting process. To reflect the 
complementary roles of recognition and metacognition in decision-making, this 




Real world QUICK TEST 
(1) Do I have some time before I must commit to a decision? 
(2) Are stakes of an error high? 
(3) Is the situation unfamiliar, atypical? 




(a) Test for incompleteness in model or plan (Checklist, temp, SOP; 
mental simulation). 
(b) Discover conflicts (Mentally simulate expectations, compare 
with data or goals; get other' views; adopt different points of 
view). 
(c) Uncover unreliable assumptions (Imagine how each step of 
reasoning could be wrong). 
Revised situation 






(1) Collect more data. 
(2) Activate additional parts of LTM, --and/or- 
(3) Adjust assumptions, select an explanation. 
Figure 3.2 Recognition/Metacognition model of decision-making 
(From Training Metacognitive Skills for Decision-making, by Cohen, Jared, Freeman & Thompson, 1995) 
3.1.3.3 ARTFUL Decision Making 
The ARTFUL decision-making model (Figure 3.3) is consistent with the broad range of 
evidence on human performance proposed by O'Hare (1992). Once a goal is adopted, 
behavior directed toward that goal continues unless it is interrupted. The principal 
ongoing activity of the decision maker is to monitor the information presented by the 
system and to interpret the information as either normal or abnormal. The proposed 
ARTFUL model consists of a goal-directed process with five components which are 
situation awareness; risk assessment; planning; response selection; and response 
execution. Goal setting is at the apex of the model, with reciprocal connections to the 
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processes of situation awareness and planning (O'Hare, 2003). The acronym ARTFUL 
indicates these steps and its processes, including Awareness (as a result of monitoring); 
Risk (assessing the risks of current and alternative courses of action); Time (the critical 
factor in decision making in dynamic environments; and Further options (whether the 
decision maker can generate alternative options). In dynamic systems, positive checking 
is required to initiate changes in goals. Concentrating on diagnosis can result in failures 
of planning because there is a limited supply of attentional resources which are consumed 
by the activities involved in maintaining situational awareness. In difficult situations, 
novices will be required to invest more resources in detection and diagnosis and will 

















ARTFUL model of aeronautical decision-making 
From The ARTFUL Decision Maker: A Framework ModelforAeronautical Decision Making, O'Hare, 1992) 
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3.1.3.4 Conflict Theory Decision Making Model 
The conflict-theory model of Janis and Mann (1977) follows a logical progression. 
Inaction at any step will lead to defective coping if the danger materializes, whereas 
effective coping can only occur through vigilant action (Figure 3.4). The aim is to 
understand the true situation (situation awareness) in order to look for solutions at that 
critical point, and to prevent the decision-making process from deteriorating. Among the 
models presented, the conflict-theory model appears to offer practical guidance to pilots 
(Murray, 1997). Military pilots are task-oriented and are predisposed to undertake 
difficult flights, to meet schedules, and to complete a mission as planned. Pilots probably 
believe, intuitively, that most of their flying decisions are arrived at logically, with due 
care and consideration. 
Military pilots must be able to focus attention on the most important task at hand but also 
be able to shift the focus of their attention when priorities change, as they are constantly 
facing challenges to their attention in many forms, including time pressure, goal conflicts, 
and physical requirements. In Janis and Mann's formulation a good decision-making 
process (vigilant decision maker) is one in which the decision maker successfully 
accomplishes a series of tasks involving the collection of information about a wide range 
of alternatives; the careful assessment of the risks and benefits of each course of action; 
and the preparation of contingency plans for dealing with the known risks. If cues are 
detected and diagnosed as indicating some potential threat to the attainment of their active 
goal, then the key question becomes whether or not sufficient time is available to search 
for alternative options. 
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Start 
Authentic warning of 
impending danger 
Question 1 
Are the risks serious if I 
don't take protective action? 
Maybe or yes 
Question 2 
Are the risks serious if I do 
take the most available 
protective action? 
Maybe or yes 
Question 3 
Is it realistic to hope to find a 
better means of escape? 
Maybe or yes 
Question 4 
Is there sufficient time to 
search and deliberate? 













Defective coping if 
the danger 
materializes 
Effective coping if 
Vigilance the danger End 
materializes 
Figure 3.4 Conflict-theory decision-making model 
(From A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment, by Janis & Mann, 1977) 
3.1.3.5 Decision Process Model 
The decision process model (figure 3.5) draws on Klein's (1993a) RPD model and Wickens 
and Flach's (1988) information-processing model (Orasanu 
& Fischer, 1997). The model 
consists of two major components, situation assessment and choosing a course of action. 
Situation assessment requires the definition of the problem and assessment of risk level and 
available time to make the decision. Available time 
is the major factor for selecting 
subsequent strategies. If the situation confronted 
is not understood, diagnostic actions may be 
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taken, but only if there is enough time to do so. If risk is high and time is limited, action may 
be taken without a thorough understanding of the problem. 
Certain diagnostic actions serve a dual purpose. The actions could solve the problem as 
well as provide diagnostic information about the nature of the problem. Selecting a 
suitable course of action depends on the affordances of the situation. In order to deal 
appropriately with the situation, the decision maker must be aware of what response 
options are available and what constitutes an appropriate process, such as evaluating an 
option, choosing, scheduling, or inventing an action. 
CUES 
Situational Assessment 
Recognise and Interpret 
cues 
Time limited 








V IF IF 
Rule Multiple Multiple No options 
available ions tasks to do available 
available 
Apply Choose Schedule Create Gather 
rule option task solution more informa 
Figure 3.5 Decision process model 
From Finding Decisions in Natural Environments: The View from the Cockpit, by Orasanu & Fischer, 1997) 
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3.1.4 Situation Awareness and Decision-making 
Aviation psychologists working in the area of situation awareness have made a clear 
differentiation between situation awareness (SA) as a state of the individual, and situation 
assessment as the process by which the state of awareness is achieved (Sarter & Woods, 
1991). Endsley (1995c) developed a model of situation awareness based on an 
information-processing model. Endsley (1997) defines situation awareness as `the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the future'. This 
model suggests that situation assessment begins with goal specification and includes (1) 
perceiving the status, dynamics, and attributes of relevant elements; (2) understanding 
what is perceived; and (3) using that information to project the future states of the 
elements. A model of situation awareness and its importance in decision making has been 
proposed by Endsley (1997) and is presented in Figure 3.6. 
Kaempf & Orasanu (1997) suggested that many decisions made by flight crews are 
procedural and emphasized the importance of situation assessments. Endsley & Bolstad 
(1994) suggested that in novel situations, decision makers may be forced to use analytic 
processes that stress limited internal resources. With increasing experience, decision- 
makers may be able to draw upon mental models and schemata of prototypical situations 
to provide high levels of situation understanding and hence make good decisions without 
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Figure 3.6 Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision-making 
(From The Role of Situation Awareness in Naturalistic Decision Making, by Endsley, 1997) 
Beringer & Hancock (1989) suggested that operating advanced aircraft has made 
increasing demands on pilot's cognitive abilities as the complexity of systems has 
imposed an increasing information load. In aviation operations, the limited data 
collection, integration, and response capability of the pilot will be challenged. In the 
dynamic flight environment, effective decision-making is highly dependent on situation 
awareness. Endsley & Bolstad (1994) suggested that situation awareness and decision- 
making are indispensable for flight safety and are closely related. The most significant 
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aspect of decision-making is situation assessment. This is a precursor for situation 
awareness, which itself is the precursor for all tasks of decision-making (Lipshitz, 1993; 
Nobel, 1993). 
Lipshitz (1993) compared nine models of decision-making and found situation assessment 
to be a central element in all nine. He defined situation assessment as a sizing up and 
construction of a mental picture of the situation and reported that its contribution to 
decision making was necessary for (1) action selection or (2) the initiation of alternative 
evaluations. Typical appropriate actions are identified by the decision maker's 
experience, and accuracy of assessment is determined by comparing new information with 
expectation. Noble (1993) developed a decision model in which the role of situation 
assessment is centralized and conceptualized situation assessment as including (1) 
interpretation of the meaning of a situation, (2) inference about the underlying causes, (3) 
assessment of risks, and (4) identification of the actions required. 
By analyzing crewmembers' actions in realistic scenarios, Orasanu (1995) divided 
decision making into situation assessment and action choice, and described situation 
assessment as including diagnostic skills for causal reasoning, hypothesis generation and 
testing. Orasanu, Davison & Fischer (2001) pointed out that situation awareness is the 
starting point for pilot's decision making in abnormal and emergency situations, as the 
pilot cannot solve a problem unless (1) the pilot recognizes that they have a problem and 
(2) the pilot understands the nature of the problem. Situation awareness is most critical to 
pilots' decision-making when conditions are changing rapidly and demand frequent 
updating. 
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3.1.5 Risk Management and Decision-making 
For military pilots operating in a hostile environment, the normal hazards of aviation are 
compounded by the enemy's intent for the destruction of their aircraft. Jensen, Guilke & 
Tigner (1997) suggested that risk management should be a key part of the decision- 
making process. Orasanu, Davison & Fischer (2001) recommended that to manage 
threats, pilots must first assess the risks associated with them. Risk assessment feeds into 
decision making in two ways: during the assessment of the precipitating threats and in 
evaluating potential courses of action. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that a good 
decision-making process is one in which the decision maker successfully accomplishes a 
series of tasks involving the collection of information about a wide range of alternatives, 
the careful assessment of the risks and benefits of each course of action, and the 
preparation of contingency plans for dealing with known risks. Slovic (1987) observed 
that risk perception depends on the experience people have with a situation; their personal 
vulnerability; the level of control they have over a situation; and the time frame. 
Two factors combine to determine how significant a loss is: the probability of the loss and 
the magnitude of the loss (Yates & Stone, 1992). Thomas (2003) suggested that in a 
military organization involved in high-risk operations there is the explicit understanding 
that safe and efficient performance is dependent upon the effective training of personnel. 
Soeters & Boer (2000) indicated that the precise following of rules is a matter of life and 
death in military aviation. A large part of aviation training focuses on learning to follow 
procedures and regulations. Previous training, extensive regulations, and flight 
preparation for all aspects of a flight limit the risks as much as possible. Thomas (2004) 
also indicated that crews are faced with a variety of external threats and commit a range of 
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errors that have the potential to impact negatively on safety in normal flight operations. 
The effective management of these threats and errors therefore forms an essential element 
of minimizing risks. 
The situations in which pilots are required to make a decision are often complex. A 
number of factors may influence pilots' decision making, such as phase of flight, aircraft 
type, problem type, available time and the risks involved (Fischer, Orasanu, & Wich, 
1995). Orasanu (1995) presented a model of aviation decision making that emphasized 
the role of situation assessment. Deciding on a course of action is contingent upon an 
adequate understanding of the nature of the problem and of the response options afforded 
by the problem situation. Risk and time pressure are situational variables that further 
constrain the decision process. Factors that influence the degree of risk and time pressure 
may call on the pilot to make an immediate response whether or not the problem is fully 
understood. Minimal risk levels and time constraints, in contrast, permit additional 
diagnostic actions or the deliberation of options. 
O'Hare (1992) proposed that a good decision-making process is one in which the decision 
maker successfully accomplishes a series of tasks involving the collection of information 
about a wide range of alternatives, the careful assessment of the risks and benefits of each 
course of action, and results in the preparation of contingency plans for dealing with the 
known risks. When a significant threat to the likelihood of achieving a goal is perceived 
and no immediately applicable procedures exist, then a more deliberative mode of activity 
is required. The planning and situation awareness functions are linked by a risk 
assessment process that monitors the potential risks of the proposed plans. In the context 
of military aviation, this is already a risky environment but pilots play the role of risk 
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takers whose primary mission is to be accomplished while still minimizing the risk 
through their skill and decision-making (Jensen, Guilke, & Tigner, 1997). 
3.1.6 Time pressure and Decision-making 
Time pressure has several obvious but important implications for decision-making. 
Firstly, decision makers will often experience high levels of stress, with the potential for 
exhaustion and loss of vigilance; secondly, their thinking will shift, characteristically in 
the direction of using less complicated reasoning strategies (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1988). Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schurmann (1993) indicated that time stress may affect the 
process of decision making in a variety of ways depending on the type of decision. It may 
lead to reallocation of cognitive resources from the decision process to the stress coping 
process. Time stress may also change the goals of the decision-making process. Under 
time stress, cognitive resources may be allocated from the decision-making process to 
monitoring of the flow of time as part of a coping strategy (Zakay, 1993). Klein & 
Thordsen (1991) observed that decision makers in difficult situations and under time 
stress did not appear to use the classical approach to make decisions, even when they were 
trained in that approach. Much of the research on qualitative changes in cognitive 
performance, when stressors such as time pressure are present, is broadly consistent with 
the conflict theory of decision making proposed by Janis and Mann (1977). 
Benson and Beach (1996) found that time pressure made the screening phase of problem 
identification less systematic. Unsystematic identification and screening processes can 
also occur in decisions concerned with ill-defined problems. The quality of decision- 
making may suffer even more from time stress in this case. Keinan (1987) found that 
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under stress the range of alternatives and dimensions that are considered during a 
decision-making process is significantly restricted, compared with normal conditions. In 
brief, the effects of time stress on decision making are: (1) a reduction in information 
search and processing; (2) increased importance of negative information; (3) defensive 
reactions increase, such as neglect or denial of important information; (4) bolstering of the 
chosen alternative occurs; (5) forgetting important data happens; (6) poor judgments and 
evaluation are more likely; (7) there is a tendency to use a strategy of information 
filtration. Information that is perceived as being the most important is processed firstly, and 
then processing is continued until time is up. 
Edland & Svenson (1993) found that under time pressure the following changes were 
observed in the decision-making processes: (1) an increased selectivity of input of 
information; (2) attributes perceived to be more important were given more weight under 
time pressure than in situations with no time pressure; (3) the accuracy of human 
judgment decreases; (4) the use of non-compensatory decision rules becomes more 
frequent than compensatory rules requiring value tradeoffs; (5) there is a decrease in the 
ability to find alternative problem-solving strategies; (6) motivation is attenuated. 
Kaempf & Orasanu (1997) suggested that under conditions of time pressure, decision 
makers need help to determine what is occurring in the environment around them. 
Therefore, decision aids and training should provide decision makers with the tools and 
skills necessary to accurately and quickly make situation assessments. Payne, Bettman, 
and Johnson (1988) found that, under time pressure, a number of heuristic choice 
strategies are more useful than attempts to apply a truncated normative model. Subjects 
adapt their decision-making strategies in reasonable ways when placed under time 
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constraints. Under time pressure, the likelihood of making serious errors increases. 
Decision makers tend to ignore relevant information, make risky decisions and perform 
with less skill (Foushee, 1984; Keinan, 1987). An implication of the fact that many 
decisions must be made under stress is that training should include extensive practice to 
learn key behaviours (Driskell & Salas, 1991). However, Zakay & Wooler (1984) found 
that practice without time pressure did not enhance decision-making under time 
constraints. This suggests that, if decision-making is likely to be required under time 
pressure or other stressful conditions, practice should include task performance under 
those conditions. 
3.1.7 Experience and Decision-making 
In most aviation situations, a pilot's ability to process information is facilitated by inter- 
correlation among cues. Expert pilots exploit this inter-correlation in their cue search and 
may perceive sets of correlated cues as a single perceptual chunk (Mosier, Skitka, Heers, 
& Burdick, 1998). They frequently use feature matching and pattern matching as 
diagnostic strategies. Pilots know and look for patterns or combinations of cues that are 
most relevant for diagnosing particular situations and they are able to incorporate 
contextual information to formulate a workable action plan based on their assessment of 
these cues (Kaempf & Klein, 1994). Kaempf & Orasanu (1997) illustrated that 
experienced aviators employ checklists and procedures differently compared to less 
experienced aviators. Those with less experience often relied only on checklists. 
However, experienced aviators considered a broader range of cues and learn when these 
cues are relevant. This enables them to employ checklists and procedures as guidelines 
rather than as absolute prescriptions of courses of action. 
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Camerer & Johnson (1997) found that experts are successful at generating hypotheses and 
inducing complex decision rules. Cohen, Freemen & Thompson (1997) suggested that the 
Recognition/Metacognition (RIM) decision making model explains how experienced 
decision makers are able to exploit their experience in a domain and at the same time 
handle uncertainty and novelty. The decision maker usually acts immediately unless the 
risk of delay is acceptable, the cost of an error is high, or the situation is unfamiliar. The 
inexperienced decision maker, however, often does not carefully assess how much time they 
have before they must commit themselves. More experienced decision makers buy more time 
for making a decision by considering the particulars of the situation. 
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model suggested that if there is enough time the 
decision maker will evaluate the dominant response option by imagining it, conducting a 
mental simulation to see if it will work. If it works, it will be implemented. If the 
solution runs into problems, it will be modified. If it can't be fixed, then it will be 
rejected, and another likely option will be considered. If there is not adequate time, the 
decision maker will implement the course of action that experience suggests as the most 
likely to be successful (Klein, 1993b). The degree of expertise a given pilot brings to the 
flight deck has a direct impact on the decision-making process. Domain experts organize 
information differently than novices, i. e., in 'chunks' rather than as individual items 
(Chase & Simon, 1973). They also may use different strategies for solving problems and 
making decisions, especially when under time constraints. Under time pressure, experts 
can make critical decisions by an intuitive, recognition process where a novice would 
need to use more analytic strategies (Klein, 1993a). 
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3.1.8 Aeronautical Decision-making Training Mnemonics 
O'Hare (2003) described a number of acronyms/mnemonics to guide and structure 
decision-making. The aim of these techniques is to form a systematic approach to 
decision-making that should be less affected by human biases and should also reduce the 
cognitive workload for pilots. There is an increased need for military pilots to be trained 
specifically in making decisions in different tactical environments to improve aviation 
safety. Aviation psychologists studying aeronautical decision-making have suggested that 
ADM can be improved with training (Endsley, 1997; Jensen, 1997; Jensen & Hunter, 
2002; Klein, 1997; Prince & Salas, 1993). Buch and Diehl (1984) found that judgment 
training produced significantly better decisions among civil aviation pilots. Connolly, 
Blackwell & Lester (1989) advised that pilot's decision-making skills could be 
significantly improved by the use of judgment training materials coupled with simulator 
practice. However, Orasanu (1993) has pointed out that there was no evidence to support 
the development of generic training techniques to improve all-purpose decision making 
skills, as there were different component skills involved in making the different basic 
types of decisions. The six basic types of decision are: 
(1) Go/no go decisions: since these decisions usually must be made under severe time 
pressure and involve considerable risk, the amount of thinking should be minimal. 
Training design should focus on developing perceptual patterns in memory that 
constitute the conditions for an action. They should be trained under realistic time 
pressure and should include cases that have additional contingencies that require more 
complex risk assessment. 
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(2) Recognition-primed decisions: as with go/no go decisions, pilots must be trained to 
recognize situational patterns that serve as input to condition-action rules. But in a 
recognition-primed decision scenario, pilots must also learn the response side of the 
rule and its link to the condition. 
(3) Response selection decisions: when a single option must be selected from a set, pilots 
must recognize multiple options and evaluate them in terms of how well they satisfy 
the goals and meet constraints. Often they must consider trade-offs among competing 
goals which are satisfied by different options. 
(4) Resource management decisions: the relative priorities of various tasks, especially 
critical ones, must be part of the basic knowledge of all crewmembers. Skills that 
enter into this type of decision include estimation of the time required to complete 
various tasks, knowledge of interdependencies among tasks, and scheduling 
strategies. 
(5) Non-diagnostic procedural decisions: This is the least clearly defined type of decision. 
It involves a cue pattern that falls into a category with no prescribed response. The 
nature of the problem is unclear. Many different types of ambiguous cues may signal 
dangerous conditions. Training for these cases would involve mainly situation 
assessment and risk assessment. Cues that signal possible emergencies need to be 
distinguished from those that are troublesome but not severe enough to precipitate an 
emergency landing. 
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(6) Creative problem-solving: these tasks are the most complex, because they involve 
both diagnosis to determine the nature of the situation and response generation. Once 
the nature of the problem has been determined, it may be found that there are no 
recommendations in the manuals. Pilots must determine what their goals are, develop 
a plan and candidate strategies, and evaluate these strategies and planned actions 
based on projections of outcomes (Orasanu, 1993). 
Orasanu also suggested that decision-making ranged from simple to complex and their 
demands varied from little cognitive work to considerable mental effort. However, no 
guidance was provided for identifying the best training intervention for improving pilots' 
in-flight decision-making in different tactical environments. There is a need to investigate 
different types of decision-making training for improving the overall quality of pilots' 
decision-making. 
3.1.8.1 SHOR Mnemonic 
The SHOR mnemonic (Wohl, 1981) consists of four steps: Stimuli (data); Hypotheses 
(perception alternatives); Options (response alternatives); and Response (action). It was 
originally developed for use by U. S. Air Force tactical command and control, where 
decisions were required under high pressure and severe time constraints. The increasing 
information load in tactical aviation required an appropriate and effective decision aid for 
helping military pilots to make timely in-flight decisions (Figure 3.7). 
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Action or Communication 
Figure 3.7 Dynamics of tactical decision process - the SHOR model 
(From Force Management Decision Requirements for Air Force Tactical Command and Control, by Wohl, 1981) 
The SHOR mnemonic is basically an extension of the stimulus- response (S-R) paradigm 
of classical behaviourist psychology extended to provide explicitly for the requirement to 
deal with two realms of uncertainty in the decision-making process: (1) information input 
uncertainty, which creates the need for hypothesis generation and evaluation; and (2) 
consequence-of-action uncertainty, which creates the need for option generation and 
evaluation. 
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3.1.8.2 PASS Mnemonic 
PASS was originally developed by a civil airline (Delta) to train pilots as part of a CRM 
training program. Airline pilots are often required to make fast and safe decisions in a 
limited time period, usually in an information rich environment. PASS provides a 
heuristic approach to help pilots make in-flight decisions (Maher, 1989). The PASS 
mnemonic is based on Janis & Mann's decision-making model (1977). PASS consists of 
four steps: Problem identification (define/redefine problems); Acquire information (seek 
more information); Survey strategy (survey/resurvey strategies); Select strategy (Maher, 
1989). After the selection of a solution strategy, if the problem is not solved, then the 
pilot should re-enter the problem solving loop (Figure 3.8). 
Problem Acquire Survey 
Identification Information Strategy 
Redefine Seek More Resurvey 





Figure 3.8 Decision heuristics - the PASS model 
(From Beyond CRM to Decisional Heuristics: An Airline Generated Model to Examine Accidents 
and Incidents Caused by Crew Errors in Deciding, by Maher, 1989) 
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3.1.8.3 SOAR Mnemonic 
The SOAR mnemonic decision making method (Oldaker, 1996) comprises of four steps, 
Situation, Options, Act, Repeat. It has the strength of repeating the evaluation of a 
changing situation after the initial actions have been made. In aviation, a decision is often 
merely the pre-cursor to another decision or series of complex decisions to achieve 
mission success. The mnemonic was originally developed for glider pilots and applied to 
gliding. 
The first step in SOAR is `situation'. This is the important part of seeing the situation 
from the perspective of where and what the aircraft is doing. There are three factors, 
pilot, environment and aircraft, all of which must be considered. The second step is 
'options'. Pilots use their experience to predict what will happen for the option they 
might choose. Each prediction must include an estimate of the benefit of choosing that 
option. The third step is `acting'. After pilots have chosen the option that provides the 
greatest benefit, it is important to act appropriately. This immediately leads to a new 
situation, and so the fourth step is `repeating the process'. The pilot needs to compare the 
results of his decision to his predictions for the chosen option. This builds up his 
experience to make more accurate future predictions (Oldaker, 1996). An example of 
applying SOAR mnemonic in a broken tow-rope emergency in a glider is shown in Figure 
3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 Decision-making training for glider pilots - the SOAR model 
(From Pilot Decision-making - An Alternative to Judgement Training, by Oldaker, 1996) 
3.1.8.4 FOR-DEC Mnemonic 
Prescriptive models for ADM are defined as `quick and easy' heuristic methods to 
structure the process of decision-making (O'Hare, 1992). There are a series of steps 
which must be followed to improve the quality of pilots' decision-making. The FOR- 
DEC mnemonic is a prescriptive model to aid decision-making developed from the 
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contents of a Lufthansa CRM-course. It comprises of six steps: Facts, Options, Risks & 
Benefits, Decision, Execution, Check (Hormann, 1995). It incorporates an analysis of 
risk and benefits to handle situations, including the effects of time pressure, continually 
changing conditions, distraction, and having incomplete information. The advantage of 
such a simple prescriptive model is that it can easily be remembered to help pilots to 
structure the decision-making processes in the cockpit. FOR-DEC covers primarily three 
broad subjects: communication, teamwork and decision-making. It is designed to 
counteract certain cognitive mechanisms that can adversely affect the quality of pilots' in- 
flight decision-making. 
Each step of the FOR-DEC process is connected to a guiding question which should help 
to focus the pilot's attention on a sequence of essential steps for effective decision- 
making. The phases of the FOR-DEC model, as shown in figure 3.10, are: (1) Facts: 
What is actually going on here? (2) Options: What are the choices we've got? (3) Risk & 
Benefits: What is there to be said for and against the application of the different options? 
(4) Decision: So, what shall we do after all? (5) Execution: Who shall do what, when, and 









Figure 3.10 FOR-DEC model of aeronautical decision-making 
(From FOR-DEC: A Prescriptive Model for Aeronautical Decision-making, by Hormann, 1995) 
3.1.8.5 DESIDE Mnemonic 
The DESIDE mnemonic method (Murray, 1997) was developed on a sample of South 
African pilots. It comprises of six steps, Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, 
Do, Evaluate (figure 3.11). The DESIDE method is a practical application adapted from 
conflict-theory model of Janis and Mann (1977). The reasons for modifying DECIDE to 
DESIDE (an incorrect spelling of the word `decide') was to make the mnemonic 
somewhat more memorable, and `S', `set safe objectives', is a clear reminder to pilots that 
objectives need to be carefully considered, not only in terms of the originally desired 
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outcomes, but also by taking into account the newly changed, unanticipated circumstances 
(Murray, 1997). 
Letter and Description 
Questions 
D Detect change 
Question 1 Are the risks serious if I take no action? 
E Estimate the significance 
Question 2 Are the risks serious if I select only the most available 
alternative or protective action? 
S Set safe objectives (beware hazardous attitudes) 
Question 3 Is it realistic to hope to find a better solution? 
I Identify options 
Question 4 Is there sufficient time to make a careful search for and 
evaluation of information and advice? 
D Do best option 
E Evaluate, and the DESIDE model continues if there is a 
further change, or if the optimized decision is not in fact 
producing the desired outcome. 
Figure 3.11 An integration of the adapted conflict theory and the DESIDE model 
(From Deliberate Decision-making by Aircraft Pilots: A Simple Reminder to Avoid Decision- 
making Under Panic, by Murray, 1997) 
3.1.9 Similarities and Differences between the ADM Mnemonics 
There are a number of strategies embodied in the mnemonics describing the processes and 
procedures concerned with ADM. The five ADM mnemonic-based methods that could 
potentially improve pilots' in-flight decision-making that were selected as followings (Li 
& Harris, 2005): 
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" SHOR: Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, Response (Wohl, 1981). 
" PASS: Problem identification, Acquire information, Survey strategy, Select 
strategy (Maher, 1989). 
" SOAR: Situation, Options, Act, Repeat (Oldaker, 1996). 
" FOR-DEC: Facts, Options, Risks & Benefits, Decision, Execution, Check 
(Hormann, 1995). 
9 DESIDE: Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate (Murray, 1997). 
A similarity of these five mnemonic-based methods is that they all start from situation 
assessment for gaining situation awareness, including fast changing abnormal situations in 
a dynamic environment. All of these five ADM mnemonic-based methods follow a 
logical structure to form the safest strategy. These mnemonics have been developed in 
recent years by researchers and used by pilots to support ADM `best practice'. They 
share some common characteristics but have certain differences. For example, (1) SHOR 
and PASS are focused on making quick actions (such as Response in SHOR and Select 
Strategies in PASS). The other three mnemonics are more comprehensive for considering 
a changing situation resulting from the pilots original actions (such as Repeat in SOAR; 
Check in FOR-DEC; and Evaluate in DESIDE). (2) SHOR, PASS and SOAR have only 
four steps for decision-making, however, FOR-DEC and DESIDE have six steps. (3) 
SHOR was originally developed for use in the Air Force Tactical Command and Control 
situations; SOAR had been used for training glider pilots; PASS, FOR-DEC and DESIDE 
been developed for using in Civil Airlines, as parts of CRM training. (4) SHOR was an 
extension of the stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm of classical behaviourist psychology 
(Wohl, 1981); PASS is a description of reality and simplified for classroom use based on 
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Janis and Mann's model (1977); SOAR was derived from adaptive management 
techniques which was used in making business decisions; FOR-DEC promoted teamwork 
and communication between crew members for tasks that can be shared by crew 
members; the DESIDE model is also based on conflict-theory model (Janis & Mann, 
1977). 
3.1.10 Research Purposes 
There was actually no evidence to support these ADM mnemonics had improved the 
quality of pilots' decision-making, although these mnemonic methods have been 
developed for many years. The purposes of the second study are to evaluate the best ADM 
training mnemonics in six different decision-making situations, and to elicit any 
differences between experienced and inexperienced pilots with regard to their judgments 
about the suitability of the five various ADM mnemonics for use in the six different 
decision-making scenarios, as described by Orasanu (1993). The ADM mnemonics 




3.2.1 ADM Training Mnemonics 
Five ADM mnemonic methods that could potentially form the basis of the ADM training 
program were selected from a review of the literature by a research team comprising of 
three instructor pilots and one aviation psychologist. These were SHOR (Wohl, 1981); 
PASS (Maher, 1989); SOAR (Oldaker, 1996); FOR-DEC (Hormann, 1995); and DESIDE 
(Murray, 1997). These mnemonics were described briefly in the previous section. 
3.2.2 Participants 
There were 107 participants, including 60 instructor pilots and 47 cadet pilots. Instructor 
pilots had between 1,175 and 10,000 hours flying experience, the average being 3,788 
hours in the R. O. C. Air Force Academy. Cadet pilots had between 204 and 800 hours 
flying experience, with an average of 281 hours. None of the participants had any 
previous experience in employing these five structured decision-making training 
mnemonics. 
3.2.3 Selection of Scenarios and Development of Rating Materials 
Six scenarios taken from the R. O. C. Air Force accidents and incidents database 
corresponding to the six types of decisions proposed by Orasanu (1993) were used as 
stimulus material in the evaluation of the suitability of the ADM mnemonic methods for 
forming the basis of training. 
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To develop a rating instrument for the subsequent evaluation of the suitability of the 
ADM mnemonic-based methods, six focus groups were formed, one for each scenario. 
Each comprised one human factors specialist and three senior instructor pilots. The 
purpose of these groups was to verify that the scenario selected from the database of 
R. O. C. air force accidents and incidents corresponded to the appropriate type of decision 
making scenario (see Orasanu, 1993). These focus groups also ensured enough detail was 
available in the scenario description to enable a thorough evaluation of the suitability of 
the mnemonic methods. The six selected scenarios were analyzed by the focus group 
members using all five mnemonic methods. This process provided the material for the 
construction of a rating form to evaluate the suitability of the ADM mnemonics for 
decision-making training. 
The rating form (see Appendix 8.1) developed required participants to evaluate each 
mnemonic on four dimensions, each using a nine-point Likert-type scale (with a high 
score of 9 and a low score of 1), in terms of its suitability for situation assessment 
(Endsley, 1995 & 1997; Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997; Sarter Woods, 1991); risk 
management (Jensen, Guilke & Tigner, 1997; Orasanu, Davison & Fischer, 2001; Slovic, 
1987; Thomas, 2003 & 2004); response time (Benson &Beach, 1996; Klein & Thordsen, 
1991; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schurmann, 1993; Zakay, 
1993); and applicability (Kaempf & Klein, 1994; Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997; Klein, 1993; 
Mosier, Skitka, Heers & Burdick, 1998). Further space was allowed for respondents to 
add qualitative comments justifying their reasons for the ratings awarded. 
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It was decided to use rating scales rather than a ranking procdure for several reasons. 
Likert-scale type data, similar to the data obtained from the rating scales used, are best 
described as `scalar' data, a higher order of data than ordinal (ranking) data but not as 
high as interval. All statistical procedures based upon the General Linear Model are 
extremely robust from even quite major deviations from normality in either the dependent 
or independent variable. The application of order methods is now often not recommended 
in circumstances such as those encountered in this research. When applying order 
methods with a moderately large sample size (in excess of 20-30) in a study using Likert- 
scale data, there can be a great many instances of tied ranks within the data set which 
effectively eliminates these data from the analysis leaving the final result dependent upon 
very few observations in the overall sample, hence the relatively poor statistical power of 
non-parametric order-based methods (Hays, 1981). It can easily be demonstrated that 
once a sample size exceeds about 30, all non-parametric statistical distributions tend 
toward normality. Thus, there is little merit in applying non-parametric techniques with a 
sample size of 41. Furthermore, collection of higher-ordr raing-type data allows 
subsequent reduction of data to rank data, but not vice versa. As a result, it was thought 
that the collection of data using rating scales allowed greater flexibility in analysis and 
also more ppowerful analytical techniques to be applied. 
3.2.3.1 Go/no go Decision Scenario 
Scenario 1: F-5E No. 2 wingman has to make a decision as the No. 1 (Leader) abandons 
a tactical formation take-off at 145 knots. 
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3.2.3.2 Recognition-primed Decision Scenario 
Scenario 2: F-5E right engine fails as a result of Foreign Object Damage (FOD) just as 
the nose gear leaves the ground at a speed 165 knots. 
3.2.3.3 Response Selection Decision Scenario 
Scenario 3: No. 4 in a tactical formation of F-5Es is required to make a decision when 
No. 1 (Leader) becomes lost in cloud during formation flight (3 feet distance between 
wing tips of the four fighters). 
3.2.3.4 Resource Management Decision Scenario 
Scenario 4: F-5E leader (No. 1) of 4 aircraft needs to make a decision for the No. 3 and 
No. 4 aircraft when a `no joy' call (no visual contact with No. 1 and No. 2) is made and 
No. 2 calls `one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 o 'clock with same altitude'. This 
occurs during practice of a2 versus 2 engagement (Air Combat Manoeuvre). 
3.2.3.5 Non-diagnostic Procedural Decision Scenario 
Scenario 5: Both the leader and wingman in a formation of F-5Es are unable to land at 
home-base in a 'bingo' (low fuel) situation during instrument flight in bad weather. 
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3.2.3.6 Creative Problem-solving Scenario 
Scenario 6: When flying an F-5F both left and right generators fail at the same time 
during a tactical manoeuvre. 
3.2.4 Administration of Rating Forms 
As a result of the length of the scenarios and the number of ratings required each 
participant only evaluated the ADM decision techniques in three scenarios selected 
randomly from a total of six. To eliminate order effects, the five ADM mnemonic-based 
methods were presented in a randomized order within each scenario. The ADM rating 
forms were distributed to Cadet Pilots and Instructors in the Training Division, R. O. C. Air 
Force Academy. Completed instruments were returned to the researcher the following 
day. For each participant an overall score for each mnemonic method in each scenario 
was created by summing the scores across situation assessment; risk management; 
response time; and applicability giving a potential range of scales between 4 (low 
suitability) to 36 (high suitability). 
3.2.5 Ethics 
This research program was approved by the Ethics committee of Cranfield University. 
This committee operates to the principles prescribed by the British Psychological Society 
(the UK professional body for psychologists). Participants were informed of the purpose 
of the study prior to participating. The data were collected anonymously. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Sample Characteristics 
In total, data were collected from 319 scenarios. There were 51 (29 Instructors, 22 
Cadets) completed rating forms for the go/no go decisions scenario; 57 (35 Instructors, 22 
Cadets) for the recognition-primed decision-making scenario; 58 (32 Instructors, 26 
Cadets) for the response selection decision-making scenario; 44 (22 Instructors, 22 
Cadets) for the resource management scenario; 57 (32 Instructors, 25 Cadets) for the non- 
diagnostic procedural decisions-making scenario, and 52 (30 Instructors, 22 Cadets) 
completed rating forms for the creative problem-solving scenario. 
3.3.2 Go/no go Decisions 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics in the go/no go decision- 
making scenario by instructors was received by PASS followed by SHOR, DESIDE, 
FOR-DEC, and SOAR; the highest overall rating by cadets, in order, was SHOR, SOAR, 
FOR-DEC, PASS, and DESIDE (see Table 3.1). There was no significant difference in 
the summated suitability scores between Instructors and Cadet Pilots when assessing the 
decision making mnemonics in the go/no go decision-making scenario, F (1,49)=1.176; 
p=0.283. There were also no significant differences in the ratings of suitability among the 
five ADM mnemonics, F (4,196) =0.735; p=0.569. However, the qualitative data suggest 
that PASS was regarded by the instructors as providing a method for a quick decision- 
making response in urgent situations with a logical order for promoting safety. PASS also 
matched the instructors' own training guidelines for this scenario as it had clear and 
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specific procedures to follow. FOR-DEC and DESIDE were regarded as being 
comprehensive but did not fit this scenario as time was very limited. SHOR enabled a 
quick response to be made in urgent situations and was simple to practice. SOAR was 
regarded as being easy to understand, however, it was also thought to need frequent 
practice on the ground to be familiar with the process. 
Table 3.1 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the suitability of 
each ADM mnemonic method for scenario 1: Go/no go decisions 
ADM mnemonic method N $ 
SHOR Instructors 29 6.62 631 6.07 621 2521 5.70 
Cadets 22 655 650 7.00 6.82 26.86 5.78 
PASS Instructors 29 655 638 5.97 638 2528 5.84 
Cady 22 632 655 627 6.68 25.82 4.61 
FOR DEC Instructors 29 624 624 6.10 5.90 24.48 456 
Cadets 22 6.73 636 636 6.41 25.86 5.06 
SOAR Instructors 29 5.97 6.00 5.76 5.83 23.56 6.60 
Cady 22 636 6.45 655 659 25.95 3.86 
DESIDE Instructors 29 6.48 652 5.90 621 25.11 5.44 
Cady 22 655 650 5.68 623 24.95 4.10 
3.3.3 Recognition-primed Decisions 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by instructors was 
received by SHOR followed by SOAR, PASS, DESIDE, and FOR-DEC. The highest 
overall rating by cadets, in order, was SOAR, PASS, SHOR, FOR-DEC, and DESIDE 
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(see Table 3.2). There was no significant difference in the summated suitability scores 
between Instructor and Cadet Pilots when assessing the decision making mnemonics in 
the recognition-primed decision-making scenario, F (1,55)=0.585; p=0.448. However, 
there were significant differences among the rated overall suitability of the five ADM 
mnemonics in this scenario, F(4,220)=3.188; p=0.014. Further comparisons using post- 
hoc t-tests showed significant differences between SHOR (mean=26.42) vs. FOR-DEC 
(mean=24.07); t=2.77, df=56, p=. 007, and SHOR (mean=26.42) vs DESIDE 
(mean=24.14); t =2.83, df=56, p= . 006. Table 3.3 contains the qualitative data with the 
opinions of both Instructor and Cadet Pilots about these ADM mnemonics within this 
scenario. 
Table 3.2 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the suitability 
of each ADM mnemonic method for Scenario 2: Recognition-primed decisions 
ý E ý o ea 
0 
o 
ADM training acronyms N E 
o A 
vý cc äE x 
a > 
C vý 
SHOR Instructors 35 6.71 6.63 6.83 6.46 26.63 5.01 
Cadets 22 6.59 6.36 6.55 6.59 26.09 3.11 
PASS Instructors 35 6.23 6.37 6.26 6.23 25.09 5.69 
Cadets 22 6.32 6.32 6.95 6.82 26.41 4.93 
FOR- Instructors 35 6.54 6.20 5.37 5.51 23.62 6.09 
DEC Cadets 22 6.59 6.41 5.64 6.14 24.77 6.01 
SOAR Instructors 35 6.34 6.29 6.57 6.00 25.20 6.86 
Cadets 22 6.64 6.68 6.95 6.77 27.05 4.94 
DESIDE Instructors 35 6.31 6.46 5.46 5,71 23.94 6.63 
Cadets 22 6.32 6.09 5.77 6.27 24.45 4.81 
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Table 3.3 Opinions of Instructor and Cadet pilots with regard to the suitability of the five ADM 





















Simple and thorough to help reach a quick 
decision 
Effective with specific actions specified 
for completion in a very short time 
SHOR has logical responses matches the 
flight simulator training scenario with 
which, cadets are familiar and practice 
several times 
Assesses the situation precisely and has 
encourages safe actions 
Quickly analyzes the problem and 
evaluates the options for safe actions 
Matches the principles of military aviation 
Fits with the time limited situations for 
immediate action 
Provides easy guidance for judging and 
executing procedures in emergent 
situations 
Identifies problems and helps select the 
best options quickly 
Considers the risks and benefits for 
making decisions but does not fit this 
emergent situation, it need be done by 
automatic response and quickly 
Considers the details when checking items 
for safety, however, time is limited 
Good for situation assessment and risk 
management, but you need to have time to 
do so 
Efficient and safe 
Catches the highest priority action for 
safety and is able to respond to urgent 
situation 
Easy to apply and to reach a safe decision 
quickly 
Too many steps, requires more 
consideration, more time consuming and 
more dangerous 
Logic is comprehensive but it does take 
much time 
The analysis is specific and reasonable, 








Encourages thinking about the effect of 
the hypotheses for a follow-up action 
You need to respond quickly when 
evaluating options during take-off, abort 
take-off, or parachuting, SHOR fits these 
requirements 
Provides a quick resolution 
Makes you aware of the current position 
and helps choose the best option for action 
Evaluate the situation by stimuli and 
hypotheses is good for reducing risk 
1. The simplest strategy to eliminate risk 
2. Quick and with specific decision points 
for urgent situations 
3. Helps reach the appropriate decision 
quickly 
4. Low altitude and low airspeed needs a 
quick response 
1. Has a loop from options to check and to 
risks and benefits, however, it takes time 
2. Is able to consider the whole situation 
before making decisions, but an engine 
failure is a time-limited situation, so needs 
quick action 
1. Provides quick analysis of the problems 
for effective action, then repeats the 
evaluation process for follow-up 
2. Highly applicable 
1. Good for risk management, but the detail 
in the acronym is a bit complicated 
2. Response to risk is effective but does not 
fit critical time-limited situations 
3. FOR-DEC and DESIDE do not fit urgent 
situations but both are good for training 
scenarios with more time to practice 
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The comments in table 3.3 suggest that the reasons for the superior ratings received by 
SHOR, PASS and SOAR in this situation were because these mnemonic-based decision 
making methods were fastest to undertake. FOR-DEC and DESIDE were regarded as 
comprehensive but too slow to apply in a time-limited emergency situation. Instructors' 
comments showed that SHOR was thought to be simple and thorough but comprehensive 
enough to reach a safe decision in a short time. It was also in accordance with the 
principles taught during flight simulator training. SHOR was regarded as being able to 
help the precise assessment of a situation and it contained a logical order for dealing with 
an emergent situations. Cadets' opinions suggested that SOAR and PASS also fitted the 
requirements of an emergent and time limited situation but needed more practice on the 
simulator. Making urgent, time-pressured decisions in the air benefits from practicing 
decision-making on the ground, as normally decisions need to be made in one or two 
seconds. FOR-DEC had a good logical order of operations however it required too much 
time to assess the situation. DESIDE was rated as being good for risk management but 
was also thought to take too much time to analyze the situations. 
3.3.4 Response Selection Decisions 
In this scenario, the highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by 
instructors was received by DESIDE followed by PASS, SOAR, SHOR, and FOR-DEC. 
The highest overall rating by cadets in order was DESIDE, FOR-DEC, SOAR, and SHOR 
(see Table 3.4). There were no significant differences in the summated suitability scores 
between Instructors and Cadet Pilots when assessing the mnemonics in the response 
selection decision-making scenario, F (1,56)=1.410; p=0.240. There were also no 
significant differences in the ratings of suitability among the five ADM mnemonics, F(4, 
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224)=1.279; p=0.279. The qualitative comments showed that DESIDE was thought to 
contain appropriate considerations for safe actions, quick responses, was easy to practice 
and promoted situation awareness. SOAR, PASS and SHOR were regarded as promoting 
quick responses, however there were no time pressures in this scenario. FOR-DEC was 
regarded as not fitting the requirements for making a quick response. 
Table 3.4 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the suitability 
of each ADM mnemonic method for Scenario 3: Response selection decisions 
ADM irammg acronyms N 
ä E 
SHOR irlsh odors 32 6.00 5.97 6.06 5.94 23.97 6.43 
Cadets 26 5.96 6.12 6.00 6.04 24.12 4.09 
PASS instructors 32 622 625 6.09 6.16 24.72 553 
Cadets 26 6.15 6.12 6.15 638 24.81 4.05 
FOR DEC Instructors 32 622 6.16 559 5.94 23.91 758 
Cadets 26 6.77 6.69 631 6.65 26.42 5.01 
SOAR Inductors 32 6.09 6.13 6.06 6.03 2431 6.09 
Cadets 26 638 6.42 635 658 25.73 4.81 
DESIDE Lustrvctois 32 6.41 622 5.97 6.16 24.74 738 
Cadets 26 7.08 6.73 6.46 6.81 27.08 458 
3.3.5 Resource Management Decisions 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by instructors was 
SHOR followed by DESIDE, FOR-DEC, SOAR, and PASS. The highest overall rating 
" by cadets in order was FOR-DEC, SOAR, DESIDE, PASS, and SHOR (see Table 3.5). 
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There were no significant differences in the summated suitability scores between 
Instructors and Cadet Pilots when assessing the applicability of the decision-making 
mnemonic methods in the resource management decision-making scenario, F (1, 
42)=1.291; p=0.262. There were also no significant differences in the ratings of 
suitability among the five ADM mnemonic methods themselves, F(4,168)=0.465; 
p=0.761. The qualitative comments suggested that FOR-DEC was regarded as promoting 
a comprehensive consideration of the situations and it contained a logical order to deal 
with uncertain situations. DESIDE was regarded as promoting good situation assessment 
but was much too time consuming. SHOR and PASS were thought to be very easy to 
remember but did not match the requirements of this situation. 
Table 3.5 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the suitability 
of each ADM mnemonic method for Scenario 4: Resource management decisions 
ADM training acronym N 
SHOR Instructors 22 659 632 6.41 623 2555 6.02 
Cady 22 6.77 632 636 6.00 25.45 4.82 
PASS Inrs 22 5.82 5.77 5.82 5.77 23.18 6.02 
Cady 22 650 6.77 6.41 6.68 25.45 4.82 
FOR DEC Instluctois 22 650 636 6.00 636 2522 6.09 
Cady 22 7.00 732 6.64 6.86 27.82 456 
SOAR Invctors 22 632 6.14 627 5.73 24.46 6.08 
Cady 22 6.82 6.86 7.00 655 2723 4.74 
DESIDE Instructors 22 6.88 6.41 5.91 6.05 2525 5.66 
Cady 22 7.05 659 659 650 26.73 4.83 
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3.3.6 Non-diagnostic Procedural Decisions 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by instructors was 
received by SHOR followed by PASS, SOAR, FOR-DEC, and DESIDE; the highest 
overall rating by cadets in order was DESIDE, PASS, SOAR, FOR-DEC, and SHOR (see 
Table 3.6). There were no significant differences in the overall summated suitability 
scores between instructors and cadet pilots in the non-diagnostic procedural decision- 
making scenario, F (1,55) =0.341; p=0.561. 
Table 3.6 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; and 
applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the suitability 
of each ADM mnemonic method for scenario 5: Non-diagnostic procedural 
decisions 
ADMtrYah ftacronyms N 
SHOR Instructors 30 637 623 6.47 633 25.40 5.10 
Cadets 25 628 624 6.60 6.40 2552 3.79 
PASS In 30 630 630 6.43 627 2530 5.42 
Cady 25 652 6.64 6.88 6.92 26.96 4.73 
FOR DEC InstmCtots 30 637 620 5.77 6.00 2434 552 
Cadets 25 652 6.60 6.48 6.76 2636 5.71 
SOAR Instructors 30 650 6.13 6.07 630 25.00 4.83 
Cady 25 6.56 6.60 6.48 6.76 26.40 4.09 
DESIDE hnshlxtm 30 633 597 5.77 5.97 24.04 6.06 
Cade 25 6.76 6.88 6.64 6.92 2720 431 
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Table 3.7 Opinions of instructors and cadet pilots with regard to the suitability of the five ADM 
mnemonic-based methods in the Non-diagnostic procedural decision-making 
scenario 








SHOR is quicker 
Low fuel is not an emergency situation 
and needs comprehensive considerations, 
SHOR is not the best strategy 
PASS fit for quick action, however, this is 
not an urgent situation 
Too simplistic for the situation and lacks 
the ability to evaluate the risks and 
benefits for other alternative airfields 
Cadet pilots 
1. There is a need to consider more risks and 
benefits for other alternative landing 
airfields, SHOR is not capable of 
analyzing a complex situation 
2. SHOR is applicable and matches the 
critical situation 
3. Simple 
1. Decisions need to be made quickly before 
fuel becomes low 
2. Weather and low fuel conditions need 
quick action 
3. Helps make the right decision in a short 
time 
FOR-DEC 1. Good situation assessment and risk 1. FOR-DEC has comprehensive 
management considerations especially the C (check) for 
2. FOR-DEC is the safest the effect of action is good for promoting 
3. Logically reasonable safety 
4. Comprehensive analysis followed by 2. In this scenario there is time to consider 
execution the best strategy 
5. Comprehensive consideration of risks and 3. It is important to check the situation after 
benefits of alternative landing airfields making an action, so FOR-DEC is good 
4. This is not an urgent situation, FOR-DEC 
is able to consider the whole situation for 
the best action 
SOAR 1. SOAR is the safest strategy for good 
situation assessment 




DESIDE is good for situation assessment: 
as this scenario is not urgent, it is good to 
have time to think thoroughly 
Good for risk management and highly 
applicable 
Comprehensive consideration 
Provides specific analysis and safe 
I. Re-formation for landing at another base is 
safer than remaining alone 
2. Promotes quick action to avoid consuming 
fuel 
1. Provides a more detailed analysis - more 
safety 
2. Comprehensive consideration for set 
safety objectives 
3. Minimizes potential risk to ensure the 
safety 
4. Identifies the safe objectives for actions 
5. Has a logical order - easy to remember 
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However, there were significant differences in the ratings of the suitability of the five 
ADM mnemonic-based methods, F(4,220)=3.352; p=0.011. There were four significant 
post-hoc t-tests, SHOR (mean=25.00) vs PASS (mean=26.42); t=-2.53, df=56, p=. 014; 
SHOR (mean=25.00) vs FOR-DEC (mean= 26.56); t= -2.30, df=56, p= . 025; SHOR 
(mean=25.00) vs DESIDE (mean =27.04); t=-3.49, df=56, p=. 001; and SOAR 
(mean=25.53) vs DESIDE (mean=27.04); t=-2.39, df=56, p=. 020. 
The qualitative data containing the opinions of instructor pilots and cadet pilots with 
regard to the suitability of the five ADM mnemonic-based methods in the non-diagnostic 
procedural decision-making scenario are contained in table 3.7. It will be noted from the 
comments in table 3.7 that there are some qualitative differences between the comments 
elicited from instructor and cadet pilots. In general, there would seem to be more urgency 
perceived in this tactical situation by the Instructors than by the Cadet pilots. The 
qualitative comments from the Cadets indicated that DESIDE was regarded as promoting 
good situation assessment, risk management and was highly applicable as this was not an 
urgent situation. It was, however, necessary to think the situation through thoroughly. 
However, Instructors' opinions suggested there were many unexpected situations in the 
air and the main priority was to eliminate the risk and promote awareness of the changing 
situations hence quick responses were needed to implement a solution as soon as possible, 
as the fuel was limited. 
3.3.7 Creative Problem-Solving 
The highest overall rating of suitability for the ADM mnemonics by instructors was 
received by DESIDE followed by FOR-DEC, PASS, SOAR, and SHOR; the highest 
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overall rating by cadets, in order, was FOR-DEC, DESIDE, SHOR, PASS, and SOAR 
(see Table 3.8). There were no significant differences in the overall suitability scores 
between instructors and cadet pilots in the creative problem-solving scenario, F (1, 
50)=1.038; p=0.313. There were also no significant differences in the ratings of suitability 
among the five ADM mnemonic-based methods, F(4,200)=0.292; p=0.883. The 
qualitative comments of Instructors revealed that DESIDE was regarded as promoting an 
effective response in a non-time-limited situation (the backup battery has about nine 
minutes power for both generators failures). It was also regarded as progressing in a 
logical order and was easy to remember. However, Cadets preferred FOR-DEC as it 
provide a more comprehensive consideration and analysis of potential risks and benefits. 
Table 3.8 Individual scale means (situation assessment; risk management; response time; 
and applicability) and overall mean for Instructor and Cadet ratings for the 
suitability of each ADM mnemonic method for Scenario 6: Creative-problem 
solving 
ADM framing acronyms N 
SHOR rs 32 628 6.06 6.16 6.09 24.59 651 
Cadets 22 623 6.41 655 6.77 25.95 4.13 
PASS rs 32 6.56 6.63 6.44 638 26.00 5.69 
Cadets 22 6.00 6.14 650 6.68 2532 4.86 
FOR DEC rs 32 6.84 6.81 638 6.69 26.72 5.05 
Cadets 22 6.86 655 6.64 6.86 26.91 524 
SOAR 32 6.13 637 6.19 6.16 24.84 548 
Cadets 22 6.18 623 627 636 25.05 5.19 
DESIDE Irs 32 6.84 6.91 659 656 26.90 553 
Cadets 22 6.45 659 636 655 25.95 5.14 
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3.4 Discussion 
In tactical environments, some of the decisions that must be made by fighter pilots can be 
considered as part of standard operating procedures but military pilots are also confronted 
with many problems that occur in continually changing situations that do not have a single 
best solution. Any decision made in the cockpit under circumstances of ambiguity is 
tempered by the task to be achieved (Prince & Salas, 1993). To make rapid decisions 
expert pilots make decisions using a holistic process involving situation recognition and 
pattern matching. Within this framework, pilots' situation awareness becomes the driving 
factor in the decision-making process. For the novice pilot, who often operates using very 
different decision-making strategies, understanding the situation frequently poses the 
major portion of their task (Klein, 1993b). In general, military aviation training 
organizations do not have specific methods or techniques for decision-making instruction 
during ab-initio training. The ability to make decisions in the air has often been regarded 
as by-product of flying experience rather than training. The data obtained in this research, 
however, suggests that the SHOR and DESIDE ADM mnemonic-based methods may be 
suitable as a basis for providing training which will be applicable for covering all six 
basic types of decision. 
3.4.1 The Strengths of Different ADM Training Mnemonics in 
Different Tactical Scenarios 
SHOR was developed for use in U. S. Air Force tactical command and control scenarios, 
where decisions were likely to be made under high pressure and within severe time 
constraints. These situations involve making near-real-time decisions involving threat 
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warning and rescheduling, and will often require dynamic modifications to plans (Wohl, 
1981). This research found that if instructor pilots thought that they were under time 
pressure they tended to rate SHOR as being most suitable the mnemonic method (see 
table 3.2). The contents of SHOR match the requirements of the scenarios requiring 
urgent decisions. As SHOR is basically an extension of the stimulus-response (S-R) 
paradigm of classical behaviourist psychology, it explicitly addresses the requirement to 
deal with two aspects of uncertainty in the decision-making process; information input 
uncertainty (relating to hypothesis generation and evaluation) and consequence-of-action 
uncertainty (which creates the requirement for option generation and evaluation) (Wohl, 
1981). SHOR is able to promote quick responses in a time-limited situation and it also 
corresponds to the basic principles of briefing during tactical training. This may well 
explain why SHOR was rated more favorably than the other mnemonic methods in the 
recognition-primed decision-making scenario. 
SHOR was also rated as the most suitable ADM mnemonic for making decisions in the 
`go/no go decisions' scenario by cadet pilots, and in the `recognition-primed decision'; 
`resource management decisions'; and `non-diagnostic procedural decisions' scenarios by 
instructor pilots, although SHOR showed no significant differences with other mnemonic- 
based methods in both the `go/no go decisions' and `resource management decisions' 
scenarios (see table 3.9). The qualitative data from both instructor pilots and cadet pilots 
also revealed that the four steps in SHOR fulfilled the requirements to deal with time- 
limited, urgent situations. It has simple steps with high applicability; it is easy to 
practice and it promotes the logical procedures required for safe action (table 3.3). PASS 
and SOAR did not receive such high ratings as SHOR but the qualitative comments 
received regarded both methods as having some strengths in promoting situation 
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awareness, analysis of risk and were both useful when a quick response was required. 
SOAR was regarded by instructors as being good in encouraging pilots to re-evaluate 
their decisions after they had made their initial actions, and the best mnemonic in the 
`recognition-primed decision' scenario by cadet pilots. 
Table 3.9 Summary of rankings of the five ADM mnemonic methods across the six decision 
making scenarios broken down by Instructor pilots and Cadet pilots 


















SHOR Instructors 2 1 4 1 1 5 
Cadets 1 3 5 4 5 2 
PASS Instructors 1 3 2 5 2 3 
Cadets 4 2 4 4 2 4 
FOR-DEC Instructors 4 5 5 3 4 2 
Cadets 3 4 2 1 4 1 
SOAR Instructors 5 2 3 4 3 4 
Cadets 2 1 3 2 3 5 
DESIDE Instructors 3 4 1 2 5 1 
Cadets 5 5 11 3 1 2 
DESIDE gained significantly superior suitability ratings by cadet pilots in the `response 
selection decisions' and `non-diagnostic procedural decision' scenarios. It was also rated 
by instructors as the best mnemonic method in the `response selection decisions' and 
`creative problem solving' scenarios (see table 3.9). This type of scenario is not an urgent 
tactical situation and has no immediately dangerous threats (although some of the 
qualitative comments from less experience cadet pilots would suggest otherwise: see table 
3.7). Pilots have time (15 minutes in the bingo fuel scenario and nine minutes in the 
generator failure scenario) to think thoroughly about the alternative actions for safe 
operations. Murray (1997) suggested that the DESIDE mnemonic-based decision making 
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method was a practical approach for assisting pilots when making decisions in such 
situations. The respondents in this study also indicated that when they would prefer to 
consider their options more fully (if they have enough time to do so), they regarded the 
DESIDE mnemonic-based ADM method as being the most suitable. DESIDE was also 
rated as the best decision-making mnemonic by both instructors and cadets for response 
selection decisions (see table 3.4) although there were no significant differences with the 
other mnemonic-based methods in this non-urgent scenario. 
The qualitative data also showed that this method had suitable characteristics for dealing 
with non-urgent situations. It was rated highly for situation assessment, risk management, 
and applicability. It was thought to be comprehensive and thorough; clear about how to 
identify the safest actions; and it also had a logical order and' was easy to remember (see 
table 3.7). However, it did require much more time to perform this analysis and produce a 
response. Instructor pilots advised that practicing DESIDE in the simulator was 
extremely important before attempting to apply it in a real life situation. The other six- 
step mnemonic method, FOR-DEC, was regarded as having similar strengths but again, 
only in non-time pressured situations. FOR-DEC was rated by cadet pilots as the best 
ADM mnemonic-based decision making method for promoting good resource 
management decisions (e. g. in the `no joy for 2 versus 2 air intercept' scenario and in the 
`generator failure' scenario) as would be expected of a methodology originally developed 
to promote good CRM. 
The qualitative data elicited from the instructor pilots' showed that DESIDE has 
characteristics to deal with non-urgent situations as a result of its good situation 
assessment and risk management characteristics; it was thought that it prompted a 
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comprehensive approach in terms of the number of factors that it encompassed in the 
decision making process; it was regarded as providing a specific and clear approach to 
analyze a situation and it possessed a logical order that was easy to remember. However, 
it did require more time to undertake the required steps and analyze and respond to the 
changing situation. 
3.4.2 Critical Issues Affecting the Rating to ADM Mnemonics 
The numeric data showed that instructor pilots and cadet pilots had no differences in their 
opinions about the overall suitability of the five ADM mnemonics as a basis for decision- 
making training across the six types of decision-making scenarios. However, this should 
not be taken to imply that experience has no effect on the quality of decision-making. 
There were however, significant differences in the ratings of suitability of the ADM 
mnemonics within certain decision-making scenarios. The critical issue affecting pilots' 
ratings of suitability was `the perception of urgency'. As Fischer, Orasanu, & Wich 
(1995) suggested, perceived risk and time pressure may provoke an immediate response 
irrespective of if the problem was fully understood. Minimal risk levels and time 
constraints, in contrast, permit additional diagnostic actions or the further deliberation of 
options. This research found that if pilots thought that they were under time pressure they 
tended to rate the SHOR mnemonic as being most suitable. Otherwise, if not under such 
pressure, pilots would prefer to consider their options more fully and regarded the 
DESIDE mnemonic as being more suitable for decision-making training. 
However, it is very interesting to know the definition of `the perception of urgency' as it 
potentially has three different dimensions: available time, aspects of physical environment 
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and uncertainty. For example, some pilots defined `scenario six, both generators failure 
during tactical manoeuvre' as not being an `urgent situation' as backup power was 
available for a further nine minutes. However, other pilots defined it as `very urgent', 
because no one knows what's going to follow this failure in the next few seconds? 
Another example was the `response selection scenario' where No. 4 lost his leader in cloud 
during a tactical formation. Some pilots defined it as an urgent situation as the distance 
between the fighters' wingtips was only three feet. However, some pilots defined it as 
non-urgent for the SOPs had detailed descriptions of how to deal with the situation. In a 
third example, some pilots defined the `non-diagnostic procedural scenario, bingo fuel in 
bad weather' as an urgent situation as a result of the uncertainty induced by the 
deteriorating environment. In contrast some pilots regarded it as a normal situation as 
there was still enough fuel to land at a diversionary airfield with sufficient time. 
3.4.3 The Differences between Experts and Novices 
Instructor pilots consistently selected SHOR as the best mnemonic-based decision making 
method in the recognition-primed decision, resource management decision and non- 
diagnostic procedural decision scenarios, all of which were urgent, potentially high risk, 
time-critical situations and required prompt actions. The instructor pilots' comments 
suggested that SHOR had the required characteristics to deal with urgent situations as it 
promoted quick responses. It was simple and easy to remember; it fitted the constraints 
inherent in time-limited and critical situations; it matched the general format of a pre- 
flight briefing; it was easy to put into practice; and it was thought that its logical 
procedures promoted safe action. Instructors were also consistent in selecting DESIDE as 
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the best mnemonic for response selection decisions and creative problem solving 
decisions which were less urgent. 
On the other hand, cadet pilots exhibited little consistency when assessing the suitability 
of the ADM mnemonic methods in the six different decision-making scenarios, selecting 
SHOR (for go/no go decisions), SOAR (for recognition-primed decisions), FOR-DEC (for 
resource management decisions and creative problem-solving), and DESIDE (for response 
selection decisions and non-diagnostic procedural decisions - see summary in table 3.9). 
The numeric data showed that there were no significant differences between instructor 
and cadet pilots concerning the overall suitability of the ADM mnemonic methods as a 
basis for decision-making training across the six types of decision-making scenario. There 
were however, differences in the qualitative comments regarding the suitability of the 
ADM mnemonics between instructors and cadet pilots. These differences between 
instructors and cadets may further be explained by Chase and Simon's (1973) finding that 
experts organize knowledge about their domain into semantically meaningful units in 
long-term memory and that these units differ from those formed by novices. Also, expert 
knowledge in long-term memory is pattern indexed, and this pattern indexing is organized 
to facilitate achievement of domain-specific goals. 
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3.5 Summary 
Orasanu (1993) suggested that the six basic types of decisions each impose different 
demands on the decision-maker and require different approaches. This research proposes 
that just two ADM training mnemonics form a suitable basis for decision-making training 
that encompass the requirements for these six basic decision making situations. SHOR 
was rated as being the best ADM mnemonic method in time-limited and critical, urgent 
situations; DESIDE was regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which 
required more comprehensive considerations but also had time available to do so. The 
qualitative differences in the ratings of the suitability of ADM mnemonics between 
experts and novices was probably a result of hazard perception. To optimize the 
effectiveness of decision-making training, it is suggested that it will be necessary to 
deliver instruction using both the SHOR and DESIDE ADM mnemonic-based methods 
and also provide advice concerning which approach is most suitable in which situations in 
the tactical environment. 
I 
The principal limitation of the present study was that it only elicited instructor and cadet 
pilots' opinions about the efficacy of these decision-making techniques. As a result, 
research needs to be undertaken to produce empirical performance data to establish if 
training in the use of ADM mnemonic-based methods such as SHOR and DESIDE can 
actually improve pilots' in-flight decision-making. These data are necessary to verify the 
opinions of the instructor pilots elicited in this study. The following study three 
corresponds to phases four and five (implement and control) of the IPISD model for 
training construction and evaluation. This further study needs to justify the effectiveness 
of ADM training interventions based on SHOR and DESIDE mnemonics methods across 
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all different types of decision-making scenarios encountered in tactical environments. 
The following study was concerned with evaluating the effectiveness of the ADM training 
program subsequently derived using performance data obtained in a full-flight simulator. 
The cognitive processes employed by pilots were also investigated in a series of pencil- 
and-paper basd tests. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Evaluation the Effectiveness of the Aeronautical Decision-making 
Training Intervention for Military Pilots 
4.1 Introduction 
Military pilots generally make critical decisions in dynamic tactical situations under time 
pressure and using ambiguous information. The ability to make timely effective decisions 
is an essential competence required of all military pilots, but until recently decision 
making training remained unstructured. Military pilots must perform a wide range of 
tasks in addition to flying the aircraft safely. These tasks may include intercepting 
offensive aircraft, delivering weapons, troops or equipment, in addition to flying the 
aircraft. Therefore, military pilots must learn to make decisions related to mission 
performance in addition to those decisions related to flying the aircraft (Kaempf 
Orasanu, 1997). 
The quality of decision-making has been treated as a by-product of flight experience 
(Buch & Diehl, 1984). Decision-making skills of military pilots are acquired through 
situation-specific training which incorporates an increasing variety of tactical 
environmental variables (David, 1997). There is a need for in-flight decision-making 
training to be addressed directly and to be incorporated into the tactical training programs 
(Li, Harris & Yu, 2005). At the present time, there is no training program for aeronautical 
decision-making for military pilots in existence either in the R. O. C. Air Force or 
elsewhere around the world, although research had recognized the need for training 
aeronautical decision-making (Klein, 1993; Orasanu, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997). 
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There are many theoretical frameworks describing the processes and procedures 
concerned with aeronautical decision making (ADM) and many mnemonics have been 
promulgated in recent years to support what is thought to be decision-making 'best 
practice' (e. g. Wohl, 1981; Maher, 1989; Klein & Woods, 1993; Hormann, 1995; Oldaker, 
1996; Jensen, 1997; David, 1997; Murray, 1997; Orasanu, 1997; Jensen & Hunter, 2002; 
O'Hare, 2003). However, while a great deal of research has suggested that ADM is 
trainable (Endsley, 1993; Klein, 1993 &1997; Orasanu, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997; Li & 
Harris, 2005), there is a lack of hard empirical research investigating the efficiency of 
these ADM mnemonics in flight. 
4.1.1 The Critical Components in Decision-making Process 
ADM is defined by FAA (1991) as 'a systematic approach to the mental process used by 
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set 
of circumstances' (Hunter, 2003). This definition includes both process and outcome, and 
is clearly similar in scope and meaning to Jensen's (1995) definition of judgment as 'the 
mental process that pilots use in making decision'. Flying an advanced fighter 
performing a tactical mission has increased the demands on pilots' cognitive abilities as 
the complexity of systems inside cockpit and the dynamic situations outside the cockpit 
has also increased. As described in the previous chapter, Endsley (1997) defines 
situation awareness (SA) as 'the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the future'. Situation awareness and decision-making are indispensable for flight 
safety and are closely related. In both processes, situation assessment is ftindamental. 
Situation assessment has been described as the process by which the state of situation 
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awareness is achieved and has been identified as a critical decision-making component 
(Endsley & Bolstad, 1994). Situation assessment is a precursor for situation awareness, 
which is itself the precursor for all tasks of decision-making (Prince & Salas, 1997). 
For military pilots operating in a hostile environment, the normal hazards of aviation are 
compounded by the enemy's intent for the destruction of the aircraft. It was also noted in 
the previous chapter that Fischer, Orasanu, & Wich (1995) suggested risk and time 
pressure are situational variables that further constrain the decision process, as risk and 
time pressures may dictate an immediate response whether or not the problem was fully 
understood. Minimal risk levels and time constraints, in contrast, permit additional 
diagnostic actions or the deliberation of options. Jensen, Guilke & Tigner (1997) 
suggested that risk management should be a key part of the decision-making process. 
Orasanu, Davison & Fischer (2001) also recommended that to manage threats, pilots must 
first assess the risks associated with them. Risk assessment feeds into decision making in 
two ways: during the assessment of the precipitating threats and in evaluating potential 
courses of action. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that a good decision-making process 
is one in which the decision maker successftilly accomplishes a series of tasks involving 
the collection of information about a wide range of alternatives, the careful assessment of 
the risks and benefits of each course of action, and the preparation of contingency plans 
for dealing with known risks. Slovic (1987) observed that risk perception depends on the 
experience people have with a situation; their personal vulnerability; and the level of 
control they have over a situation. The time frame of the risk was also important. 
Time pressure has several obvious but important implications for decision-making. As 
noted in the previous study, decision makers will often experience high levels of stress; 
and, their thinking will shift, characteristically in the direction of using less complicated 
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reasoning strategies (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Also, research on the use of 
probabilistic cues has demonstrated that decision makers focus on the most salient cues 
and ignore other critical, less obvious information, especially when under time pressure 
(Wickens & Flach, 1988). Military pilots often make important decisions using 
ambiguous information under great risk and time pressure. Therefore, decision aids and 
training are required to provide pilots with the necessary skills to make quick situation 
assessments (Kaempf & Orasanu, 1997). 
When evaluating decision-making efficacy, Baron and Hershey (1988) suggested that the 
study of 'outcome' bias on decision evaluation shows the tendency of people to assess the 
correctness of their decision-making based on the outcome of the decision. However, 
good decisions can lead to bad outcomes (and vice versa). Decision makers cannot 
infallibly be graded by their results (Brown, Kahr, & Peterson, 1974). A good decision 
cannot guarantee a good outcome. All in-flight decisions are made under uncertainty. 
Evaluating a decision as good or not must depend on the stakes and the probability, not on 
the outcome. Hence, in this study the evaluation of the effectiveness of decision-making 
training is based on using situation assessment and risk management measures. Rather 
than assessing the outcomes of the decisions made. 
4.1.2 The History of ADM Training 
Means, Salas, Crandall, and Jacobs (1993) advised that it is important to give pilots 
pattern recognition exercises during training. A flight simulator can offer great 
advantages for pattern recognition presenting simulated situations based around scenarios 
that are significant when making real-time decisions. They can provide scenarios that 
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occur frequently during tactical maneuvers. A simulator offers the option of being able to 
provide many practice problems, designed to build up the recognition of patterns. Positive 
transfer of training can be expected the more the simulator duplicates the operation of the 
aircraft when performing a mission. The task of flying military aircraft requires part-task 
training on procedures, navigation, flying skills, and weapon delivery, each of which is 
practiced separately before being assembled into whole-task training. Knowing these 
goals enables training design to be directed more appropriately. Furthermore, if it is made 
clear how the design of a training course fits into the trainee's future job, such as training 
ADM for fighting, reconnaissance, escort or transportation missions, the learning 
motivation of trainee will be improved. 
There are a number of strategies (often embodied in mnemonics or acronyms) that have 
been developed by researchers and used by pilots to guide and structure decision-making. 
The common aim of these techniques is to form a systematic approach to decision-making 
that should be less affected by the human nature and which should also reduce the 
cognitive work for pilots (O'Hare, 2003). Buch and Diehl (1984) found that judgment 
training produced significantly better decisions among civil aviation pilots in Canada. 
Connolly, Blackwell & Lester (1989) advised that pilot's decision-making skills could be 
significantly improved through the use of judgment training materials along with 
simulator practice. However, Orasanu (1993) has pointed out that there was no evidence 
to support the development of generic training techniques to improve all-purpose decision 
making skills, as there were different component skills involved in making six different 
basic types of decisions. As a result Orasanu (1993) suggested that it was unlikely that 
any one single training method could improve all decision-making, there were need 
different types of training for improving the quality of decision-making. 
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SHOR was rated as being the best ADM mnemonic in time-limited and critical, urgent 
situations, DESIDE was regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which 
required more comprehensive considerations but also had time available to do so (see 
previous Chapter). To optimize the effectiveness of decision-making training, it is 
suggested that instruction is provided using both the SHOR and DESIDE ADM 
mnemonic-based methods and also advice should be provided concerning which approach 
is most suitable in which situations in the tactical environment (Li & Harris, 2005). 
4.1.3 Evaluating the Effectiveness of ADM Training 
Kirkpatrick's (1976) hierarchy for training evaluation examines the impact of training 
interventions at four different levels: reactions, learning (attitudes and knowledge), 
behaviour, and organizational effects. The first of these levels is reactions. Reactions are 
concerned with how the participants respond to the training. These are important because 
while positive reactions do not ensure learning, a negative reaction almost certainly 
reduces the likelihood that this has taken place. Information about flight crew reactions 
are usually collected from questionnaires asking about satisfaction or enjoyment of the 
training course. The second level of evaluation is learning, and is concerned with whether 
the participants have acquired knowledge or have modified their attitudes or beliefs as a 
result of attending a training course. Learning can be measured in terms of changes in 
attitudes and/or knowledge. If these do not alter then it is unlikely changes in behaviour 
will occur. Attitudes can be measured with paper-based questionnaires. Knowledge can 
be assessed in a number of ways but again paper-based examinations are most frequently 
used. The third level of evaluation is behaviour. This involves assessing whether 
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knowledge gained in training transfers to actual behaviours on the job. This is considered 
the most critical part of CRM evaluation so far because this is where changes in actual 
perfonnance can be detected. The fourth level of evaluation is at the organizational level. 
This is concerned with whether the training has a beneficial impact on the organization 
itself Therefore, for a CRM training program, the ultimate aim would be to produce 
tangible evidence of an improvement in safety and efficiency (Kirkpatrick, 1976 & 1998). 
It is vital that training programs are assessed to determine if they are achieving their goals 
(FAA, 1993). O'Connor, Flin, & Fletcher (2002) suggested that there are a number of 
important reasons for evaluating the effects of training programs. They should be 
evaluated to determine if they meet stated goal of improving safety and efficiency; teach 
the appropriate knowledge, attitudes and skills in an ever-changing technology and risk 
environment; and to check that they produce a return on investment for their development 
and delivery costs. Patrick (1992) advised that there are several approaches to the 
evaluation of training that differ in ten-ns of their aims, criteria, and methods. The 
traditional approach to evaluation has been to identify whether the training meets its 
training objectives, or if not, how the training program should be modified. The role of 
evaluation is therefore to correct and manage training design, and this is integral to the 
Instrumental System Development (ISD) approach. Feedback from evaluations may 
result in revision to the training objectives or training design. The criteria used for this 
type of evaluation concerns both the processes of training development and the products 
of training as manifested in performance at both the individual and organizational levels. 
In military aviation, Prince and Salas (2000) found that although CRM training did not 
show an effect on the pilots' attitudes, it did appear to increase their knowledge of 
teamwork principles. However, the problem with relying on subjective assessment is that 
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the individual will be most influenced by whether they enjoyed the training, or by how 
well they felt they performed. Additionally, participants will only describe what can be 
verbalized, which results in information that cannot be verbalized being ignored. 
4.1.4 Research Purposes 
Simulator experiment was to assess the 'product' of ADM training. Pencil and paper tests 
were to provide insight into if the trainees were applying the correct procedures to reach a 
decision. The purposes of this research are to evaluate the effectiveness of an ADM 
training intervention based on the SHOR and DESIDE mnemonic methods across six 
basic decision-making scenarios in a tactical environment using a flight simulator-based 
experiment and pencil and paper tests. The pencil and paper trials analyzed pilots' 
cognitive 'processes', however, this research approach could not assess the real-time 
performance of pilots' in-flight decision-making, also not suitable for evaluating the 
dimension of 'response time' of pilots' decision-making performance. On the other hand, 
simulator trials can assess the 'products' of ADM performance including the situation 
assessment, risk management, and response time in real-time setting, however, they had 




Forty-one male pilots from R. O. C. Air Force Tactical Training Wings participated in the 
study. The flying experience of participants was between 354 and 220 hours with an 
average of 292 hours. Participants were randomly divided into two groups, 21 pilots in 
experimental group (trained), and 20 pilots in control group (untrained). 
4.2.2 Research Design 
The experimental design was a mixed groups design, with two factors, one with repeated 
measures. Participants were randomly divided into two groups, an experimental group 
and a control group. Firstly, both groups participated in a pre-test for both trials in the 
flight simulator and the pencil and paper evaluations. After the pre-test trials, the 
experimental group attended a four hour "ADM Training Program for Military Pilots". 
The control group had no training intervention. Both groups participated in post-training 
performance trials to further evaluate their performance of in-flight decision-making (see 
table 4.1). 
The main advantage of this design is that it takes into account the impact of individual 
characteristics such as flight experience, flight performance, cognitive ability and motor 
skill (Christensen, 1997), and it provides the highest level of control over the factors that 
impact upon subsequent performance. However, the difficulty is that there is often a need 
to control for variables that may occur as part of the intervention process, such as practice 
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effect, memory effect or the placebo effect (Lloyd, Mayes, Manstead, Meudell, & 
Wagner, 1990). One strategy to overcome the effects of repeated measure is to employ a 
control group, as it provides for maximum control over these extraneous variables 
(Wiggins & Stevens, 1999). 
Table 4.1 The experimental design for comparison of the effectiveness of training interventions 
Pre-test Training Intervention Post-test 
Experimental 3 Simulator Trials Aeronautical Decision- 3 Simulator Trials 
Group & making Training Programs for & 
(21 Subjects) 6 Pencil and Paper Trials Military Pilots(4 hours) 6 Pencil and Paper Trials 
Control 3 Simulator Trials No Intervention 3 Simulator Trials 
Group & & 
(20 Subjects) 6 Pencil and Paper Trials 6 Pencil and Paper Trials 
4.2.2.1 Simulator Trials 
As a result of the available time for using the flight simulator and the pilots' tight schedule 
for flight training time was limited. As a result only three different types of decision- 
making scenario were assessed in the simulator study. These were the scenarios requiring 
participants to make a recognition-primed decision, a non-diagnostic procedural decision 
and where they were required to engage in creative problem solving. Furthermore, 
previous research (Li & Harris, 2005a) had found that the ADM mnemonic methods 
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trained were assessed as being particularly applicable in these three situations. The 
strength of conducting simulator trials was to evaluate the 'products' of pilot's decision- 
making performance on the simulator scenarios. However simulator trials can't evaluate 
the 'process' of pilot's decision-making, hence the use of pencil and paper tests of 
decision-making performance was added. 
All trials were undertaken in the Northrop F-5E simulator from the R. O. C. A. F Tactical 
Wing. The F-5E simulator was equipped with six different Air Force visual databases 
which provided a realistic representation of the airfields and terrain within a 250 miles 
radius of Taiwan. The cockpit of F-5E simulator was exactly the same as the real F-5E 
fighter and it was capable of performing the whole range of different tactical manoeuvres. 
From the Instructor's control panel it was possible to program the simulator to meet a 
wide range of training requirements, including manipulating the weather, terrain 
characteristics, and other emergency situations. 
4.2.2.2 Pencil and Paper Tests 
After completing the three simulator trials, participants undertook a series of pencil and 
paper tests using all six scenarios; go/no go decisions, recognition-primed decisions, 
response selection decisions, resource management decisions, non-diagnostic procedural 
decision, and creative problem solving scenarios. The strength of pencil and paper tests is 
to investigate the 'processes' of pilot's decision-making on the paper scenarios. 
Participants were required to write down their decision-making process to deal with six 
different situations, what they perceived the situations to be and how they formed the 
strategies to solve the problems. When the pilot wrote down his decision-making and 
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response to deal with the requirements of scenarios, it was possible to analyze the 
6 processes' of his decision-making strategies. 
4.2.3 The Contents of ADM Training Program 
Two ADM mnemonic methods, SHOR (Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Murray, 1997), that 
had been previously been assessed by instructor and cadet pilots as being the most 
applicable and having the potential to significantly improve the quality of military pilots' 
decision-making in study two (Li & Harris, 2005) formed the basis of the ADM training 
program. The training program commenced with an introduction to ADM theories (one 
hour), including the Recognition-Primed Decision Model of Rapid Decision Making 
(Klein, 1993); The ARTFUL' Decision Maker: A Framework Model for Aeronautical 
Decision Making (O'Hare, 1992); Conflict-theory Decision Making Model (Janis & 
Mann, 1977); a Model of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Decision-making (Endsley, 
1997); and the Decision Process Model (Orasanu, 1995). This was followed by a 
description of the content and method of the application of the SHOR and DESIDE ADM 
mnemonic-based methods (half an hour). Following this, participants practiced in the 
classroom the application of SHOR and DESIDE in flight situations exemplifying the six 
basic types of decision making scenario described by Orasanu (1993). These included 
go/no go decisions; recognition-primed decisions; response selection decisions; resource 
management decisions; non-diagnostic procedural decisions, and decisions requiring 
creative problem-solving (one and half hours). Finally, the application of ADM in 
military aviation was described and the participants undertaking the training were de- 
briefed (one hour). The ADM training program last for four hours in total. 
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4.2.4 The Development of Decision-making Scenarios for Pre-training and 
Post-training Evaluation Trials 
To develop scenarios for the simulator trials and the pencil and paper trials, six focus 
groups were conducted, one for each scenario. Each comprised one human factors 
specialist and three senior instructor pilots. The purpose of these focus groups was to 
verify that the twelve scenarios, six scenarios for pre-training evaluation (see Appendix 
8.2) and six scenarios for post-training evaluation (see Appendix 8.3) selected from the 
accidents and incidents database, corresponded to the appropriate six types of decision- 
making scenarios described by Orasanu (1993). These focus groups also ensured enough 
detail was available in both the simulator trials and the pencil and paper trials to evaluate 
the decision-making performance of the pilots. There were six different scenarios used in 
the pre-training and post-training evaluation to counteract the effects of practice. All the 
pre-training scenarios used were the same as those used in study 2. 
4.2.4.1 Go/no go Decision Scenarios 
Go/no go decisions are made under severe time pressure and involve considerable risk; 
the amount of thinking involved should be minimal. 
Pre-training: F-5E No. 2 wingman has to make a decision as the No. I (Leader) 
abandons a tacticalformation take-off at 145 knots. 
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Post-training: F-5E No. 2 wingman practicing the tacticalformation training. During the 
take off run with the throttles at maximum, No. I (leader) suddenly slants seriously 
towards the No. 2. 
4.2.4.2 Recognition-Primed Decision Scenarios 
Recognition-primed decisions are defined by Orasanu (1993) as the need to recognize 
situational patterns that serve as inputs to condition-action rules, but which also require 
the decision maker to learn the response side of the rule and its link to the condition. 
Pre-training: F-5E right engine fails as a result of Foreign Object Damage just as the 
nose gear leaves the ground at speed 165-knots. 
Post-training: F-5E solo, after taking off at 500feet, pilot hears two unusual soundsftom 
the engines and feels the aircraft shake. Engine EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) is 
increased, and RPM decreased 
4.2.4.3 Response Selection Decision Scenarios 
Response selection decisions require a single option to be selected from a set; pilots must 
recognize multiple options and evaluate them in terms of how well they satisfy the goals 
and meet constraints. 
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Pre-training: No. 4 wingman in a tactical formation of F-5Es is required to make a 
decision when No. I (Leader) becomes missing in cloud during formation flight (3 feet 
distance between wing tipsfor thefourfighters). 
Post-training: F-5E leader while maintaining easy formation with No. 2 on the left, at 
13000 feet, the GCI (Ground Control Intercept) reports an unidentified aircraft at one 
o'clock and 5 miles away. At the same time No. 2 visuals an airliner in ftont and head-on 
3 miles away with same altitude and approachingjast (leader had no orders). 
4.2.4.4 Resource Management Decision Scenarios 
Resource management decisions involve assessing the relative priorities of various tasks, 
especially critical ones. Skills relevant to this type of decision include estimation of the 
time required to complete various tasks, knowledge of interdependencies among tasks, 
and scheduling strategies. 
Pre-training: F-5E leader offour aircraft needs to make a decision for the No. 3 and No. 4 
aircraft when a 'no joy' call (no visual contact with No. I and No. 2) is made and No. 2 
calls 'one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 o'clock with same altitude'. This occurs 
duringpractice of a2 versus 2 Engagement (Air Combat Manoeuvre). 
Post-training: Leader and No. 2 is practicing BFM (Basic Fighting Manoeuvres) for a 
gunshot attack, the distance between No. 2 and the leader is only 500feet, the angle off is 
over 90 degrees. The possibility of a mid-air collision is high as both aircraft are at 480 
knots and same altitude. 
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4.2.4.5 Non-diagnostic Procedural Decision Scenarios 
Non-diagnostic procedural decisions involve a number of cues falling into a category with 
no prescribed response. The nature of this problem is unclear and many different types of 
ambiguous cues may also signal potentially dangerous conditions. 
Pre-training: Both the leader and wingman in a formation of F-5Es are unable to land at 
home-base in a 'bingo' qowfuel) situation during instrumentflight in bad weather. 
Post-training: F-5E is finishing the BFM training, the GCI reports that home base 
weather is worsening. Surplus fuel is down to only 1400 lb. The pilot asks for weather 
conditions at alternative airports. 
4.2.4.6 Creative Problem Solving Scenarios 
Creative problem-solving are the most complex decision-making scenarios, as they 
involve both diagnosis to determine the nature of the situation and response generation. 
Pilots must determine what their goals are, develop a plan and candidate strategies, and 
evaluate these strategies and planned actions based on projections of likely outcomes. 
Pre-training: When flying an F-5F both left and right generator warning lights are active 
during a tactical manoeuvre. 
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Post-training: When an F-5E is lowering the landing gear while on the down-wind leg the 
landing gear shaft warning light illuminates, indicating the nose landing gear is 
abnormal. 
4.2.5 Procedure 
4.2.5.1 Procedure for Simulator trials 
Each participant undertook two sets of trials in the simulator encompassing three different 
decision-making scenarios; recognition-primed decisions, non-diagnostic decisions and 
creative problem solving. One set of trials were undertaken pre ADM training and the 
second set of trials were undertaken after the experimental group had received the four 
hours ADM training course. To negate practice effects, different (but equivalent) 
simulator scenarios were used pre- and post ADM training for both groups. To eliminate 
order effects, the three scenarios were presented in a randomized order in both the pre- 
and post-training trials. 
Durng the flight trials participants were required to provide a running commentary 
concerning their perception of the flight situation and how they were forming their 
strategies to deal with the problem. No participants were aware of the overall design of 
the research or the scenarios for the simulator trails. After each simulator trial, 
participants undertook a structured de-briefing concerning their performance and the 
pilots described the decision-making process employed and the factors underpinning their 
decision. 
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4.2.5.2 Procedure for Pencil and Paper Trials 
Both the experimental (trained) and control (untrained) groups undertook an initial set of 
pencil and paper based evaluations where they were required to describe how they would 
deal with each of the problems described in above pre-training decision making scenarios. 
These evaluations were simply in the form of narrative-based responses. After these 
initial tests the experimental group attended a four-hour 'ADM Training Program for 
Military Pilots'. The Control group had no such training. Both groups then participated 
in a further set of pencil and paper evaluations. As in the simulator trials, to eliminate 
order effects, the six scenarios were presented in a randomized order in both the pre- and 
post-training trials. 
4.2.6 Measures 
Pilots' performance was evaluated on three dimensions (situation assessment, risk 
management and response time) by a professional simulator instructor. These dimensions 
were derived from the earlier study (study 2: Li and Harris, 2005b) to select the most 
appropriate ADM training mnemonic methods. Each aspect of performance was rated 
using a nine-point Likert-type scale (the best performance with the highest score of 9 and 
the poorest performance with the lowest score of 1, or in the case of the dimension of 
response time a score of I indicating the fastest and, 9 is the slowest). 
To enhance the reliability of the performance evaluations, the same simulator instructor 
evaluated trainee performance on all occasions. The instructor was trained by an aviation 
human factors specialist in the required manner to evaluate performance with regard to 
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their situation assessment, risk management and speed of response. For the evaluation of 
both Situation Assessment and Risk Management performance in the simulator trials, a 
list of key performance factors was developed for each scenario based upon the tactical 
training and flight simulator training manuals. The steps that should be undertaken and 
sources of information that should be considered in each circumstance were listed, these 
being factors underlying Situation Assessment performance. For example in the scenario 
of an engine failure at take-off, the pilot needs to be aware of (1) engine temperature and 
pressure, (2) airspeed, (3) attitude and altitude, (4) left or right engine problem, (5) the 
length of available runway, (6) other aircraft nearby, and (7) the availability of the safety 
net. The more components that pilots mentioned the higher their score for Situation 
Assessment. Emphasis on the risk management dimension was placed upon the 
generation and analysis of options and the quality of reasoning underlying the pilot's final 
decision based specifically on the control of risk and the probability of dealing with that 
risk successfully. Using the same example of an engine failure on take-off, the pilot has 
to conduct a mental simulation to minimize the risk for his final decision of (1) an aborted 
take-off, (2) a single engine take-off, or (3) ejection. These ratings were again based upon 
the verbal commentary provided by the pilots. The more suitable actions taken by pilots 
to minimize the risk, the higher their score was for Risk Management. From the 
configuation of the control panel on the flight simulator, the instructor could also evaluate 
participants' Response Time to each scenario. 
The same types of measure were used to evaluate the pilots' decision-making processes in 
the pencil and paper tests (with the exception of the rating of response time). The 
narrative responses describing the process by which the participants would arrive at their 
decision were evaluated by a flight instructor with regard to their situation assessment and 
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risk management performance. As in the simulator assessments, to enhance the reliability 
of the measures, the same instructor evaluated trainee performance on all occasions. The 
instructor was trained by an aviation human factors specialist to evaluate performance in 
the required manner. For the evaluation of both Situation Assessment and Risk 
Management performance in the narrative answers produced, a list of key performance 
factors taken from the tactical training manuals was derived for each scenario. The steps 
that should be undertaken and sources of information that should be interrogated in each 
circumstance were listed, these being factors underlying Situation Assessment 
performance in particular. Emphasis on the risk management dimension was placed upon 
the generation and analysis of options and the quality of reasoning underlying the pilot's 
final decision based specifically on the control of risk and probability of dealt with risk 
successfully. Perfect performance was awarded with the highest score of 9 and the 
poorest performance with the lowest score of 1. 
4.2.7 Ethical Approval 
This research program was approved by the Ethics committee of Cranfield University. 
This committee operates to the principles prescribed by the British Psychological Society 
(the UK professional body for psychologists). Participants were volunteers and informed 
of the purpose of the study prior to participating. 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Simulator Trials 
In total, 246 trials assessing pilots' ADM performance on the flight simulator were 
undertaken, 123 trials prior to the experimental group undertaking the ADM training and 
the same number after the training course had been delivered. One hundred and twenty- 
six trials were undertaken by the experimental (trained) group and 120 by the control 
(untrained) group. 
4.3.1.1 Recognition-Primed Decisions 
There was an effect verging on statistical significance with regard to pilot performance 
before and after the decision-making training on the dimension of situation assessment 
(FI, 39=3.520; p=0.068). This suggested that pilots' situation assessment was rated as 
having improved on the second trial (see table 4.2). The group that had received ADM 
training also significantly outperformed the group that had not received training on 
situation assessment (FI, 39=6.904; p=0.012). The interaction term between the 
trained/untrained group and before training trial/after training trial was non-significant 
(F 1,39== 1.73 5; p=O. 195). 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (FI, 39'= 12.467; p=0.001). This also indicated that pilots' 
performance was rated as being superior during the second trial. There was a further 
significant difference in performance between the trained and untrained group 
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(FI, 39=6.736; p=0.013) with the group that had received ADM training outperfonning the 
group that had not received training (see table 4.2). As before, there was no significant 
interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial (F, 39=2.248; p=O. 142). 
There was no significant difference on rated speed of response between trials (FI, 39=2.778; 
p=O. 104). There was also no difference between the trained and untrained group 
(FI, 39=0-013; p=0.910) (see table 4.2). There was, however, a result verging on 
significant with respect to the interaction term (FI, 39=3.890; p=0.056). The group that had 
received ADM training tended to exhibit longer response times in the second trial 
compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.1). 
Table 4.2 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Recognition-primed 
decision-making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the three dimensions of 
situation awareness, risk management, and response time 
Recognition-primed 
decisions 
Group N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Trained 21 5.00 1.703 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 4.35 1.599 
assessment Trained 21 5.86 1.526 
Post-test Untrained 20 4.50 1.051 
Trained 21 4.48 1.537 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 4.05 0.945 
management Trained 21 5.71 1.309 
Post-test Untrained 20 4.55 1.146 
Trained 21 4.67 1.592 
Response Pre-test Untrained 20 5.35 1.872 
time Trained 21 5.86 0.964 

























Figure 4.1 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for response time in the 
Recognition-primed decision-making scenario 
4.3.1.2 Non-diagnostic Procedural Decisions 
There was a significant difference in performance on the dimension of situation 
assessment before and after decision-making training (FI, 39=8.216; p=0.007). Pilots' 
perfonnance was significantly better during the second trial (see table 4.4). There was no 
significant difference between the trained and untrained groups (FI, 39=2.484; p=O. 123). 
However, there was a significant interaction term (FI, 39=4.237; p=0.046). The group that 
had received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in situation assessment 
performance in the second trial compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.2). 
There was also a significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and 
after decision-making training (FI, 39=6.761; p=0.013). The results indicated pilots' 
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performance was significantly better on the second trial. There was a result tending 
toward statistical significance between the trained and untrained groups (Fi, 39=3.3 16; 
p=0.076) with the group that had received ADM training exhibiting better perfonnance 
than the group that had not (see table 4.3). Furthermore, there was a significant 
interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial (FI, 39=7.743; p=0.008). The 
group that had received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in performance 
on the second trial compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.3). 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of rated speed of response between 
trials (F,, 39ý9.369; p=0.004). It showed the pilots' response times during the second trial 
were significantly longer than the first trial. However, there was no significant difference 
between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39ý 1 . 753; p=0.193) in this respect and there 
was also no significant interaction term (FI, 39ý0.692; p=0.41 1) (see table 4.3). 
Table 4.3 Means and Standard Deviations in perfon-nance scores in the Non-diagnostic 
procedural decision-making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the three 
dimensions of situation awareness, risk management, and response time 
Non-diagnostic 
procedural decisions 
Group N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Pre-test Trained 21 4.38 1.774 
Situation Untrained 20 4.55 0.826 
assessment Post-test Trained 21 5.90 1.480 
Untrained 20 4.80 1.196 
Pre-test Trained 21 4.29 1.454 
Risk Untrained 20 4.55 0.826 
management Post-test Trained 21 5.76 1.375 
Untrained 20 4.50 1.192 
Pre-test Trained 21 4.33 1.494 
Response Untrained 20 4.20 0.894 
time Post-test Trained 21 5.38 1.244 












First trial Second trial 
Trained 
Untrained 
Figure 4.2 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for situation assessment 













First trial Second trial 
Figure 4.3 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management in 




4.3.1.3 Creative problem-solving 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment between the 
first and second trials (FI, 39=5.364; p=0.026). The results showed that pilots' situation 
assessment was significantly better during the second trial. The result examining the main 
effect of training was verging on significance, suggesting that the group that received ADM 
training performed better (FI, 39=3.063; p=0.088) (see table 4.4). Similarly, there was also a 
result approaching significance for the interaction term (FI, 39=2.993; p=0.092). The group that 
had received ADM training again showed a trend toward better perfonnance in the second set of 
trials after training compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.4). i 
There was a significant difference in performance on the dimension of risk management 
with respect to trial (FI, 39=6.617; p=0.014). Pilots' performance on this dimension was 
superior during the second set of trials. There was no significant difference in this regard 
between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39ý0.669; p=0.418) (see table 4.4). However, 
there was a significant interaction ten'n between the trained/untrained group and trial 
(FI, 39=4.278; p=0.045). The group that had received ADM training showed greater gains 
in perfon-nance in the second trial (after training) compared to the untrained group (see 
figure 4.5). 
There was a result verging on a significant difference on the dimension of response time 
(FI, 39=3.185; p=0.082). It indicated that pilots' response times during the second trial 
were longer than the first trial. Also, there was a significant difference between the 
trained and untrained group (FI, 39=6.164; p=0.017). The group that had received ADM 
training tended to be rated as having significantly longer response times than the group 
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that had not received training (see table 4.4). There was no significant interaction term 
between the main effects (F, 39=2.132; p=O. 152). 
Table 4.4 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Creative problem- 
solving scenario, broken down by main effect, on the three dimensions of situation 
awareness, risk management, and response time 
Creative problem- 
solving 
Group N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Trained 21 5.05 1.830 
Situation Pre-test Non-trained 20 5.00 1.686 
assessment Trained 21 6.43 1.076 
Post-test Non-trained 20 5.20 1.704 
Trained 21 4.86 1.682 
Risk Pre-test Non-trained 20 5.15 1.843 
management Trained 21 6.24 1.375 
Post-test Non-trained 20 5.30 1.380 
Trained 21 5.19 1.778 
Response Pre-test Non-trained 20 4.80 1.735 
time Trained 21 6.19 1.167 












Figure 4.4 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for situation assessment 
in the Creative problem-solving decision-making scenario 
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Figure 4.5 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management in 
the Creative problem-solving decision-making scenario 
4.3.2 Pencil and Paper Based Assessments 
4.3.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
Each participant had their ADM performance assessed in a series of pencil and paper 
based evaluations in the six decision-making scenarios. In total 492 trials assessing pilots' 
ADM performance in the pencil and paper tests were undertaken, 252 scenarios in the 
experimental (trained) group and 240 scenarios in the control (untrained) group. There 
were two aspects of performance evaluated in each scenario, pilots' situation assessment and 
risk management. 
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First trial Second trial 
4.3.2.2 Go/no go Decisions 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment before and 
after decision-making training (FI, 39ý1.214; p=0.277). There was a result verging on 
significance between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39=3.277; p=0.078). The group 
that had received ADM training tended to outperform the group that had not received 
training (see table 4.5). There was also a significant interaction term between the 
trained/untrained group and before training trial/after training trial (FI, 39=4.355; p=0.043). 
The group that had received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in the 
second trial compared to the untrained group with decreased in performance (see figure 4.6). 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (FI, 39=0.448; p=0.507). There was also no significant difference 
between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39=2.207; p=0.145). However, there was a 
result verging on significance for the interaction term between the trained/untrained group 
and trial (FI, 39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM training showed 
greater gains on risk management in the second trial compared to the untrained group (see 
figure 4.7). 
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Table 4.5 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Go/no go decision- 
making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both dimensions of situation 
awareness and risk management 
Go/no go decisions 
Group N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Trained 21 5.38 1.203 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 5.25 1.743 
assessment Trained 21 6.19 0.981 
Post-test Untrained 20 5.00 1.654 
Trained 21 5.57 1.076 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 5.30 1.525 
management Trained 21 5.95 1.071 














First trial Second trial 
Trained 
Untrained 
Figure 4.6 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for situation assessment 
















First trial Second trial 
Trained 
Untrained 
Figure 4.7 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management in 
the Go/no go decision-making scenario 
4.3.2.3 Recognition-primed Decisions 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment before and 
after the decision-making training (FI, 39ý0-927; p=0.342). There was also no significant 
difference between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39-=l . 337; p=0.225) (see table 4.6). 
However, there was a significant interaction term between the trained/untrained group and 
trial (FI, 39ý9.555; p=0.004). The group that had received ADM training showed 
significantly greater gains in performance in the second trial compared to the untrained 
group (see figure 4.8). 
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There was no significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (FI, 39=0,141; p=0.710). There was a result verging on a 
significant difference between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39=2.900; p=0.097). 
The group that had received ADM training tended to have better performance than the 
group that had not received training. There was also a result approaching statistical 
significance on the interaction tenn between the trained/untrained group and trial 
(Fl 39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM training showed greater gains 
in performance in the second trial compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.9). 
Table 4.6 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Recognition-Primed 
decisions scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both dimensions of situation 
awareness and risk management 
Recognition-primed 
decisions 
Groups N Means 
Standard 
deviations 
Trained 21 5.43 1.121 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 5.55 1.234 
assessment Trained 21 6.10 0.944 
Post-test Untrained 20 5.20 1.436 
Trained 21 5.29 1.189 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 5.30 1.128 
management Trained 21 5.86 0.727 
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Figure 4.8 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for situation assessment 
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Trained 
Untrained 
Figure 4.9 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management in 
the Recognition-Primed decision-making scenario 
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4.3.2.4 Response Selection Decisions 
There was a result verging on a significant difference on the dimension of situation 
assessment before and after the decision-making training (FI, 39=3.246; p=0.079). It 
showed pilots' performance on the second trial to be better than on the first trial. There 
was also a result verging on significance between the trained and untrained group 
(FI, 39=3.277; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM training tended to outperform 
the group that had not received training (see table 4.7). There was no significant 
interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial (FI, 39=1.461; p=0.234). 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (FI, 39=2.0641; p=0.112). There was a result verging on a 
significant difference between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39=4.022; p=0.052). 
The group that had received ADM training tended to have better performance than the 
group that had not received training. There was also a significant interaction term 
between the trained/untrained group and trial (FI, 39=5.591; p=0.023). The group that had 
received ADM training showed greater gains in performance in the second trial compared 
to the untrained group (see figure 4.10). 
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Table 4.7 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Response selection 
decision-making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both dimensions of 
situation awareness and risk management 
Response selection 
decisions 
Group N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Trained 21 5.14 1.459 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 4.75 1.552 
assessment Trained 21 5.90 0.995 
Post-test Untrained 20 4.90 1.774 
Trained 21 4.86 1.014 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 4.85 0.988 
management Trained 21 5.67 0.856 
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Figure 4.10 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management 
in the Response selection decision-making scenario 
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4.3.2.5 Resource Management Decisions 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment before and 
after decision-making training (FI, 39=4.914; p=0.033). It showed pilots' performance on 
situation assessment in the second trial to be better than on the first trial (table 4.8). There 
was no significant difference between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39ý1.767; 
p=0.191). There was also no significant interaction terin between the trained/untrained 
group and trial (FI, 39: --l . 238; p=0.273). 
There was a result verging on statistical significance on the dimension of risk 
management before and after decision-making training (FI, 39=3.035; p=0.089). It 
indicated pilots' performance on risk management during the second trial to be better than 
the first trial. There was no significant difference between the trained and untrained group 
(FI, 39ý0.052; p=0.820). Also, there was no significant interaction term between the 
trained/untrained group and trial (F 1,39=2.247; p=O. 142). 
Table 4.8 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Resource management 
decision-making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both dimensions of 
situation awareness and risk management 
Resource management 
decisions 
Group N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Trained 21 4.95 1.564 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 4.80 1.322 
assessment Trained 21 5.86 1.153 
Post-test Untrained 20 5.10 1.518 
Trained 21 4.71 1.189 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 4.95 0.999 
management Trained 21 5.38 1.071 
Post-test Untrained 1 20 5.00 1.522 
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4.3.2.6 Non-Diagnostic Procedural Decisions 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment before and 
after decision-making training (FI, 39: = 1 . 007; p=0.322). There was a result verging on 
significance between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39=3.593; p=0.065). The group 
that had received ADM training tended to outperform the group that had not received 
training (see table 4.9). There was also a significant interaction term between the 
trained/untrained group and pre-test/post-test (FI, 39ý19.540; p=0.000). The group that had 
received ADM training showed significantly greater gains in performance in the second 
trial compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.11). 
There was no significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (FI, 39ý0.067; p=0.797). There was no significant difference 
between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39: --l . 887; p=0.177). ' There was a result 
verging on significance for the interaction term between the trained/untrained group and 
trial (FI, 39=3.266; p=0.078). The group that had received ADM training showed greater 
gains in performance in the second trial compared to the untrained group (see figure 4.12). 
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Table 4.9 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Non-diagnostic 
procedural decision-making scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both 
dimensions of situation awareness and risk management 
Non-diagnostic 
procedural decisions 
Groups N Means 
Standard 
deviations 
Trained 21 5.00 1.304 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 5.30 1.218 
assessment Trained 21 6.19 1.123 
Post-test Untrained 20 4.55 1.638 
Trained 21 4.95 1.161 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 5.25 1.070 
management Trained 1 5.71 0.956 
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Trained 
Untrained 
Figure 4.11 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for situation 












Figure 4.12 The interaction between the trained/untrained group and trial for risk management 
in the Non-diagnostic procedural decision-making scenario 
4.3.2.7 Creative problem-solving 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of situation assessment before and 
after decision-making training (FI, 39ý_- 10.320; p=0.003). It showed the pilots' performance 
in situation assessment in the second trial was better than the first trial (see table 4.10). 
There was no significant difference between the trained and untrained group (F 1,39=0 - 18 7; 
p=0.668). There was also no significant interaction term between the trained/untrained 
group and trial (FI, 39=2.393; p=0.130). 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of risk management before and after 
decision-making training (F, 39=5.885; p=0.020). It indicated pilots' performance on risk 
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First trial Second trial 
management during the second trial was better than in the first trial. There was no 
significant difference between the trained and untrained group (FI, 39ý0- 162; p=0.690). 
Also, there was no significant interaction term between the trained/untrained group and 
trial (FI, 39=2.509; p=O. 12 1). 
Table 4.10 Means and Standard Deviations in performance scores in the Creative problem- 
solving scenario, broken down by main effect, on the both dimensions of situation 
awareness and risk management 
Creative problem- 
solving 
Groups N Means 
Standard 
deviations 
Trained 21 4.71 1.347 
Situation Pre-test Untrained 20 4.90 1.483 
assessment Trained 21 5.71 1.007 
Post-test Untrained 20 5.25 1.020 
Trained 21 4.71 1.347 
Risk Pre-test Untrained 20 4.95 1.761 
management Trained 21 5.67 0.966 




The decision to abort a take-off requires a different decision process from losing a 
formation leader in clouds or choosing an alternative airfield for landing with bingo fuel. 
The nature of the cognitive processes involved in a decision depends on the requirements 
of the tasks and the surrounding environment. Therefore, no single method can improve 
decision-making performance in all situations (Orasanu, 1993). The ADM training 
program included SHOR, the quickest ADM mnemonic to apply, and DESIDE, the most 
comprehensive mnemonic. The ADM training program also addressed the use of 
different decision-making theories across six basic types of decision-making scenario to 
trigger pilots' awareness regarding to the role of ADM in tactical tasks a topic which had 
never been taught in their basic flight training, advanced training or conversion training. 
This research used pencil and paper trials for assessing pilot's process performance in six 
basic types of decision-making scenario. In three simulator trials, which used only 
recognition-primed decisions, non-diagnostic procedural decisions, and creative problem 
solving scenarios, the products of decision-making were evaluated. The main purpose of 
this research was to evaluate the efficiency of the ADM training program. 
4.4.1 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Go/No Go Decisions 
The pre-test and post-test scenarios were quite similar in go/no go decision scenarios. In 
both instances other aircraft had a problem during a formation take-off run. Pilots had to 
make a decision under time pressure with high risk. As the patterns were recognized and 
responses were pre-set, the cognitive work of pilots was essentially perceptual and 
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interpretive (Orasanu, 1993). It is likely pilots would follow the pre-set rules and SOPs 
for making a rapid decision. According to the findings from the pencil and paper trials, 
the trained group made significant improvements on both the dimensions of situation 
assessment and risk management compared to the untrained group (table 4.5). Both 
dimensions also had significant interaction effects. The ADM training intervention had a 
positive impact on the dimensions of situation assessment and risk management. 
4.4.2 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Recognition-primed Decisions 
The aircraft's engine failed as a result of FOD (Foreign Objects Damage) on take-off in 
both the pre-test and post-test scenarios in recognition-primed decision-making situations. 
Pilots have to make a quick decision to deal with urgent situations. The findings from the 
pencil and paper trials confirm that as soon as pilots assess these situations properly, the 
response strategies are retrieved on the basis of their past success experience, as proposed 
by Klein (1993a). The findings from the simulator trials provided further evidence that 
this ADM training program improved pilots' situation assessment and risk management. 
There were significant differences between the pre-test and post-test results and the pencil 
and paper trials also showed significant interaction effects on situation assessment and 
risk management. 
However on the dimension of 'response time' it took longer for trained group in the post- 
test on simulator trials (table 4.2). This is a reasonable result, as pilots in the trained 
group undertook a more comprehensive consideration when assessing the situation and 
when making a plan to manage the impending risks. As a result the processes of situation 
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assessment and risk management will consume more time than when using an automatic 
response with no considered strategy. As Klein (1993) suggested, the recognition- 
primed decision model explaining how people make decisions focuses on two processes, 
situation assessment (to generate a plausible course of action) and mental simulation (to 
evaluate that course of action for risk management). If a pilot recognizes there is 
sufficient time to make a considered decision, he will evaluate the dominant response 
option by imagining it and conducting a mental simulation to see if it will work. If there 
is not adequate time, the pilot will tend to implement the course of action that experience 
has determined as the most likely to be successful. Although the situation was urgent and 
needed a fast response, pilots showed that appropriate situation assessment and effective 
risks management before making a decision was more favorable than rushed reactions. 
4.4.3 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Response Selection Decisions 
The wingman has to make a decision to choose a response to deal with an impending 
hazard in both the pre-test and post-test scenarios in the response selection decision- 
making scenarios. Although these are not urgent situations, pilots may perceive the 
potential risk in front of them to be very high and choose an inappropriate response. The 
findings from the pencil and paper trials showed the ADM training program to have a 
positive effect in improving pilots' situation assessment and risk management (table 4.7). 
Although the interaction effect was not significant on the dimension of situation 
assessment, the main effects of trained/untrained group and pre-test/post-test were verging 
on significant. The trained group had greater gains in ADM performance than the 
untrained group in the post-test on dimensions of situation assessment and risk management. 
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4.4.4 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Resource Management Decisions 
The pilots were practicing Air Combat Maneuvers with the potential for a mid-air 
collision in the pre-test and post-test scenarios in the resource management decision 
situations. The cognitive work that must be done in this type of decision includes 
establishing priorities amongst the various tasks, assessing available resources, estimating 
the available time, and developing an action plan (Orasanu, 1993). According to the 
results of the pencil and paper trials, the ADM training program had a positive effect in 
improving pilots' situation assessment and risk management after the training intervention 
(table 4.8). Although the main effect of trained/untrained group and the interaction effects 
were not significant, the main effect of before/after training was significant for situation 
assessment and verging on being significant for risk management. Perhaps the most 
critical issues for resource management decisions are setting the priorities for response. 
For example, certain actions must be done within a few seconds to avoid a mid-air crash, 
such as descending or climbing or changing direction with a call-out to alert the other 
wingman. Generally, pilots had better performance with regard to situation assessment 
and risk management after the training intervention. 
4.4.5 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Non-diagnostic Procedural Decisions 
Pilots had to evaluate the strengths and weakness of using alternative airfields in 
deteriorating weather in a 'bingo fuel' situation in both the pre-test and post-test scenarios 
in the non-diagnostic procedural decision situations. According to the results of the 
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simulator and pencil and paper trials, the ADM training program significantly improved 
pilots' situation assessment and risk management in this ill-defined situation (tables 4.3 & 
table 4.9). The interaction effects were significant on both the dimensions of situation 
assessment and risk management. The scores in the post-test were significantly higher 
than the scores in the pre-test for the trained group. 
The dimension of 'response time' had a significant main effect before/after the training 
intervention. The trained group took more time to form a response strategy in the post- 
test scenario (table 4.3). This is the least clearly defined type of decision situation as it 
involves a pattern of cues that fall into a category which has no prescribed response. 
Many different types of ambiguous cue may signal danger. Training for these cases 
involves mainly situation assessment and risk management (Orasanu, 1993). In this type 
of scenario, pilots had more time to assess the situation and project the situation into the 
near future for managing the potential risks. The pilots in the trained group gained 
significantly higher scores on situation assessment and risk management in the post-test 
than the untrained group. The more extensive considerations using the mnemonics 
resulted in a longer time to form a decision. To minimize the response time but while 
maintenance the increased quality of situation assessment and risk management, 
practicing non-diagnostic procedural decisions in a simulator might help. 
4.4.6 The Impact of the ADM Training Intervention on 
Creative Problem-solving 
Pilots had to resolve the problems presented by generator failures and a landing gear 
abnormal condition in the pre-test and post-test scenarios. The results of the simulator 
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trials showed the ADM training program to significantly improve performance on the 
dimensions of situation assessment and risk management. The interaction effects for both 
dimensions were also significant. The cognitive processes for this type of decision task 
are the most complex, because they involve both diagnosis to determine the nature of the 
situation and response generation for dealing with an ambiguous problem. Once the 
nature of the problem has been determined, there may be no recommendations in the 
SOPs/manuals. Pilots receiving the ADM training program showed better situation 
assessment and risk management for determining what their problems were and planning 
their actions to solve the problems (table 4.4). The pencil and paper trials also showed 
the ADM training program to have a positive effect on pilots' performance on situation 
assessment and risk management (table 4.10). However, the evidence was not as strong in 
this case as simulator trials (table 4.11). 
The dimension of 'response time' had an effect verging on significance on the main effect 
of before/after training intervention in simulator trials. The trained group took more time 
to form the response strategies in the post-test scenario (table 4.4). It was evident that 
pilots did apply the ADM mnemonics for analyzing the situations and evaluating the risks 
when forming response strategies. However, pilots need further time to practice the 
decision-making strategies from the ADM training. As a result the pilots who received 
ADM training took longer as they spent more time undertaking the cognitive processes 
necessary for safe action. 
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4.4.7 The Differences between Simulator Trials and Pencil and Paper Trials 
There were three significant interaction effects on both the situation assessment and risk 
management dimensions on the pencil and paper trials. These were go/no go decisions, 
recognition-primed decisions, and non-diagnostic procedural decisions. For response 
selection decisions, only risk management had a significant interaction effect. Resource 
management and creative problem-solving decisions had no significant interaction effects 
on situation assessment and risk management, however, both scenarios had significant 
main effects on situation assessment and risk management before/after training. After the 
training intervention pilots had better decision-making performance than before training 
based on the result of the paper-pencil trials. On the other hand, the simulator trials had 
significant interaction effects on non-diagnostic procedural and creative problem-solving 
decisions on both the situation assessment and risk management variables. Recognition- 
primed decisions had a significant interaction effect on response time. Both non- 
diagnostic procedural and creative problem-solving decisions had significant main effects 
on situation assessment, risk management and response time before/after training. This 
suggests that the ADM training program improved pilots' decision-making performance 
across all six basic types of decision-making (table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11 The summary of main effects of before/after training and trained/untrained groups 
and interaction effects on the simulator trials and paper-pencil trials on situation 





Six basic types of Dimensions before/after of 
Interaction effects 
decisions of training 
trained/untrained 
evaluation S P-P S P-P S P-P 
trials trials trials trials trials trials 
SA na na 1k. na 4 




RT na na lk, na 
SA na k. na It. na 
Response selection 
decisions RM na na na 
SA na na na 
Resource management 





RT 41 na na na 
SA 
Creative problem- RM 
solving 
RT 1k. na q na na 
Notes: 1. S means simulator trial. 
2. P-P means paper-pencil trials. 
na means not applicable. 
4. means significant (. 00-. 05). 
5. means verging on significance (. 05-. 099). 
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Typically, training evaluation involves a series of levels, from the assessment of pilots' 
reactions to training, through the measurement of individual changes in knowledge and 
behavior, to the measurement of organizational change (Kirkpatrick, 1976). Simulator 
trials offer the option of being able to provide pilots with many practice problems, 
designed to build up their recognition of patterns. They can consistently be adapted to the 
pilot in terms of difficulty level and in terms of evaluating pilots' skills/knowledge and 
behavior. Pilots can perform tactical tasks in the context of a simulated environment and 
missions and pilots can be evaluated in terms of their decision-making performance by an 
instructor. Pencil and paper trials have limitations for evaluating pilots' behavior. 
The pencil and paper trials can analyze the cognitive processes of a pilot, for example 
what aspects of situation assessment and risk management were conducted during a pilots' 
mental simulation. However, this research approach can't assess the real-time 
performance of pilots' in-flight decision-making. It also has a lack of psychological time- 
pressure. The key cues for pilots' decision-making are time and risk (Orasanu & Fisher, 
1997). In emergency situations, uncertainty may outweigh time pressure as the key 
stressor bearing on the decision-making strategy (Lynne, Flin & Skriver, 1997). Based 
only upon the pencil and paper trials it is difficult to conclude whether it was the cognitive 
processes of pilots for conducting situation assessment and risk management that caused 
longer response time, as the pencil and paper trials were not suitable for assessing 
C response time'. On the other hand, simulator trials can assess the products of the ADM 
performance of pilots' including the situation assessment, risk management, and response 
time in real-time setting, however, they had limitations for analyzing the cognitive 
processes of pilots. 
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4.4.8 Trade-off Effect in Decision-making Process 
All in-flight decisions are made under uncertainty. Evaluating a decision as good or not 
must depend on the stakes and the probability of successful performance, not just on the 
outcome. It is important to evaluate both the 'products' and 'process' of ADM training 
efficacy. Overall, results from both the simulator-based trials (which assessed the product 
of the ADM training programme) and the pencil-and-paper tests (which assessed the 
process that the trainees applied) showed gains being made in both Situation Assessment 
and Risk Management skills which were attributable to the decision-making training 
course. The ADM training program improved pilots' situation assessment and risk 
management. However, the assessed response time of the trained group was longer than 
the untrained group in all three simulator trials, although only in the recognition-primed 
decision scenario was there a significant interaction effect. However, the non-diagnostic 
procedural decision-making scenario had a significant main effect of before/after training 
and the creative problem-solving scenario had a main effect that was significant orý 
before/after training and on trained/untrained group. All these results indicate that 
response times did increase after pilots received ADM training. There were two possible 
explanations; firstly, as pilots were not familiar with the ADM mnemonics, they spent 
more time applying these steps. After they have had more opportunity to practice these 
ADM mnemonics, their response times may be quicker. Secondly, simply thinking more 
takes more time. However, the results of evaluating both dimensions of situation 




The nature of a decision depends on the requirements of the tasks and the conditions of 
the surrounding enviromnent. If the situation confronted is not coincident with 
established SOPs or previous experience, pilots must conduct their analysis of the 
problem and select a solution from the available options assessed by mental simulation. 
However, it takes time to conduct a mental simulation to form a course of action for 
dealing with a problem. This research has proved that an ADM training program does 
improve pilots' in-flight decision-making performance. However, when improvements in 
pilots' situation assessment and risk management were obtained, they tended to be traded- 
off against response time. As Klein (1993) advised, experience affects decision making by 
improving the ease and accuracy of situation assessment, and by enabling the decision 
maker to construct and use a mental simulation. A simulator provides many alternative 
options for practice to build up experience and recognition of patterns. 
The longer-term effectiveness of such ADM training courses needs evaluation to see if it 
translates into improved decision-making behavior during day-to-day operations which 
should ultimately also result in a reduction in the accident rate attributable to poor 
decision-making. There is also a need to investigate if additional practice in the 
application of the ADM mnemonic methods in a flight simulator increases the speed of 
decision-making. Nevertheless, it is suggested that a simple, short, cost-effective training 
program in the appropriate use of ADM mnemonic methods may ultimately produce 
significant gains in flight safety. Such a course may easily be integrated into current 
CRM or simulator-based training programs. 
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CHAPTER 
Summary and Overview 
5.1 Overview 
As Orasanu (1993) pointed out, all types of decisions have at least three elements in 
common; choice among options, situation assessment, and risk assessment. Beyond these 
three common elements, decision problems in the cockpit also differ in their underlying 
structure, time parameters, and information characteristics. They require different kinds of 
mental work. Pilots have little control over the uncertain situations which may confront 
them when flying an aircraft. Therefore, it is important to identify their ADM training 
needs and equip pilots with relevant strategies for making appropriate decisions in 
dynamic tactical environments. 
The Interservice Procedures for Instructional System Development (IPISD) adopts what is 
known as a systems perspective, where training development is viewed as a system that 
attempts to achieve a particular goal (Branson et al., 1975). The aim was to provide a 
context-free framework for the development good training programs. The IPISD model 
divided the development of training into five main phases: analyze, design, develop, 
implement and control. These phases are in a logical order, phase- I identifying training 
needs, so that the content of training can be specified; phase-2 specifies training 
objectives and map out the overall structure of training program; phase-3 develops the 
training content into effective learning materials and delivers the instruction; phase-4 
implements the training program; and phase-5 evaluates the training intervention. This 
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chapter summarizes the three studies undertaken. Study- I was the identification of ADM 
training needs using HFACS. It is corresponds to phase one (analyze) of IPISD, as this 
study was concerned with analyzing the training requirements. Study-2 was the 
assessment of the suitability of ADM training mnemonics. It was related to phases two 
and three (design and development) of IPISD, as this study was involved in determining 
the structure of ADM training and developing the content of ADM training program. 
Study-3 was concerned with evaluating the effectiveness of the ADM training program for 
military pilots. It corresponded to phases four and five (implement and control) of the 
IPISD model in conducting the instruction and evaluation of ADM training program. 
5.2 Analysis of ADM Training Needs Using HFACS 
The HFACS is a framework originally developed by Wiegmann & Shappell (1997) for 
underlying U. S. military aviation as a tool for investigating and analyzing the human 
factors accidents. This framework analyses accidents at four levels with 18 causal 
categories of human errors based on Reason's latent and active failures model, with each 
higher level affecting the next downward level. This research found that there were 
significant associations among categories in the HFACS framework from level-4 
6 organizational influences' to 'decision errors' in level-1. The category of 'inadequate 
supervision" was found to be the critical factor in the HFACS framework, because it was 
affected by 'resource management', 'organizational climate', and 'organizational process' 
and it in turn affected 'adverse mental states', 'physical/mental limitations, 'crew resource 
management', and 'personal readiness', all of which had significant associations with 
'decision errors'. The results show 'decision errors' had involved in 223 (42.6%) of 
accidents as a significant contributory factor in aviation mishaps. 
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Concerning the nature of the military mission, pilots have to perform a wide range of 
tasks. Pilots must learn to make decisions related to mission performance whilst 
operating complex systems of the aircraft which they are flying. There was a need 
identified for aeronautical decision-making to be trained directly and incorporated into the 
tactical environment. For developing ADM training programs to fit specific military 
missions and aircraft, a matrix can be formed by three dimensions consisting of missions, 
types of aircraft, and contents of HFACS categories affecting decision-making. ADM 
training programs should focus not only on pilot's decision-making, but also upon 
awareness of military tasks, type of aircraft and type of decision all of which may affect 
the decision-making strategy to be employed. 
5.3 Suitability of ADM Training Mnemonics in Tactical Environments 
This study was to develop the contents of ADM training program by evaluating the 
efficiency of five ADM mnemonic methods in six different tactical situations. By 
specifying different tactical situations military pilots may confronted, the purpose was to 
find the best ADM mnemonic across different decision-making scenarios to form the 
foundation of training program. SHOR was developed for use in U. S. Air Force tactical 
command and control scenarios, where decisions were likely to be made under high 
pressure and within severe time (Wohl, 198 1). The contents of SHOR matched the 
requirements of the decision-making scenarios requiring urgent decisions. SHOR is able 
to promote quick responses in a time-limited situation and it also corresponds to the basic 
principles of briefing during tactical training. 
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Murray (1997) suggested that the DESIDE mnemonic-based decision making method was 
a practical approach for assisting pilots when making decisions in such situations. The 
respondents in this study also indicated that when they had time to consider their options 
more fully they regarded the DESIDE mnemonic-based ADM method as being the most 
suitable. The qualitative data also showed that this method had suitable characteristics for 
dealing with non-urgent situations. It was rated highly for situation assessment, risk 
management, and applicability; it was thought to be comprehensive and thorough; clear 
about how to identify the safest actions; and it also had a logical order and was easy to 
remember. However, it did require much more time to perform this analysis and produce 
a response. Instructor pilots advised that practicing DESIDE in the simulator was 
extremely important before attempting to apply it in a real-time situation. 
The two ADM mnemonic methods, SHOR (Wohl, 1981) and DESIDE (Murray, 1997), 
that had been previously been assessed by instructor and cadet pilots as being the most 
applicable and having the potential to significantly improve the quality of military pilots' 
decision-making in study two (Li & Harris, 2005) formed the basis of the ADM training 
program. The training program commenced with an introduction to ADM theories; 
followed by a description of the content and method of application of the SHOR and 
DESIDE ADM mnemonic-based methods. Following this, participants practiced in the 
classroom the application of SHOR and DESIDE in flight situations exemplifying the six 
basic types of decision making scenario described by Orasanu (1993). Finally, the 
ap lication of ADM in military aviation was described and the participants undertaking IT 
the training were de-briefed. The results showed that pilots would apply SHOR for the 
scenarios which they thought were urgent situations, where quick responses were needed; 
and DESIDE for the scenarios which they thought were not urgent situations, where 
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comprehensive considerations were preferable to deal with the problems. The qualitative 
differences in the ratings of the suitability of ADM mnemonics between experts and 
novices were probably a result of hazard perception. To optimize the effectiveness of 
decision-making training, it was suggested that it was necessary to deliver instruction 
using both the SHOR and DESIDE ADM mnemonic methods and also to provide advice 
concerning which approach was most suitable in which situations in the tactical 
enviromnent. It was also identified as being necessary to instruct pilots both with regard 
to the operation of the individual techniques and to recognize which technique is most 
appropriate to apply in a given circumstance. 
The principal limitation of the second study though was that it only elicited instructor and 
cadet pilots' opinions about the efficacy of these decision-making techniques. Further 
research was required to be undertaken to produce empirical data using a full-flight 
simulator to establish if training in the use of ADM mnemonic-based methods such as 
SHOR and DESIDE could improve pilot decision-making. These data were necessary 
verify the opinions of the instructor pilots elicited in this study. The third study was 
required to justify the effectiveness of ADM training interventions based on SHOR and 
DESIDE mnemonics methods in the six basic decision-making scenarios in the real time 
tactical enviromnents. 
5.4 The Evaluation of the ADM Training Program 
The ADM training program included SHOR, the quickest ADM mnemonic, and DESIDE, 
the most comprehensive mnemonic. The main purpose of this research was to evaluate 
the efficiency of ADM training program for military pilots using a flight simulator and 
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pencil and paper trials. The pencil and paper trials analyzed the cognitive 'processes' of 
pilots, for example what aspects of situation assessment and risk management were 
conducted by pilots' mental simulation. However, this research approach could not assess 
the real-time performance of pilots' in-flight decision-making. It also has a lack of 
psychological time-pressure. Pencil and paper trials were also not suitable for evaluating 
the dimension of 'response time' of pilots' decision-making performance. On the other 
hand, simulator trials can assess the 'products' of ADM performance including the 
situation assessment, risk management, and response time in real-time setting, however, 
they had limitations for analyzing the cognitive processes of pilots. Simulator trials 
allowed the behavior of pilots to be evaluated and the outcomes of their decision-making 
processes to be observed, but did not allow any insight into the cognitive processes. 
The results suggested that the ADM training programs did improve pilots' situation 
assessment and risk management. However, the response times of the trained group were 
longer than the untrained group in all three simulator trials. There were two possible 
explanations; firstly, as pilots were not familiar with the ADM mnemonics, they spent 
some time applying these steps. With more opportunity to practice these ADM 
mnemonics, their response times may improve. Secondly, it may have been that the 
cognitive processes of situation assessment and risk management took more time. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Overview 
O'Hare (2003) reviewed aeronautical decision-making and came to the conclusion 'it is 
difficult to think of any single topic that is more central to the question of effective human 
performance in aviation than that of decision-making'. This chapter draws conclusions 
from the three studies conducted and provides recommendations for improving the safety 
of military aviation, with focus on enhancing the quality of pilots' Aeronautical Decision- 
making. 
6.2 Conclusions 
I. To improve aviation safety, the precise identification of the role of human error in 
accidents and pinpointing of human factors problems, especially with regard to 
pilot's decision errors, is imperative to develop effective intervention strategies. 
The HFACS framework can provide both a theoretical and practical foundation for 
describing the multiple components that are required for effective accident 
investigation. It helped identify the ADM training needs for developing a training 
program to improve pilots' in-flight decision-making. 
2. The HFACS framework has proved to be a useful tool for accident analysis. It has 
high inter-rater reliability in each individual category. This research has also 
demonstrated that the HFACS framework, originally developed for analysis of US 
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military aviation mishaps, also can be used to analyze accident data from the 
R. O. C. Air Force. 
3. There is now empirical evidence of how actions and decisions at higher levels in 
the organization promulgate throughout the R. O. C. Air Force to result in 
operational errors and accidents. This has not previously been done with data 
analyzed using HFACS. 'Decision errors' were associated with very high 
percentage (42.6%) of aircrew-related accidents. These had an intimate 
relationship with 'crew resource management' (level-2), and subsequently with 
'inadequate supervision' (level-3) and 'organizational climate' and 'organizational 
process' (level-4). There were clearly defined, statistically-described paths that 
related errors at level-I (the operational level) with inadequacies at both the 
immediately adjacent and more remote levels in the organization. 
4. This research supports Reason's (1990) model, upon which the HFACS 
framework is based, of active failure resulting from latent conditions in the 
organization. Fallible decisions of upper-level management can directly affect the 
middle level of supervisory practices, creating 'preconditions for unsafe acts' 
which impairs the performance of pilots, leading to accidents. 
There are a number of strategies embodied in mnemonics developed by aviation 
researchers and used by pilots that help guide and structure decision-making. The 
common aim of these techniques is to form a systematic approach to decision- 
making that should be less affected by the human nature and should also reduce 
the cognitive work for pilots. Two ADM training mnemonics formed a suitable 
basis for decision-making training which encompassed the requirements of the six 
basic decision making situations. SHOR was rated as being the best ADM 
mnemonic method in time-limited and critical, urgent situations; DESIDE was 
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regarded as superior for knowledge-based decisions which required more 
comprehensive considerations but which also had the time available to do so. The 
ADM training program based on these mnemonics improved pilots' in-flight 
decision-making performance. Improvements of pilots' situation assessment and 
risk management were obtained, but at the expense of response time. To 
maximize ADM training benefits, more practice in the simulator may help 
minimize response time. 
6. The most significant aspect of decision-making is situation assessment. This is a 
precursor for situation awareness, which itself is the precursor for all tasks of 
decision-making (Lipshitz, 1993). In the tactical environment, effective decision- 
making is highly dependent on situation awareness for safety of flight operations. 
This research demonstrated that pilots conducted situation assessment for making 
decision by assessing of the precipitating threats and evaluating potential courses 
of action. Pilots needed to perform mental simulation to assess the situations for 
impending threats and managing risks to gain the situation awareness for making 
decision in the dymanic environment, although it might have delay for response 
time. It is possible that further training and practice may subsequently increase 
the speed of the decision-making process. As pilots were not familiar with the 
ADM mnemonics, they spent more time applying these steps. After they have had 
more opportunity to practice these ADM mnemonics, their response times may be 
quicker. However, it may simply be that thinking more when conducting 
situational assessment and risk management takes more time and it is this 




To improve aviation safety of R. O. C. Air Force, it is necessary to specific the aeronautical 
decision-making training for military pilots. It is recommended that pilots have little 
control over the uncertain tactical situations which may confront them when flying a 
fighter aircraft. Therefore, it is important to train novice pilots with the relevant strategies 
for making appropriate decisions in different types of tactical envirom-nents. The findings 
suggest that a simple, short, cost-effective training programme in the appropriate use of 
ADM mnemonic methods will produce significant gains in flight safety. Such a course 
may easily be integrated into current CRM or simulator-based training programs. There 
are three recommendations for further research. 
1. Even though HFACS proved to be a suitable tool for both accident investigation 
and accident prevention, there is still a need for further research on its cross- 
cultural application. The accidents and incidents analysed all occurred in the 
R. O. C. Air Force, a collectivist and high power-distance culture (Hofstede, 2001). 
The pattern of statistical relationships between categories in the different levels of 
the HFACS may be culturally specific, however it is likely that other, similar 
patterns of relationship may be obtained in different cultures providing further 
empirical evidence to support the HFACS methodology. 
2. There is also a need to investigate if additional practice in the application of the 
ADM mnemonic methods in a flight simulator increases the speed of decision- 
making. The guideline for practicing ADM mnemonics should simply specify 
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applying SHOR in urgent situations with little time and using DESIDE when time 
is available for comprehensive consideration situations. They may be no 
requirement to appraise tranees of all six different basic types of decision. 
3. Training evaluation involved a series of levels, from the assessment of pilots' 
reactions to training, through measurement of individual changes in knowledge 
and behaviour, to the measurement of organizational change (Kirkpatrick, 1976). 
Further research is required that to evaluate longer-term effectiveness of such 
ADM training courses to see if it translates into improved decision-making 
behaviour during day-to-day operations which, ultimately also results in a 
reduction in the accident rate attributable to poor decision-making in the future. 
176 
REFERENCES 
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (1990), Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME 
near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989, Report no. Aircraft Accident Report 
4/90ý AAIB, Famborough. 
Arnold, R. L. (1989), 'Training Pilots for the Automated Cockpit', in Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Fifth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, Columbus, Ohio, The Ohio 
State University, pp. 87-90. 
Baron, J. and Hershey, J. C. (1988), 'Outcome bias indecision evaluation', Journal of Personality 
and Society Psychology, Vol. 54, pp. 569-579. 
Beach, L. R. and Lipshitz, R. (1993), 'Why Classical Decision Theory is an Inappropriate 
Standard for Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making', in Klein, G. A., 
Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in Action: 
Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 21-3 5. 
Beaubien, J. M. and Baker, D. P. (2002), 'A Review of Selected Aviation Human Factors 
Taxonomies, Accident/Incident Reporting Systems, and Data Collection Tools', 
International Journal ofApplied Aviation Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 11 -3 6. 
Benson, L. and Beach, L. R. (1996), 'The Effects of Time Constraints on the Pre-choice 
Screening of Decision Options', Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 222-228. 
Beringer, D. B. and Hancock, P. A. (1989), 'Exploring Situational Awareness: The Effects of 
Temporal Stress on Rectilinear Normalization', in Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Fifth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, The Ohio 
State University, pp. 646-65 1. 
Billings, C. E. (1996), Aviation Automation: The Searchfor a Human-center Approach, Lawrence 
Erlbaum, Hillsdale. 
177 
Branson, R. K., Rayner, G. T., Cox, J. L., Furman, J. P., King, F. J., and Hannum, W. H. (1975), 
Interservice Procedures for Instructional Systems Development, Report no. N613.39-73- 
C-0150, Naval Education and Training Command, Florida, U. S. A. 
Brown, R. V., Kahr, A. S., & Peterson, C (1974). Decision analysisfor the manager. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Buch, G. and Diehl, A. (1984), 'An Investigation of the Effectiveness of Pilot Judgment Training', 
Human Factors, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 557-564. 
Camerer, C. F. and Johnson, E. J. (1997), 'The Process-performance Paradox in expert judgment: 
How can experts know so much and predict so badlyT, in Goldstein, W. M. and Hogarth, 
R. M. (Editor), Research on Judgment and decision making : Currents, connections, and 
controversies, Cambridge University, Cambridge, pp. 342-364. 
Chase, W. G. and Simon, H. A. (1973), 'The Mind's eye in Chess', in Chase, W. G. (Editor), Visual 
information Processing, Academic Press, New York, pp. 21-35. 
Christensen, L. B. (1997), Experimental Methodology (7th edition), Prentice Hall, Sydney. 
Cohen, M. S. (1993), 'Three Paradigm for Viewing Decision Biases', in Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., 
Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in Action: Models and 
Methods , Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 36-50. 
Cohen, M. S., Freeman, J. T. and Thompson, B. B. (1997), 'Training the Naturalistic Decision 
Maker', in Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence 
Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp. 257-268. 
Cohen, M. S., Freemen, J. T. and Thompson, B. B. (1995), 'Training Metacognitive Skills for 
Decision Making', in Jensen, R. S. and Rakovan, L. A. (Editor), Eighth International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State 
University, pp. 789-794. 
Connolly, T. J., Blackwell, B. B. and Lester, L. F. (1989), 'A Simulator-based Approach to 
Training in Aeronautical Decision Making', Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 50-52. 
178 
David, G. (1997), 'Decision Making Training for Aircrew', in Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M., and 
Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress: Emerging Themes and Applications, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 243-25 1. 
Dekker, S. (2001 a), 'The Re-invention of Human Error', Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 
Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 247-266. 
Dekker,, S. (2001b), 'The Disembodiment of Data in the Analysis of Human Factors Accidents 1, 
Human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 39-57. 
Dekker, S. (2002), The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations, Ashgate, Aldershot, England. 
Dekker, S. and Johansson, B. K. (2001), 'Cockpit Automation and Ab-initio Pilot Training: Report 
on a European Experience', International Journal ofAviation Research and Development, 
Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 103 -116. 
Diehl, A. (1991a), 'The Effectiveness of Training Programs for Preventing Aircrew Error', in 
Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, 
Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 640-655. 
Diehl, A. (199 1 b)q 'A Workshop on Understanding and Preventing Aircrew Error', in Jensen, R. S. 
(Editor), Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, Columbus, Ohio, 
U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 28-39. 
Diehl, A. (1989), 'Human Performance/System Safety Issues in Aircraft Accident Investigation 
and Prevention'. in Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Fifth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, The Ohio State University, pp. 838-847. 
Drillings, M. and Serfaty, D. (1997), 'Naturalistic Decision Making in Command and Control', in 
Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence Erlbaum, 
Mahwah, pp. 71-80. 
Driskell, J. and Salas, E. (1991)ý 'Group decision making under stress. 
1, Journal ofApplied Psychology, Vol. 76, pp. 473 -478. 
Edland, A. and Svenson, 0. (1993), 'Judgment and Decision Making under Time Pressure: 
Studies and Findings', in Svenson, 0. and Maule, A. J. (Editor), Time Pressure and Stress 
in Human Judgment and Decision Making, Plenum, New York, pp. 27-40. 
179 
Endsley, M. R. (I 995a), 'Measurement of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems', Human 
Factors, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 65-84. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995b), ' Situation Awareness: Where Are We HeadedT, in Jensen, R. S. and 
Rakovan, L. A. (Editor), Eighth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, 
Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 728-733. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995c), 'Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems', Human 
Factors, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 32-64. 
Endsley, M. R. (1997), 'The Role of Situation Awareness in Naturalistic Decision Making, in 
Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence Erlbaum, 
Mahwah, pp. 269-284. 
Endsley, M. R. (1993), 'A survey of Situation Awareness Requirements in Air-to-Air Combat 
Fighters', The International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 157-168. 
Endsley, M. R. and Bolstad, C. A. (1994), 'Individual Differences in Pilot Situation Awareness', 
The International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 241-264. 
Federal Aviation Administration (1991), Aeronautical Decision-making, Report no. Advisory 
Circular 60-22, US Department of Transport, Washington. 
Federal Aviation Administration (1993), Crew Resource Management Training, Report no. 
Advisory Circular 120-5 1 A, US Department of Transport, Washington. 
Feggetter, A. J. (1991), 'The Development of an Intelligent Human Factors Data Base as an Aid 
for the Investigation of Aircraft Accidents', in Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Sixth International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State 
University, pp. 324-629. 
Fischer, U., Orasanu, J., and Wich, A (1995), 'Expert Pilots' Perceptions of Problem Situations', 
in Jensen, R. S. and Rakovan, L. A. (Editor), Eighth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 777-782. 
Foushee, H. C. (1984), 'Dyads and Triads at 35,000 Feet: Factors affecting Group Process and 
Aircrew Perfonnance', American Psychologist, Vol. 39, pp. 885-893. 
180 
Galotti, K. M. (2002), Making Decision That Matter: How People Face Important Life Choices, 
Lawrence Erlbaurn, New Jersey. 
Harle, P. G. (1995), 'Investigation of Human Factors: the link to accident prevention', in 
McDonald, N., Johnston, R., and Fuller, R. (Editor), Applications of Psychology to the 
Aviation System, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, England, pp. 10 1- 107. 
Harris, D. (1995), 'The Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data: methodological issues in the 
derivation of trends from incident reports', in McDonald, N., Johnston, R., and Fuller, R. 
(Editor), Applications of Psychology to the Aviation System, Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, England, pp. 117-122. 
Hawkins, F. H. (1993), Human Factors in Flight, Ashgate, Aldershot, England. 
Hays, W. L. (1980), Statistics, (3rd Edition). London; Prentice-Hall. 
Helmreich, R. L. (1994). 'Anatomy of a System Accident: The Crash of Avianca Flight 02 5, The 
International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 265-284. 
Helmreich, R. L. and Merritt, A. C. (1998), Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine: National, 
Organizational and Professional Influences, Ashgate, Aldershot, England. 
Hofstede, G. (2001), Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, Institutions, and 
Organizations Across Nations, Sage Publications, California. 
Hollnagel, E. (1998), Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), Elsevier 
Science, Oxford, England. 
Hormann, H. J. (1995), 'FOR-DEC: a perspective model for aeronautical decision making ', in 
Fuller, R., Johnston, R., and McDonald, N. (Editor), Human Factors in Aviation 
Operations, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, England, pp. 17-23. 
Huddlestone, J. A. (2003), An Evaluation of the Training Effectiveness of a Low-Fidelity, Multi- 
Player Simulatorfor Air Combat Training Cranfield University, England. 
Hunter, D. R. (2003), 'Measuring General Aviation Pilot Judgment Using a Situational Judgment 
Technique'. 7-he International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 373-386. 
181 
Hunter, D. R. and Baker, R. M. (2000), 'Reducing Accidents among General Aviation Pilots through a 
National Aviation Safety Progranv, in Hayward, B. J. and Lowe, A. R. (Editor), The Fourth 
Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium, Vol. 1, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, 
Janis, I. L. and Mann, L. ( 1977), Decision making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, 
and Commitment, Free Press, New York. 
Jensen, R. and Benel, R. (1977), Judgment Evaluation and Instruction in Civil Pilot Training, 
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D. C. 
Jensen, R. and Hunter, D. (2002), General Aviation Aeronautical Decision-making, FAA, 
Washington, D. C. 
Jensen, R. S. (1997), 'The Boundaries of Aviation Psychology, Human Factors, Aeronautical 
Decision Making, Situation Awareness, and Crew Resource Management', The 
International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 259-268. 
Jensen, R. S., Guilke, J. and Tigner, R. (1997), 'Understanding Expert Aviator Judgment', in Flin, 
R., Salas, E., Strub, M., and Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress .- 
Emerging Themes and Applications, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 233-242. 
Jing, H. S., Lu, C. J. and Peng, S. J. (2001), 'Culture, Authoritarianism and Commercial Aircraft 
Accident', Human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 341-359. 
Johnston, N. (1993a), 'CRM: Cross-Cultural Perspectives', in Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. G., and 
Helmreich, R. L. (Editor), Cockpit Resource Management, Academic Press, San Diego, 
pp. 367-398. 
Johnston, N. (1993b), 'Regional and Cross-Cultural Aspects of CRM', in Hayward, B. J. and 
Lowe, A. R. (Editor), Australian Aviation Psychology Symposium, Sydney, 
Kaempf, G. L. and Klein, G. (1994), 'Aeronautical Decision Making: The Next Generation', in 
Johnston, N., McDonald, N., and Fuller, R. (Editor), Aviation Psychology in Practice, 
Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 223-254. 
Kaempf, G. L. and Orasanu, J. (1997), 'Current and Future Applications of Naturalistic Decision 
Making', in Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp. 81-90. 
182 
Va 
Keinan, G. (1987), 'Decision-making under Stress: Scanning Alternatives under ControUable and 
uncontrollable Tbreats', Jownal ofPersonality andSocial PsycholoST, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 639-644. 
Kirkpatrick, D. L. (1998), Evaluating Training Programs, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco. 
Kirkpatrick, D. L. (1976), 'Evaluation of Training, in Craig, R. L. and Bittel, L. R. (Editor), 
Training and Development Handbook, McGraw Hill, New York, pp. 18.1-18.27. 
Kirwan, B. and Ainsworth, L. K. (1992), A Guide to Task, 4nalysis, Taylor & Francis, London. 
Klein, G. and Thordsen, M. L. (1991), 'Representing Cockpit Crew Decision Making', in Jensen, 
R. S. (Editor), Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, 
Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 1026-103 1. 
Klein, G. A. (2000), 'Analysis of Situation Awareness from Critical Incident Reports, in Endsley, 
M. R. and Garland, D. J. (Editor), Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement, 
Lawrence Erlbaum, London, pp. 51-71. 
Klein, G. A. (1997), 'The Current Status of the Naturalistic Decision Making Framework', in Flin, 
R., Salas, E., Strub, M., and Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress .- 
Emerging Themes and Applications, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 11 -2 8. 
Klein, G. A. (I 993a), 'A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making', 
in Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision 
Making in Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 13 8-147. 
Klein, G. A. (I 993b), 'Twenty Questions: Suggestions for Research in Naturalistic Decision Making', 
in Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 3 89-403. 
Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R. and MacGregor, D. (1989), 'Critical Decision Method for Eliciting 
Knowledge ', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Mans, and Cybernetics, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 
462-472. 
Klien, G. and Klinger, D. (1991), Naturalistic Decision-making, CSERIAC, Gateway, 2,14. 
183 
Klein, G. A. and Woods, D. D. (1993), 'Conclusions: Decision Making in Action', in Klein, G. A., 
Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in Action: 
Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 404-411. 
Klein, H. A. (2004), 'Cognition in Natural Settings: The Cultural Lens Model', in Kaplan, M. 
(Editor), Cultural Ergonomics, Elsevier, San Diego, pp. 249-280. 
Kluckhohm, C. (1951). 'The Study of Culture', in Lerner, D. and Lasswell, H. D. (Editor), The 
Policy Sciences, Standford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp. 8 6-10 1. 
Landis, J. R. and Koch, G. G. (1977). 'The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical 
Data', Biometrics, 33,159-174. 
Layton, C., Smith, P. J. and McCoy, E. (1994), 'Design of a Cooperative Problem-solving System 
for En-route Flight Planning: An Empirical Evaluation', Human Factors, Vol. 36, No. 1, 
pp. 94-119. 
Liý W. C. and Harris, D. (2005a), 'Aeronautical Decision-Making: Instructor-Pilot Evaluation of Five 
Mnemonic Methods', Aviation Space Environmental Medicine, Vol. 76, pp. 115 6-116 1. 
Li, W. C. and Harris, D. (2005b), 'HFACS Analysis of R. O. C. Air Force Aviation Accidents: 
reliability analysis and cross-cultural comparison', International Journal of Applied 
Aviation Studies, Vol. 5. No. 1, pp. 65-81. 
Li, W. C., Harris, D., and Yu, C. S. (2005c), 'The Investigation of Aeronautical Decision-making 
Training Acronyms between Experts and Novices', in Patankar, M. S. (Editor), The Second 
Conference of Safety Across High-Consequence Industries, Saint Louis, U. S. A., Saint 
Louis University, pp. 69-74. 
Lipshitz, R. (1993), 'Converging Themes in the Study of Decision-making in Realistic Settings', 
in Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision 
Making in Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 103 -13 7. 
Lloyd, P., Mayes, A., Manstead, A. S. R., Meudell, P. R., and Wagner, H. L. (1990), Introduction to 
Psychology: An Integrated Approach, Fontana, London. 
Maher, J. (1989), 'Beyond CRM to Decisional Heuristics: An Airline Generated Model to 
Examine Accidents and Incidents Caused by Crew Errors in Deciding', in Jensen, R. S. 
184 
(Editor), Fifth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, 
The Ohio State University, pp. 439-444. 
Maurino, D. E. (1999), 'Crew Resource Management: A Time for Reflection', in Garland, D. J., 
Wise, J. A., and Hopkin, V. D. (Editor), Handbook ofAviation Human Factors, Lawrence 
Erlbaurn, Mahwah, pp. 215-234. 
Maurino, D. E., Reason, J., Johnston, N., and Lee, R. B. (1995), Beyond Aviation Human Factors, 
Ashgate Publishing, England. 
Means, B., Salas, E., Crandall, B. and Jacobs, T. O. (1993), 'Training Decision Makers for the Real 
World', in Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision 
Making in Action: Models andMethods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 306-326. 
Merritt, A. C. (1993), (Editor), Australian Aviation Psychology Industry Seminar, Sydney, 
Australian Aviation Psychology Association., 
Mj os, K. (200 1), 'Communication and operational failurs in the cockpit, An International Journal 
Lr.. 
human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 323-339. 
Mosier, K. (1991). 'Expert Decision Making Strategies', in Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Sixth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The 
Ohio State University, pp. 266-271. 
Mosier, K. L. and Skitka, L. J. (1996). 'Human Decision Makers and Automated Decision Aids: 
Made for Each OtherT, in Mouloua, M. and Parasuraman, R. (Editor), Human 
Performance in Automated Systems: Current Research and Trends, Lawrence Erlbaurn, 
New Jersey, pp. 201-220. 
Mosier, K. L., Skitka, L. J., Heers, S. and Burdick, M. (1998), 'Automation Bias: Decision Making 
and Performance in High-Tech Cockpits', The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 47-63. 
Murray, S. R. (1997), 'Deliberate Decision Making by Aircraft Pilots: A simple Reminder to 
Avoid Decision Making Under Panic', The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 83-100. 
185 
National Transportation Safety Board (1991), Aircraft Accident Report: the Airline of Columbia, 
Boeing 707-321B (NTSBIAAR-91-04), NTSB, Washington, D. C. 
Noble, D. (1993), 'A Model to Support Development of Situation Assessment Aids', in Klein, 
G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 287-305. 
O'Connor, P., Flin, R. and Fletcher, G. (2002), 'Techniques used to evaluate CRM Training: a 
literature review', Human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 217-233. 
O'Connor, P., Flin, R., Fletcher, G. and Hernsley, P. (2002), 'Methods used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Flightcrew CRM Training in the UK Aviation Industry', Human Factors 
andAerospace Safety, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 235-255. 
O'Hare, D. (2003), 'Aeronautical Decision Making: Metaphors, Models, and Methods', in Tsang, 
P. S. and Vidulich, M. A. (Editor), Principles and Practice ofAviation Psychology: Human 
Factors in Transportation, Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey, pp. 201-237. 
O'Hare, D. (1992), 'The Artful Decision Maker: A Framework Model for Aeronautical Decision 
Making', The International Journey ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 175 -192. 
Oldaker, I. (1996), 'Pilot Decision Making - An Alternative to Judgment Training', Technical 
Soaring, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 36-41. 
Orasanu, J. (1993), 'Decision Making in the Cockpit', in Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. G., and 
Helmreich, R. L. (Editor), Cockpit Resource Management, Academic Press, San Diego, 
pp. 137-172. 
Orasanu, J. (1991), 'Infonnation Transfer and Shared Mental Models of Decision Making', in 
Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Sixth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, 
Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 272-277. 
Orasanu, J. (1995), 'Situation Awareness: It's Role in Flight Crew Decision Making? ', in Jensen, 
R. S. and Rakovan, L. A. (Editor), Eighth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 2, Columbus, Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 734-739. 
186 
Orasanu, 1 (1997), 'Stress and Naturalistic Decision Making: Strengthening the weak Links', in 
Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M., and Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress: 
Emgering Themes and ApplicationsAldershot, England, pp. 43-66. 
Orasanu, J. and Connolly, T. (1993), 'The Reinvention of Decision Making', in Klein, G. A., 
Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in Action: 
Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 3 -20. 
Orasanu, J., Davison, J., and Fischer, U. (200 1), 'The Role of Risk in Aviation Decision Making: 
How Pilots Perceive and Manage Flight Risks', Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 45th Annual Meeting, Vol. 1, Upper Midwest Chapter, 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, 
USA, pp. 58-62. 
Orasanu, J., Davison, J., and Fischer, U. (1997), 'What Did He Say? Culture and Language 
Barries to Efficient Communication in Global Aviation', in Jensen, R. S. and Rakovan,, 
L. A. (Editor), Ninth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, Columbus, 
Ohio, U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 673-678. 
Orasanu, J. and Fischer, U. (1997), 'Finding Decisions in Natural Environments: The View From 
the Cockpit', in Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, 
Lawrence Erlbaurn, Mahwah, pp. 343-358. 
Orasanu, J. and Salas, E. (1993), 'Team Decision Making in Complex Environments', in Klein, 
G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 327-345. 
Parasuraman, R. and Riley, V. (1997), 'Humans and automation: use, misuse, disuse, abuse ', 
Human Factors, Vol. 39, pp. 230-253. 
Patrick, J. (2003), 'Training', in Tsang, P. S. and Vidulich, M. A. (Editor), Principles and Practice 
of Aviation Psychology: Human Factors in Transportation, Lawrence ErIbaurn, New 
Jersey, pp. 397-434. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R. and Johnson, E. J. (1988), 'Adaptive Strategy Selection in Decision-making', 
Journal ofExperimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, Vol. 14, pp. 534-552. 
187 
Prince, C., Hartel, C., and Salas, E. (1993), 'Aeronautical Decision Making and Consistency of 
Crew Behaviours: Implications for Training', in Jensen, R. S. and Neumeister, D. (Editor), 
Seventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Vol. 1, Columbus, Ohio, 
U. S. A., The Ohio State University, pp. 248-251. 
Prince, C. and Salas, E. (1997), 'Situation Assessment for Routine Flight and Decision Making', 
International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 315-324. 
Prince, C. and Salas, E. (2000), 'Team Situation Awareness, Errors, and Crew Resource 
Management: Research Integration for Training Guidance, in Endsley, M. R. and Garland, 
D. J. (Editor), Situation Awareness Analysis and Measurement, Lawrence ErIbaum 
London, pp. 325-345. 
Prince, C. and Salas E. (1993), 'Training and Research for Teamwork in the Military Aircrew', in 
Wiener, E. L., Kanki, B. G., and Helmreich, R. L. (Editor), Cockpit Resource Management, 
Academic Press, San Diego, 
Rasmussen, J. (1993). 'Deciding and Doing: Decision Making in Natural Contexts', in Klein, 
G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., and Zsambok, C. E. (Editor), Decision Making in 
Action: Models and Methods, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 158-171. 
Reason, J. (1990), Human Error, Cambridge University, New York. 
Reason, J. (1997), Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate, Aldershot, 
England. 
Sarter, N. B. and Woods, D. D. (1994), 'Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation: An 
Experimental Study of Pilot's Mental Model and Awareness of the Flight Management 
System', The International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-28. 
Sarter, N. B. and Woods, D. D. (1992), 'Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation: Operational 
Experiences with the Flight Management System', The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 303-321. 
Sarter, N. B. and Woods, D. D. (1991), 'Situation Awareness: A Critical but ill-defined 
Phenomenon', The International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 45-57. 
188 
Schaub, H. (1997), 'Decision Making in Complex Situations: Cognitive and Motivational Limitations, 
in Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M., and Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress : 
Emerging Themes and Applications, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 291-300. 
Shappell, S. A. and Wiegmann, D. A. (2001), 'Applying Reason: the human factors analysis and 
classification system (HFACS)', Human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 59-86. 
Shappell, S. A. and Wiegmann, D. A. (2004), 'HFACS Analysis of Military and Civilian Aviation 
Accidents: A North American Comparison', International Society of Air Safety 
Investigators, Australia, Queensland, pp. 2-8. 
Shappell, S. A. and Wiegmann, D. A. (2003), A Human Error Analysis of General Aviation 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain Accidents Occurring Between 1990-1998, Report no. 
DOT/FAA/AM-03/4, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC. 
Slovic, P. (1987), 'Perception of Risk', Science, Vol. 236, No. 4799, pp. 280-285. 
Soeters, J. L. and Boer, P. C. (2000), 'Culture and flight safety in military aviation, The 
International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 111- 133. 
Stiensmeier-Pelster, J. and Schurmann, M. (1993), 'Information Processing in Decision Making 
under Time Pressure: The Influence of Action Versus State Orientation', in Svenson, 0. 
and Maule, A. J. (Editor), Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision 
Making, Plenum, New York, pp. 241-253. 
Stokes, A. F., Kemper, K. and Kite, K. (1997), 'Aeronautical Decision Making, Cue Recognition, 
and Expertise Under Time Pressure', in Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), 
Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence ErIbuarn, Mahwah, pp. 183-196. 
Svenson, 0. (1997), 'Differentiation and Consolidation Theory', in Flin, R., Salas, E., Strub, M., 
and Martin, L. (Editor), Decision Making Under Stress : Emerging Themes and 
Applications, Ashgate, Aldershot, England, pp. 301-314. 
Thomas, M. J. (2003), 'Improving organizational safety through the integrated evaluation of 
operational and training performance: an adaptation of the Line Operations Safety Audit 
(LOSA) methodology', Human Factors andAerospace Safety, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 25-45. 
189 
Thomas, M. J. (2004), 'Predictors of Threat and Error Management: Identification of Core 
Nontechnical Skills and Implications for Training Systems Design', The International 
Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 207-23 1. 
Waag, W. L. and Bell, H. H. (1997), 'Situation Assessment and Decision Making in Skilled 
Fighter Pilots', in Zsambok, C. E. and Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp. 247-256. 
Wickens, C. D. and Flach, J. M. (1988), 'Information Processing', in Wiener, E. L. and Nagel, D. C. 
(Editor), Human Factors in Aviation, Academic Press, San Diego, pp. II 1- 15 5. 
Wickens, C. D., Stokes, A., Barnett, B. and Hyman, F. (1993). 'The effects of Stress on Pilot 
Judgment in a MIDIS Simulator', in Svenson, 0. and Maule, A. J. (Editor), Time Pressure 
and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making, Plenum, New York, pp. 271-292. 
Wiegmann, D. A. and Shappell, S. A. (2001 a), 'Applying the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System to the Analysis of Commerical Aviation Accident Data', in Jensen, 
R. S. (Editor), Eleventh International Symposium on Aviation Ps chology, Columbus, Y 
Ohio, The Ohio State University, 
Wiegmann, D. A. and Shappell, S. A. (2001b), 'Human Error Perspectives in Aviation', The 
International Journal ofAviation Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 341-357. 
Wiegmann, D. A. and Shappell, S. A. (2001c), 'Human Error Analysis of Commercial Aviation 
Accidents: Application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System', 
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 72, No. 11, pp. 1006-1016. 
Wiegmann, D. A. and Shappell, S. A. (2003), A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident Analysis: 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, Ashgate, Aldershot, England. 
Wiegmann, D. A. and Shappell, S. A. (1997), 'Human Factors Analysis of Postaccident Data: 
Applying Theoretical Taxonomies of Human Error', The International Journal ofAviation 
Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 67-8 1. 
Wiegmann, D. A., Zhang, H., Thaden, T. L., Sharma, G. and Gibbons, A. M. (2004), 'Safety 
Culture: An Integrative Review', The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, Vol. 
14, No. 2, pp. 117-134. 
190 
Wiener, E. L. (1985). 'Cockpit Automation: In Need of a Philosophy', Proceeding of the 198.5 
Behavioural Engineering Conference, Warrandale, PA, USA, Society of Automative 
Engineers, pp. 369-375. 
Wiener, E. L. (1989), Human Factors of Advanced Technology Transport Aircraft, NASA Ames 
Research Center, Moffet Field, CA. 
Wiggins, M. W. and Stevens, C. (1999), Aviation Social Science: Research Methods in Practiceg 
Ashgate, Aldershot. 
WoK J. G. (1981). 'Force management decision requirements for air force tactical command and 
control', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Mans, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC- 11, pp. 618-63 9. 
Yates, J. F. and Stone, E. R. (1992). 'Risk Appraisal', in Yates, J. F. (Editor), Risk-taking 
Behaviour, John Wiley & Sons, Oxford, England, pp. 49-85. 
I 
Zakay, D. (1993), 'The Impact of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making under Time 
Stress', in Svenson, 0. and Maule, A. J. (Editor), Time Pressure and Stress in Human 
Judgment and Decision Making, Plenum, New York, pp. 59-72. 
Zakay, D. and Wooler, S. (1984), 'Time Pressure, Training and Decision Effectiveness', 
Ergonomics, Vol. 27, pp. 273-284. 
Zsarnbok, C. E. (1997), Naturalistic Decision Making: Where Are We Now?, in Zsambok, C. E. and 
Klein, G. (Editor), Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence ErIbaurn, Mahwah, pp. 3-16. 
191 
Appendix A- Evaluating the Suitability of ADM Mnemonics 
*; MAJRFE(No. 2 is making the decision as the leader 
abandons a tactical formation take-off during a taxi run at 145 knots) 
A "'R(Scenario) 
tAMM X it FOROP-MV. F-5E 00 VFM MINH', % 150 NIFRe"q Al IN it -_ 
MEN 
, 13 50 
A%LMR*-, tXEE* 
, 13519MMIMMAEOR S`/JN 
A/B %SLZ_VA__PHR4EE*APiW , _ýE 145 
MWIIM42404Lead R AR YR ? (A Lieutenant pilot 
flying an F-5E (No. 2) equipped with a 150-gallon-tank in centerline was ready to take off with 
the Leader (No. 1). During the take-off run, in order to maintain the normal formation position, 
No. 2 pulled the throttle to minimum A/B (after burner) because of a tendency to pass Leader 
when the Leader called etit "Abort" at 14.5 knots of ground speed. ) 
ROURAR(Question) 
r 81-11111119204A (What would you do if you were the No. 2? ) 
(, 941UMA-Please read the questions on the following 5-pages 




(1) SHOR, (2) PASS, (3) FOR-DEC, (4) SOAR, (5) DESIDE 
41vý rm", 1 aj 
_j 
Wlft)ýA ' L-T"MEN-, UN-6MMIZON)ýA ?? 
(Which ADM nmemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SHOR r3Rff&VNIj" j --SHOR ADM training 
(S) (Stimuliq perceives surroundings change. ) 
(Fonnation take-off position over leader). 
(2) jVrJAft 145 Rolling speed 145 knots, leader calling "abort"), 
(H) V& (Hypotheses, ? -Hypotheses for 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? " 
(1) AfAýqrVjrjM (Something is wrong with leader) 0 
(2) (1 need to think about the potential risk for me with the 
situation of leader) 
(0) MR Qptions, ny ? 9PHfqf& ? -What thing is the first priority. to 
do now? How to do it ?) 
(1) 4ý, arq *44: 04QWaff , (Reducing throttle to maintain a 
normal formation position, abandoned taking-off with leader),, 
(2) 9,42, ýt&YY LMJEIM*fý , OffifffiRkEA (Maintain half-runway normal operation, 
continued single take-off ). 
flDý ffilsf- -M , ýI'j _WjFXA,, 
(Response, RYNf7 - fiWf+& ? PUfkfiW ? fkH4, fiW, ? Yffln ? ... -To take 
action. What to do? How to do it? When to do it? Where to go now? ) 
NORMA (Continuing take-off), 
0_1 ;ý rjn*g jtj 0,7ý (1) ýE ft 91 RA A3- JR WN] JR IT AA rjR4j: AVtjll, IT V' W44 SHOR I 
f" p0 fnj ?(I rEQ IM x* 4R 11' 9 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5. Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) ; tt-ILEX-RAWROS SHOR 
q4m' MIS 951 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
j 
ýIj SHOR 





In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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rjR4TAWMjj, *j 2 r-, IjITJ, ±-, pofal (4) SHOR T 
95,1,1111-HUR-MVP ) 
98 7654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9. Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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PASS r'jRffýMWIj* j -PASS ADM training 
(P) fRUMMIM (Problem identification, PnH)j [] ' ý3MRrrj=PRr±-To identify NuffiAlY 
surroundings and problems at present. ) 
(1) AfRN AfflZIE4'[pfiRf§(Leader's acceleration is slower than normal. ). 
(2) K-fRffTPPV3VkBj-ft(Leader calls out "abort" by radio. ). 
(3) -- 
V), fR F,, -, rf'ýTVýRjE'4(No. 2's operation is normal. ) 0 
(A) (Acquire information, collect information 
concerning problems. ) 
(1) r7cYq: RfAqPPa-AkEA(Listen "abort" from leader. ). 
(2) LMRL*ftY=JZW9ýýLBA(Remaining runway is long enough for safe 
take-off. ) 
(S) *JWMPIýr (Survey strategy, fAQ'tVP ,, 
ftArrl -"" ff NZAMMKite-, MMPT, ý- To survey the 
strength and weakness of strategies for solving problems. 
(1) ffi abort take-off with leader 
will interrupt the following emergency operation. ). 
kBA(No. 2 continues to take off with half 
runway. ). 
(S) -ZMMPI6 (Select strategy, To choice the most proper strategy and 
take action. ) 
OM *-&8LdPnAr9, WMkBA(Contiu'e to take off with half runway. ),, 
(1) TIE ft ol &, * A-3 JR rýN 3R IT' Fri J-'%" rp , :m -W 




In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
,Z pASS rf (2) 
440fnj ?( -P-jA'-V- 5 AI*4Rif& 1, Offflil-MOM ) rau fim 
987654321 
In this.. scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 





gRm OBYRrt w14 PASS _j 
Z rfl4r. jWgj Mýj, *pafrjj ( gbt (3) jA 
RMAM )? 9, A -Pflgýý 5, ýM&g 1, OWN-MP) 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
Tpi (4) tt-ftfURIT-121-r-UP PASS r'YRI AVMIIW, ;L r* JITIt 
--qJ ff I 4R REO 9, A-P-Hit. 0- 5, --QJrTlVRfl NOWN-fMIM 
987654321 
In this scenano, what do you think about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
************************************************************************* 
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FOR-DEC r'lRffMTIj* j -FOR-DEC ADM training 
X& (Facts, WPULAM, ýýtftftixt& ? -What's happening now? 
(1) MA A#j-jfA*f_QV(Something wrong with lea .ýN 
der's speed. ) 0 
(2) : Rf%K- LVft 145 ýfflff4, PTP9VtkEA(Rolling speed 145 knots, leader calling "abort". ) 0 
(0) Z* (9ptions, What strategies can be selected? 
(1) ffi: RM-k_BtA%VkBA(Abort take-, off with leader. ) 0 
(2) Rn, t&% L-6 F, ýffefflftBA(Continuing to take off with half runway. ). 
(R) I's-#j9KfjM LRisk&Benefits, r: EffffR94%M ? -Are there any 
risk and benefits for different strategies? ) 
MUTIZYMMEM 
(Keeping formation position will make remaining runway not enough to achieve the 
required speed for take off which results in dangerous situation for leader and itself),, 
(2) n 43RfRIE'A(Pilot can judge whether the 
aircraft is normal or not according to rolling distance, speed and engine's instruments. ),, 
HU --(Before achieving 
Go No Go, it is (3) yj! ýZ' , 
first to keep formation position nonnal. ). 
V, -Y, RqjWftý, OýV(Leader's decision to (4) k 
abort take-off gives No. 2a more explicit reference for the following operation. ),, 
(5) 
leader aborts take-off, the speed and remaining runway support No. 2 to keep the 
operation of take-off. ),, 
(6) Waff - IN I 38-R*trWVI*(If 'M _[RfH_U_ Jýý in 
No. 2 makes the same decision to abort take-off, it wilf increase the interruptions and 
dangers to both of aircrafts. ) 
(D) &jL-, (Decision, ""j'ý-jkf To select the best strategy. jI IS -4 
91-L continue to take off with half - "I"RAWan, taffi MUMMA "A", lugý--ýZýAjtd-Y(To 
runway is the safest decision. 
I& )" f qf& (E) ýAff (Execution, kfffM M?? PD ? Jo execute this 
strategy and watch out for when, what and how to do it. ) 
I an, tW8L6MTJ_ , anK, atawn LýRft*f'f ( No. 2 pushes 
throttle to the maximum and continues to take off with half side of runway with the 
suggested speed. ). 
(C) *0 LCheck, *, K,, Vf[MMflf To check if each xu 
operation influences flight safety. 
rp 1%, (To keep aircraft on centerline of half runway. ) o 
Jk,, Tt: qP, YjNL6(T6 watch out the remaining runway. ) 0 (2) 
t3i-frT(To analyze the probability of RTB-return to base or transfer 
to the other bases. 
197 
(1) ýMVMAWM-, 3%4__TrFV%ftrP 0 
ZVE44 FOR-DEC r3%4TAVMIM#j 2- rJERIT-Iti 
A ýN Ix *0f n_J ? _0201 9, A __PJ 151'c A5, ýk 111 ,IAMM-fMR T- 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) W-T SPAVO 
, 
2*44 FOR-DEC rMITAM-1110 
?95, lx*4Rff_k I 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
TAMIN _j 
rý x *Pnfn-j g (3) T 4r. j%q , 
ftf 
j 9W 
-9 51 T'RPHOW) ? (, xk**F0j ARNO 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) 
.: 
MV, %FOR-DEC r'M4: TAVVI, %j Z rT4j: ltj pag? 
It 9 10 A5, __9J ff lt & 11 rm 0 ig -M Ik 5P 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you thýnk about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 





(S) MhA (Situation, HfrijAft Afif-39RA ? -What are the situations of 
aircrafts, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) (Leader's acceleration is abnormal. ). 
(2) -: Kf&K- LWft 145 fflH4, qPP&*kBA(When rolling speed 145 knots, leader calls out 
ýGnlkort'9. ) 
, au 
(0) ajo (2ptionS9 ? 7121 "IMMIMM-To 
evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. ) 
(i) jLkarwa mv-409WRIEAMN reduces speed 
and maintains normal formation position till the situation is more explicit, and then 
operates. the following procedures. 
(2) N,, t'mffTPP " --V ,, LfRffiffi" 
(To keep throttle position normal and 
prepare to call out "No. 2 overshoot". ),, 
leader 
nu aborted take-off, No. 2 continues or aborts the operation for take-off. ) 
(A) LA c t, *A F-T PfT M; 2ja fj execute the --Mvý I -- -a la 
best strategy and watch out surroundings' change. 
LIva &,, `j- ,f (The -I-mn ml 
following operation is based on what the leader's determination is, if the situation is 
harmful to me, how long the remaining runway is and what the speed is. ),, 
(2). ý, fl4, t&, N continue to take off with half runway is the 
safest strategY. ). 
ty (Lkepeat, MTV!, 01, WJIVII (R) NIL, UfJhKf_: JI____ mpfý 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight surroundings and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the best strategy. ) 
I M-rofff IVIRIAMONFUtaff, 31PI-MlYIN MWIMM, Aft*AK 
fq(Before the decision of Go-No Go, to repeat evaluation for formation 
position, runway's remaining length, speed and leader's decision. ). 
(2) 
_014f 
(No. 2 continues to take off 
with half runway until safe amount of fuel and then landing. 
SOAR rql-AVgll, *j ;ý rar, = -Itj o, " 'IL T IT x* 
"ý X flij ?( 5* * 4ý `IN- 9, h. --QJ IX 9- 5, e* IR «1, PA M iä -A IK e2 ) 4t rm 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 




; ý, rj (2) 
PQ fill ?( ýk * 4R -r% 9, A -r-IJ tic-f- 5 ýk 4R il 11 MM- im a ýP 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
, JmL14 SOAR f6, , pQ n( : N, (3) ; rEftV-&*W8JWIffWPAr-P , 
V, ý "I'x-Tra f1i rb '- 
RP 04PI! )? (9, A --nJ" 5, *%k*aJ& 1, MIM-flMEP ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) SOAR r'JRffAVffjIj, *j Zr RHTltj PON 
-P-Jff WMIMI 9, A --PJJ5R-V- 5, --PJff 1tWI 1, j'Fj ffijN-JM a*! ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SOAR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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DESIDE r- 3A? T&MV1J" j -DESIDE ADM training 
(D) %9, JR (L)etect, W%9,11 detect if any unusual condition 
about surroundings and aircraft. ) 
(1) (The formation checkpoint changed). 
(2) K-fAhn ARA1104 lKi PT RPa%KkVR ( Leader accelerated unnormally and c1led "abort" 
(E) Wirt (Estirnate, fRJ*PfiW3,8, -z2AfJ- T 71, !R 9ý evaluate the influence on 
flight safety based on flying condition. ) 
(1) fAW__TYFW WIM111; J 
VV I( According to the rolling distance and 
experience, something would be wrong wi th leader's speed),, 
(2) ý7 ! 5ý 0, ,I, QT jVH)JM,, f& (Maintaining HU c ME' - ý' - Nfxh -J 
ýZ` MWaff 
formation position before arriving the critical speed, there was no significant risk) 0 
(3) 
If there was no risk to me when leader abandoned take-off, it is safer to continue 
taking-off 
jM (Set Safety Objectives, WýA*, MýJ ? -Are there any 
(S) RAL31ý____h 
more proper strategy? ) 
(1) (Maintaining normalformation position). 
(2) WRfX[Fr, (jX JýJ Separating a room to keep safe),, 
(1) Jg%,, (Identify, ýA ,T ý Aft time enough to 
collect more information and evaluate strategies. 
(The "abandon" instruction of leader) o 
(2) [A rij L3kftýý, HU JP, (What is the, current speed now),, 
(3) JotpWF 
=-ý1JZkBAXL*ft 
(The take-off speed of present equipmented form 
(4) ; Ptffiý, ffi L-6 (The rest of the runway). 
(D) ff M (Do, Ufj_&fýýf_f M5ftM-Take action. 
(1) annayiN mmu--f , arqa)ý (Maintaining half-runway rolling, max-A/B). 
(2) L3VfQ: kEA (Obeying the take off speed that T. 0 instructed 
(E) WjR (fvaluate, ? Am 
evaluate the influence after taking action and continue watching for the changes of flying 
condition. ) 
%fgn, 
(Maintaining the center (1) -Jf111E -line of the half-runway or not) ? 
(2) 3PEqPYY WgýýCA (Is it possible for taking-off with the rest of the 
runway) ? 
(3) (Is the the take-off speed following on T. 0 instruction) ? 
(4) (The evaluation of return to base or land to other bases) ? 
201 
ZVE14 DESIDE rjjRý- O. J _ 
rjjL*gpj-t. 0, Tt TAVMII, 2A 
n fPJ ?k Am 9 --QJJ5rcA 5, ýMlg I Mil-MINT- 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
0 2- (2) tkVIAMAUM MT241" CP , 
2. WK44 DESIDE r3R4TAXIII, jZ rf,,,; Mqg3TJ 0, 
A -9, '. A5,154 * !R Id, 1110 A J! Al- * PQ OJ ? !R RIO 9,6-, -1, - 
98765432 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very, low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
r (3) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
jrj jj: lt n? (4) VtOUNTSHRIPP , 
211,44 DESIDE rJM: TAVAjIj, 4* pa fn-j 
A -- f- 5, TPHTItIft 11 151 IT It 4R At 9, No 91 grz - in 987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of DESIDE?. 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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#))L : engine out just as the nose gear leaves the 
ground. ) 
P, WNSitHVIN COW -9-PUP. F-5EOOOO 
VE IN 
, 
+, W 150 ftR6U'-A-MJ 
,S GC I 
Xlý MVE 
;N, P4, R3R'jWT-+ , 
RIbWQAIE* 
, 165 >1 
0 RREAUM Mitt ZKOW18ONVI 'N F& 
9, *Jj ýA A. (A Lieutenant pilot flying an F-5E equipped with a 150-gallon-tank in 
centerline, after a normal roll, was ready to take off with a speed of 165 knots. Just as the nose 





M: IN M J. 111 t fý% A Off AQ fal ? (What would you do if you were the pilot? ) 
(, 4AKWUR- Please read the questions on the following 5-pages 
first, and then answer the questions here) 
(1) SHOR, (2) PASS, (3) FOR-DEC, (4) SOAR, (5) DESIDE. 
ityl-H , Aff-tM 
_j 
XU*)V-_A ? fff! Fý 55"N 
(Which ADM mnemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SHOR ý- Af--TýAMgjljý* I 
z4Yqý$r±394ý2 %! I-L-Pilot perceives surroundings change. ) (S) Oft (-StiMUH9 TIF: 3 M f7- ANARI, 'r 
(1) kBfRjýýc! LgEgAL(The attitude for taking off had been set up. ) 0 
(2) engine had blast sound and then power off. ). 
(3) ýE-RRfA9, J] ! Ea (Left engine was normal. ). 
(4) kEfR L3VftS! fL(Speed for taking off was changed. ). 
(H) URQ (Hypotheses, ftfl& , ,? -Hypotheses for 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? ") 
that right engine's power off was 
resulted from FOD or IOD. 9 
(0) MR (ýqptionsq ? nl PPf5jfW ? -What thing is first priority to do 
now? How to do? ) 
(1) ATPVALBIR(Abort take-off immediately. ) 0, 
(2) ffikEA(To continue taking off with single engine. ) 0 
(3) Mý9jQ': J, 
', -MýT_4jVL*(Eject or not? ). 
(R) ffftiA, (Response, ? pnfýjfjW ? f5jHjfj! A ? Jýqgýjffl -What thing is ? 
first priority to do now? How to do? ) 
165 
-a 
Eg), -LBI JýJR, (Continue taking AL Rj? ý 
off with single engine). 
(The (2) 5PtqjPYIN NU 
remaining runway and present speed are enough to abort take-off, but the risk to stop 
aircraft safely is high. ) 0 
W_j ;ý rjMLM: -E if , . 10; SHOR "T tj 
: ': 'V Pa fnJ ?( I% *& r-r=u 9, A --AJ ticft 5, , 
lx * 4R Ilk I, IA ill A- fM -V 
12 ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very hig h: 9, Acceptable: 5*, Very low: I. Please select one number. ) 
W 
_1 
Z (2) rR4TAVMjj, =., a Iff gq, , 
2*44 SHOR 
jR -9 4R fEI, -=I-: rs] am 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9. Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
204 
Aob SHOR rWTM- Ipj rj*rEj". j 
MAW ?951 
987654321 
in this scenano, what -do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) V4 SHOR rMITMVMIIWj 2- r-,, pTjtj pnpq 
C= b95 RIJIT 
AE MIMI I 
987654321 
Ift this, scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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pASS r3Rff&MWjjN , 
(P) W9tI,, rrjN9 (Problem identification, PnH)j [j ' r± HUPfTSTý'*MIRMjMPfT ±-To identify 
surroun ings and problems at present. ) 
k-BAM9,9A, 0,40iff-M, , ; Eff4MM-,, K-5'&(When the attitude for taking off had been set 
up, right engine's power out. ) 0, 
(A) Xjf4Utj@, LAcquire information, J%Iffi. MiM-jTMZN, @, -Tb collect information 
concerning problems. ) 
attitude for taking off had been set up and nose 
wheel had been departed from runway. ). 
(2) --y. (Right engine failed(is out) probably because 
of FOD or IOD. ). 
(3) 2ýEffltf&E'M(Left engine is normal. ). 
(S) *JRTPI6 (Survey strategy, To survey the J 
strengths and weaknesses of strategies for solving problems. ) 
(1) 
_ýLNPR3VkEftAbort 
take-off immediately. ). 
(2) VýRn, kBfRjýftftfflkBjR(Maintain the attitude to take off. ). 
(S) ZMM* (Select strategy, Fj- To choose the best strategy and take 
action. ) 
LNfIII(To maintain the attitude to take off with 
single engine and to increase speed with little pitching angle. ). 




PQ DO ?I 
987654.3 21 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1. Please select one number. ) 
pASS ýEftfl&-*jLBJRrýN MITIftif-RPO w 
llý A5 IR II PE M 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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MjAftqj ,M PASS 
rWTMILW_j 2 r*rajeff (3) tibl-O. "ROMPI IT -j 
ý6' A* PA f5j (W NI x 
RMAN) ? (ý0WRE1059 ,A -P-Jg&' 5, Ix*IRI1 I, PF1 MR-f RMP 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
PASS (4) TtEILMORIT 111-Eft 
' 
rp Zr PJ IT lt i AQ fRJ ? 
--RJ FT It * _r'163 9, A --PJ tlt'A 5, -A-J ff I jR J& im - 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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FOR-DEC F%kfT_"TIjM I 
(F) (Facts, JLH4, fLj-ttR_t ffiVM& ? -What's happening now? ) 
ý'/_(The attitude for taking off had been set up. ),, 
(2) (Right engine had blast sound and power was off. ). 
(3) Mg (Left engine's power was normal. ). 
(4) ! RfR LýkftkBAkU -, k %-ýýt -no go speed. ). 
T PIA 
- 
L3kft(The aircraft speed was more than go 
(0) MIR (Pptions, R-ýqft ny%n, YjjN,, M J1 ý, ,, 
KýIq"M ?- What strategies can be selected? ) 
(1) AVPV*kUYR(Abort take-off immediately. ). 
(2) k(Maintain the attitude to take off),, 
(R) fffaffl*M (Risk & Benefits, ?- Are there any 
risks and benefits for different strategies? ) 
ýN"-, +, ýH(The following operation after aborting take-off will be unknown; it will be 
unknown to stop aircraft safely or to use safety net. ). 
(2) JHTRMfRTj-- )Ar Ti VA Ti I' 
ft)(According to the technical order, to take off is well, but it has risk to continue 
flying with failings. ). 
(3) 5q- 
the following operation, no matter take-off or landing, 
which were practiced with simulator or real flight, the factors pilot can handle are no 
problem. ),, 
(D) JkjL-, (Decision, To select the best strategy. 
R41MOVALEA(To continue take-off with single engine. ),, 
(E) tkff (Execution, "Y. -To execute this le, 
fiwf-F*,, ? PUMN ? 
strategy and watch out for when, what and how to do it. ) 
f IAT4101N (To maintain the attitude to 
take off with single engine and to increase speed with little pitching angle. ),, 
To check if each (C) *JW LCheck, I 
operation influences flight safety. 
(1) ? (Is take-off angle over or under? ) 
? (A etd left trimmers adjusted with (2) r righ an 
power distribution? ) 
(3) 4ýUUXV", 175 210 ýf LýVPR ? (Are landing gears up with the speed 
limitation between 175 and 210 knots? ) 
(4) M,, Nrj--3$ Lý4PR ? (What is the speed limitation for flaps? ) 
: 
-T 
? (Does aircraft climb to 2000 feet for eject? ) (5) 2000 
? (Operates smo thly at all time? ) (6) 0 
(7) ? (What is the base pattern for single engine landing? ) 
(8) ? (Is left engine power normal? ) 
? (What are thetips for bail out? ) 
* 
-1 ;ý 
rm r3ag ft (1) TtUMMARROMMARINAPP , 
2*44FOR-DEC r3TjýTAvgjjj, 
fýý lx*AQfnl ?( A1*4RABRO' 9, A5, ýWRfl I, lill-RUN-MVP ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
208 
_j ;ýr 
2'Vjfýj_j (2) FOR-DEC rjRff ýAVý_Ijp 
0% l,, x*, AQ fPJ ?( ýk * ffý Ar 9A __QJ 40 A5 ýk * ýM il I rM M iN -IRT) rM 1 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
_j (3) 
tjA: #jMVJ_33M,, W. "r FOR-DEC r3TjjTMj[*. j rqr 
TRPOMM ?( *xk*&_rIF3'9 ,A --PJ4kf- 5, Ix*MI I MIIRM-Wr 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
_j 
r (4) 211,44FOR-DEC rjpTýA'VM11, jq lt 
_j 
pa fnj 
_P_J MERSO 9 __QJ 5, __9J ff it IR il 1A0 1H !P 
98765432 
in this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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SOAR r'YRff&MTIj" , 
(S) J'pjj (Situation, [J'An at are the situations of HU Wh 
aircrafts, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) (The attitude of take-off has been set up. ) 
(2) (Right engine had blast sound and power was out. ) 
(3) ýEOMMWIIE14. (Left engine's power is normal. ) 
(4) 5001IN MOWMfIJ (Remanding runway distance and 
rolling speed are both before go no go point. ) 
*Jý(4) np gift],, (Present position is before the go no go point 
[refuse taking off speed. I 
M 
(0) -Zlß (2ptions, ? eýji ? _TO 
evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. ) 
(1) AVPV3KkRM. (Abort take-off immediately. ) 
(2) fý f944, kBA; 2jj: W. (To maintain the attempt to take-off. ) 
(A) ffe (Act, F, P, T' -ýZ%!, fh-To execute the V_ - A21 
R IWOM flaft, 
best strategy and watch out surroundings' change. ) 
WREMMMEYR , AWAIA-AL/f LýV,, (To continue the operation of 
take-off with single engine, reduce pitching angle and make use of the remaining runway to 
increase speed. ) 
(R) (Repeat, JV 91 FAL -5 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight surroundings and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the best strategy. ) 
(1) 
_W-RMfjRn, 
-OJXM. (The single engine's reliability. ) 
(2) fftfX2 LWVft, j%ft, WjýN,, (Aircraft's speed, altitude and attitude. ) 
m, W- ra*=- it , H4 SOAR -j j 
Aý'Aq 
P0N? (*, xk * !R -rial ul" 9, A -R-J AA5, It *IR IV- ý1, lef I[ 10 iR-fM -V 
ýP) 
987654 32 1 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
210 
(2) TEItt&b SOAR 
Mi 9, A -P-J AA5M iN - fffl X ? ift AM 
98765432 
in this scenario, what do you think about the. effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
T-ýWdjpj 2 rfkjpqP&ýgj (3) 12R, m %SOAR rWj 
RAM-9) ? (Ix*! R-r'MIr3 951 
98765432 11 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
_j 
pQ fn (4) VLOURIT-Mil"43 , 
IME44 SOAR rjRýTAWjg-jj, %j r--, pTjt -j 
-P-J R-3 9 -q-J tl 9'-' 5, T-IJ ff lt 4R 11 
98764321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SOAR? 
(Very high- 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
0 
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DESIDE r- jRff&MWIjj# 
(D) MR (Detect, detect if any unusual condition Q. ý .1N 
about surroundings and aircraft. ) 
LEAMMI-i'L, MAffft", ' 5M18-RMfR1f ItERVA*hIE 
(When the attitude for taking-off had been set up and nose gear left runway, right engine 
had blast sound and power was out, but left engine power was normal. ) 
(E) Waf (Estimate, evaluate the influence 
on flight safety based on flying condition. ) 
(The right engine should be JJU 
damaged by FOD or 10D. ) 
' Ila (Set. Safety Objectives, ? -Are there any (S) 
more proper strategies? ) 
ijpr '(Abort take-off and stop the aircraft immediately. ) 
(2) (To make use of the remaining runway to take off safely. ) 
(1) Wt, (Identify, time enough to 
collect more information and evaluate strategies. ) 
(1) IY--H *LE" Wft,, (The attitude for taking-off had been set up _EYqL kL 
and the speed was enough for taking off. ) 
(2) (The left engine could provide enough power to 
take off. ) 
(3) Ttlqffiý, YN L-UM H (The remaining runway and the speed HU 
were enough for aborting take-off safely. ) 
(D) (L)O, Ufffkf4ýf_RMMýJ-Take action. 
(Take action for taking off with a single engine. ) 
? Jo -:: Elf EI 
fi a AZ§V_L 
(E) (Evaluate, Aff RJR 
evaluate the influence after taking action and continue. watching for the changes of flying condition. 
(The evaluation for the take-off 
operation with single engine: 
(1) 2ýE-RmfjM2 _r_JqJWM,, (The left engine's reliability. ) 
(2) (The difficulty for single engine operation. ) 
(3) VNAFJ (The extra burden for emergency procedure. ) 
21,11WRI4 DESII )E rYRITAXMII, %. j Z rgLospitj 0ý. 
. 
Ix * PQ fnj ?( Al * jR 'b 9, A --nJ A 0- 5, *%k * 4R VE 1 14-1 0M- ffl R! 
P ) rBI 1 01 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
2.12 
0rf. - (2) Tt COMARM rjRITýAWMII, J2 -j 
EIF MrTIAPRIVP 2*44 DESIDE 
PQ 031 ?( ýk * &MMU 95 NO iN - 
987654321 
In this scenario, what. do you think about the effectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
WýT (3) rtA*-&*I3-MrMFji%V3 , 
V'IM1444DESIDE rJR4--TMIbW., r 04 r. 1 j 
? (I. R*02106 9, A --RJJO-V- 5, IR*all I, MR M-f 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
rjRjj: AV@jjj, 4* 5, r-njjjj: jtj Pug? (4) TI-ftf-MITIAMPAVO , 
2*44 DESIDE 
-j 
( --RJIT1tfR-rR-I] 9, VGJ"5Mý-f- 5, --PJjTjtfjjJE 1, ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of DESIDE? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
213 




ý: 5MRVI F-5EOO J/4 1%0ý0ý41 4 01'PMR , 1322 04 
M 'M 1tA*RR 
, 1337 
I*'ft 1500 URi94, -tEVWJUAM* ( *r%, * E 0A 28 _z *4P 
, 
[§ iT /-k M P., -A it 
4 WIMPI 
,4 
WN Ili tA, A 8-_ #111 JA LN z J&,, V'! 5 
(A Lieutenant pilot flying an F-5E (No. 4) was led by a major pilot (No. 
1) of four F-5E formation planning to, go to a range for bombing drill. Because of low visibility, 
they held the attitude at 15 00 ft and joined the eastern pattern of bomb-site with a left echelon 
formation. During the phase encompassing the left turn to the downwind leg to rejoin the pattern, 
the formation was in dark cloud and the No. 4 located on the left end of the formation lost sight 
of leader. ) 
. 
1111 (What would you do if you were the No. 4? ) 9-5. tA '- 5M 
ro 
IBEI 
I All aa mi H A; L iý-- -, 9 All 2 ft A 
; g-- EJ pQ Rý -, 'K R& 
Z- A ff i 
n, 
TV ýR 




(Which ADM mnemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SHOR Fftff., MMIIN_j 
(S) t (-Stimulig rIM4ýZSY-L-Pilot perceives surroundings change. ) 
(1) (No. 3 was invisible resulted in losing reference 
for formation) 
(2) (The safe. distance was required. ) 
(H) VIA ( HLypotheses, ý-tYlViRM, ( AM ) W[M I? -Hypotheses for 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? ") 
(In dense cloud any wingman in echelon formation lost during the 
operation of right turn. ) 
(0) XM (Qptions, OMfiWftJ! YX- ? 9/ýPUfqfiW ? -What thing would be the first 
priority to do now? How to do it? ) 
(Maintain safe separation. ) 
(2) (Flying with instruments and following 
the standard operation procedure of (getting) lost inside clouds. ) 
(3 . (Landfonns of range can be reference for 
emergency operation. ) 
(R) ffMYJV, (Response, RlUTU-M , fiWftPk ? PDf4fiW ? jqffjfiW ? Jýffln ?... -To take 
action. What to do? How to do? When to do? Where to go? ) 
(1) (Calling out lost. ) 




procedure of getting lost within clouds andreport one's intention to the leader. ) 
(To assemble with leader above or under clouds. ) M -J:: ý 
I#j rjn*== rjRjTAVpj, Vl N 44 SHOR 
""' e fill ?( ex * ea --PJ, e 9- 5, ex *2 111 , 173 
fN in -fN Xk e2 ) Ir- mu ER 
987654.3 21 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
r, ql-AVMII, W, Z rf, -; MqM3jp , 'k (2) 211*44 SHOR Xj 
F- 4*40foj ? lJFlRRiA-iM-WP ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
215 




in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
rjRj-ýAWpj, % Tr I-Ij 4T lt j pQ fn-j (4) tt- It63RI TIM il" SH0R 
C= M95 A 
9876.5 432 
in this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low. 1, Please select one number. ) 
216 
PASS 1- ArTVMTII* i 
(P) Wtrt3jMff (Problem identification, -HUPfTfaRý, MhA)ArrijjMPfTr±-To identify 
surroundings and problems at present. ) 
(Losing leader because of turning right in a left echelon 
formation inside clouds. ) 
(A) Xt%M& (Acquire informationg XIIf-@QrrjrLRýrTrAZ! Aft-T6 collect information 
concerning problems. 
(1) (Echelon fon-nation turning right and located on outer loop. ) 
(2) JR no 090 $4jý 180 2 rfIVjM77'K-Y"<AfR. (Losing leader when turning from heading 090 to 
180. ) 
(3) 090 [Jjgrjý,. (There are mountains higher than 10,000 ft which 
located on bearing 090. ) 
(4) R-MIR 180 Ek*. (Leader leveled off at heading 180. ) 
(S) *FAMPq (Survey strategy, Týw kT, , ff Ik ! ý- To survey the 
strength and weakness of strategies for solving problems. 
(1) (If a pilot 
followed the process to deal with losing inside clouds, it could approach Central 
Mountains and even strike mountains. ) 
(2) (After operated with instrument 
flight, pilot had to level off immediately in order to avoid spatial disorientation. ) 
(3) :, WRrffl- 090 ; ýaZrIP9ý9rjk,, (It was -TfW 
01 W-1 0: V 
required to follow landforMs of the range in order to evade Central Mountains on 
bearing 090. ) 
(S) XMMPIýr (Select strategy, F-jj- To choose the most proper strategy and 
take action. ) 
(With instrument flight to maintain aircraft's 
attitude and then level off. ) 
(To call Out "Lost", report intention and operate aircraft- 180 
Push the throttle, climb and turn right until leaving the top of clouds for evading 
Central Mountains, level off at heading 180 and assemble with Leader by visual flight. ) 
(3) R-'-' (To assemble with Leader above or under clouds by r: I rýz -; I= -; Zý ri 
visual flight. ) 
217 
2*44 PASS r3RIT _ýAMM110-i ; -L 
PO fIIJ ?( ýk ME 9 13ý ! W_ 5, ýk 0M- IN R ýP 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS -for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
'. 
g. mKj, %pASS rjR4j: AMMjj'Wj 2 rt. - 'goMIT ,1 (2) j Ox 
b09, ? ýMR3136 
- --9JNzA 5,1x*IR11 1,1401-Flin M 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
.. 
j, %. pASS rWITý)Wýjp_j 2 rflýpqqgýjj r,,. k , pQ (3) 
RP* WE J! )? (Ix WOMR-39 , 
NO -P-JION- 5, IR4*1 1, IIM-IIMIý 
987654321 
hi this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
W 
_j 
;2r -q IT lt j An fnj (4) PASS rjRjTAXjg-jj, 
T-IM WRir111- 9, A --PJIO-f- 5, --PJff WRII I, III M it -JMR*! 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think. about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
218 
FOR-DEC r'Xkff&XM1j" j 
(F) (Facts, ft", kftR/t f+jtV& ? -What's happening now? ) 
T_%KýýNaff, _-At0#H 
A Lf'R-. (Left ladder formation at outer loop and in the 
dark clouds during turning from upwind leg to downwind. ) 
(2) IP- rPL7K4, -- AfR. (Losing L er in the dark clouds. ) X_5ý ead 
(3) j%ft 1500 DR. (Altitude was 1500 ft. ) 
(4) 090 -jT_rF: %ft 10000 (The Central Mountains was on bearing 090 
and the altitude was above 1 OQOO ft. ) 
(0) jaýa (Options, ?- What strategies can be selected? ) 




r-j-. (To follow the procedure which deals with losing 
Leader inside clouds. ) 
(2) (Flying with IFR. ) 
(3) C nq 180 &-7F. (To level off at tke, heading 180. ) 
(R) (Risk & Benefits, -T-, MR ?- Are there any 
risk and benefits between different strategies? 
Z: Sý 
k- [Rfqjj; , 
(1) ýý17G 
-9 
(If a pilot followed the rp Q P9 _'11 Q&AV 
procedure whitch deals with losing inside clouds, it could collide with the Leader. ) 
(2) L7K n"Ztrw. (If a 
pilot didn't operate with IFR and tried to find the Leader in the dark clouds that would 
result in the danger of spatial disorientation. ) 
(3) fpaf A: IV , vDi" 090 afs" 0, IE#bt ffý aMA0: V -U L 10000 NW__L 
(It was required to follow landforms of the range because of 
Central Mountainsl 10000 ft above, located on bearing 090 that was harmful to flight 
safety. ) 
(4) ;A no 180 (To maintain heading 180 was the best strategy to 
avoid striking mountains. ) 
Ný- To select the best strategy. ) (D) 9ýjLN (Decision, "Zý-fkf 
(To follow the standard operation procedure about outer 
loop formation which lost Leader inside the dark clouds. ) 
(2) nri. (After operated with instrument flight, pilot had to avoid 
spatial disorientation. )- 
(To maintain heading 180 for avoiding striking mountains. ) (3) JR no 180 Rýftj 
- -1 13 
(D) *Aff (Execution, *4Tj ft&IMMMtlý JER'NON& ? WtVkv ? Oft ? -To execute this 
strategy and pay attention for when, what and how. to do it. 
(Operate the emergency procedure after calling out 
"Lost" and reporting intention. ) 
(2) (Topaya ttention to the safe separation intervals 
with mountains located on the left side. ) 
(3) ffE (To assemble with Leader on the top of clouds or 
under clouds. ) 
(C) #0 LCheck, To check if each. 
operation influences the flight safety. 
(To identify the related position between aircraft and 
mountains. ) 
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(2) PE (To report aircraft's position 
to Leader was not only for searching and assembling easily, but also for avoiding 
colliding with each other. ) 
(3) nFMAR. (Using attitude gauge to diagnosis spatial 
disorientation all the time. ) 
(4) N rr 11: RMa WE, J rit nri fiq ,I 
AA (To inquire the information about Leader's 
position, heading and altitude for assembling. ) 
V42,44 FOR-DEC ryRjTAVpj, *j 2 rjR*gTjt_, 
?951 
987654321 
In this sce nario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) FOR-DEC 
2N ex * PU fOJ ?(e** r-, --i 9, h- Z le 3e 5, ex*eitx 1, ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(3) ; ý: AM&OjLilMONrpii: A"rP,. 4,1', *44FOR-DEC ryWfj: ýWpL*Jzrj*r. jqff3TJ , PQ . *Xý* f 
A : N'RP ?( Al** 06a 9, A __RJ" 5,1x*911 RM f Wr 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one humber. ) 
0jr -q 47T lt j An fal ? (4) tftVMjTjpj ýArP , 
2*44 FOR-DEC r 3IRff AMs-pl, 
_'_lJ ýi A IR AMR3 9, A __PJ 10 A5 It im in - fm R! P 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
220 
SOAR r-lRff&MMIJN_, 
(S) 1*1 (Situation, [JjrfjfRfA, HU 3RT--TMI, ýNllfRTU_1F! AlZVjRPHfq ? -What is the situation of 
the aircraft, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) (Left echelon formation at outer loop and in 
the dark clouds during turning from upwind leg to downwind. ) 
(2) la= rp L7K-9', --: RfR. (Losing Leader in the dark clouds. ) ; Zý 
(3) 090 10000 
, 
A,, (The mountain area was on bearing 090 and the 
altitude was above 10000 ft. ) 
(4) Hiriji%ft 1500 OR,, (Aircraft's altitude at that time was 1500 ft. ) 
(0) 2* (Pptions, MRýJjD§ L-ý ?§ L-ý ? "'p-MMImma-To Jý8-i V f-*- -, W;: 
evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. ) 
"it (If pilot didn't follow (1) ýý*fpffi3lýffi 1: 3c rp 
the procedure of dealing with losing inside clouds, it could approach mountains and 
collide with Leader. ) 
(After operated with instrument 
'flight, pilot had to level off immediately in order to avoid spatial disorientation. ) 
JýQ,, (To maintain heading 180 for avoiding striking mountains. ) (3) 180 Rýftj 
PfT (A) LAct, Ef M -To execute the 
best strategy and watch outsurroundings' change. 
(To follow the standard 
operation procedure for outer loop fonnation when losing Leader inside the dark clouds 
after calling out "Lost"' and reporting intention. ) 
JL* (After operated with instrument flight, pilot had to (2) 
avoid spatial disorientation. ) 
'ý11ý-F [I (To assemble with Leader on the top of clouds or r: 1 -JýgLLNY 
(3) ; CýC M 
under clouds. ) 
- 3M , "'I & ý,, jT- fa fHA fj (R) (Repeat, M 1-1 jý _ý__ 
m FU 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight enviromnents and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the best strategy. ) 
(To report aircraft's position to Leader for MH AMT afU. 4 Mo 
searching and assembling easily. ) 
(2) 180,, (To operate with instrument flight and identify the 
heading of 180. ) 
(3) (To identify the infonnation about 
Leader's position, heading and altitude for assembling reference. ) 
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SOAR *. j 
Pn f"I ? jR 9, P-1 -5j AA51 NO M- JM R! P 
9876 .54321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
-Mllff 3T ,A (2) SOAR r3RIT-3AM1114C ; -2 
rll j 
*PnfIIJ ? 9. -, 51 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: I, Please select one number. ) 
TAMI[jp. j -ý r*pgogýIJ 0"& '83ROMMINIVO 2, M44 SOAR r-M4- (3) 
-9 51 RAMM ? 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) SOAR r3Tj4TAVVjj, "j Z r--, IlTltj pag? 
--QJ FT It !R 31 95 --PJ IR II em 0A 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SOAR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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DESIDE r3Rff&MXIJW 
(D) ON (Detect, *?, % detect if any unusual condition 
about surroundings and aircraft. ) 
_RPF L: r AL tfRffi? ý Fig L7K nr3 _)a 0 
(2) 
(D) Waf (Estimate, evaluate the influence 
on flight safety based on flying condition. ) 
!ý rp _ý)k: MV A WN it: x : 
95ý 
(2) WRý ý-'ErF9iL* nri P P, ý, ti' IL '- -, -: Zý __ý R" 
(3) #A ton 180 RýAf 0 
(S) [J; M (Set Safety Objectives, ? -Are there any ALýt 
more proper strategies? ) 
(1) RS-23! ý-L H FTIOK_Irýý3_1 
AE" 
(2) 
(Identify, -Is time enough to 
collect more infonnation and evaluate strategies. ) 
(1) 090 
(2) 
(D) ffM (Do, ýAffjkflfu_RMRý-Take action. ) 
fff qjý; (2) 
(3) 
w [11,, (4) fP NO f: E 19 t ffý ri nn 18 0 LM ý'a 12 
(5) L =__ý "0 M MLLMIEFF H FT! 1R%1 
Rf-j-- (E) W: R (Evaluate, NfAV ? WT rFPAr-z%Y-L-To 




(3) Hua -Nf 
Ij 
(4) 9": Ff &R fR aM, tit nri A ft fW1,9 ý: V 
'ftq: l 24. *44DESIDE rjRffAWgjjjWj 2 rjRNkjqqtj 
0- 9, NO T-IJ 10 A5, Ix II IaR 154V* 0 fl-Ij ? r1a aI ý-: Mim-gVr) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5. Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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r3R 2 rf. - 2-*44DESIDE ý6 (2) T -j ?9 10c 5 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
n-j .j 
r6 (3) DESIDE rjrjTýW=-jjLW_I ro4plog T& 2 
T'RP ?( 1x*-&-rilor 9, NO T-Iflf& 5,1A*&I 1,14 NO-iml! 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
qj ry lt V-n- (4) ýEft*URIT IVA'14 , 
V'W4 DESIDE rr- PQ f 
=3 
1 
--51 ff IVR AM C9 --RJ tl A5j 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of DESIDE? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: I. Please select one number. ) 
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#R : IfURAWM RSR PSMARK(decision-making with no 'tally-ho! ' during a practice 
engagement) 
Ark 
J/'&V P4: &* F-5Ex4 *S Al / ACM OR P 1100 i3-3HE R-8 Fý L. 2 VIO 
C=3 #ISO it VI A ft20M , 3,, 4MVISP 
4TUNAM22M 
, 
PX 3 )M%, WFH 2VIASMIJIlid 
I 
Rd* ff, -%M*; 
M I t2l- 
, 3,4 




r IA , 
RP HE MIMNM 3,4 MIA-A 
'M 20, 
HM3,4V 
C= 3,, 4VL,; SUTn4*-RMl, 2 WN ,2 VL, VI Wf n4 1ý #1 - WtE 12 X* 151 P1 
ft 
,V 
5AAW-qI? (A pilot with the rank of Major was the leader of a four F-5E formation in airspace 
for air intercept drill. At the third pass the No. 2 change position as the leader and the Major 
held a tactical position in an offense unit. No. 3 and No. 4 were operating as another unit to 
pract ice defense maneuvers in line abreast. When the interceptor controller on the radar site 
guided them: to the engagement phase, No. 3 and No. 4 called out "No Joy for 1 and 2" and at the 
same time No. 2 also called out "one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 o'clock with same 
altitude". ) 
r0j M 
LZI- ? (What would you do if you were the leader? ) 
ro 
Please read the questions on the following 5-pages 
first, and then answer the questions here 
ý"+YJNH: 1: 1111 Fjoxiaw-*H; ftlý PROZARK-i 





XII N)v -A ? PR Fh A, ` fq? 
(Which ADM mnemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SIFIOR r- 3RfTMMIIN 
(S) (Stimuliq %! I-L-A pilot perceives surroundings change. ) 
-V)LfR,, (By using the radio to know that No. 
3 and No. 4 could not see the leader and NO. 2. ) 
(2) FWMxVft- MR= VVER H FRQ-ýPrl+ --T. 
Wýa MH AM (By using the . 0%*% 
radio to know that No. 2 saw one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 o'clock with 
same altitude. ) 
(3) -. RMýkft H FTH-EH . 
Vq9yLfR,, (Leader could not see No. 3 and 4. ) 
(4) fX Ztr 
, r,. 
(It would have a risk for colliding with another aircraft. ) 
(H) W9 (H Lypotheses, ? -Hypotheses for 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? ") 
(Except No. 2 could see one 
endangering aircraft, the others couldn't see each other. ) 
(2) (There was a very high risk to collide with another aircrafts. ) 
(0) (ýQptions, ýQ ? ApDfqfiW ? -What would be t he first priority 
to do now? How to do? ) 
(1) -FýYLRPP-PIHTý IN , --vjLfxRffYAft 
RAW. (To stop training immediately and No. 2 
took the separation of altitude. ) 
(2) LfE/kj%ftFM, ( (To have a command that each squad 
maintain the beginning altitude for safe separation and keep on the left side. ) 
(3) NEMEWWRý 141MR. (To ask groud controller re-guide all flights to intercept each 
other. ) 
(IDI - fEl- 
ki-I Iff (Response, RlUfu-M , fiWftf2Y- ? PUfalfiW, ? fýf H4, 
f& ? Yqgrn ? ... -To take 
action. What to do? How to do? When to do? Where to go?... 
(1) ffE Ir: j _- 
ft[FFfj&) (To operate in coordination with No. 2 and have a 
altitude separation, ) 
(2) (By using the radio to command each 
squad to start altitude and distance separation. ) 
(3) , )ý. (By using the radio to provide each ., INN 
FTtQYI 
squad's position for searching and seeing each other. ) 
(4) (To ask ground controller to ON -I -M 
identify each squad's position, guide them to assemble and then continue training. ) 
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WNW% SHOR nj x 
?1 
9.87654321 
in this scenario, what do you think. about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) ZVNIC44 SHOR r3MTAVjIj, *j ; -ý 
r*f, '; MV3jyj ý\jj 
AD fOl ?( Ix * 4R rICUr 9, NO --PJ 10 -f- 
5 49, JE 1, rp, 0 j. 4 - JM R! ý! 
.9.87654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
RLI, %SHOR ryR4TýW=-jjb%, (3) t1ftfMARMNS 
-9 51 MAW ?( 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) 2*44 SHOR rMhAMM110-, Z r--, jl: yltj Pof. 1 ? 
--QT4T1tfRAn- 9, No --RJA-"3'zE 5, --9JIT-IV9VI 1 
9.8 7654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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PASS r'MFT-MMIIN 
(p) M,, rrIMU (Problem identification, ýnO)J [A -HVU-PFTAaý, M! RrrIMPFTrT-T6 identify 
surroundings and problems at present. 
(During intercept training pilots could not see each other. ) 
(2) (No. 2 could see No. 3 and 4 on his 
right side who were opposing and approaching with same altitude. ) 
(3) ITT (There was a potential risk to collide each other. ) 
(A) XZf4ffiJV, (Acquire information, collect information 
concerning problems. ) 
J FT HE in IQ _ ff% (By using the radio to know that No. 
3 and No. 4 could not see 1 and 2. ) 
H FRQ -V rl +- (By radio it 
was known that one target was opposing and approaching on 12: 30 with same 
altitude. ) 
(3) VHV,, could not see No. 3 and 4. ) In vLfR. (Leader 
(S) *J*M, * (Survey strategy, To survey the 
strength and weakness of strategies for solving problems. ) 
(1) -FýA-RP ORWLVý rP4LrT , Mi-ýW Mrffftrw . (Having a 
command to stop training and start to adopt altitude separation to avoid the danger of 
approaching, or even collision. ) 
(It was 
not only to violate training regulation but also to increase risk if each squad continued 
to oprate flying course. ) 
(S) XMTPq (Select strategy, To choose the most proper strategy and "Mf7' 
take action. ) 
(1) -FýýAL-Rpf-jýj_EXIJý* INL/ (To command each squad to start altitude 
separation immediately) 
(2) AR ffij%M)ýr (To command each squad to maintain the 
safe altitude separation and keep on the left side. ) 
(3) (By using the radio to provide each 
squad's position for searching and seeing each other. ) 
flFq -- 
(To ask ground controller to (4) , J\ ri 




4e W rjRpg: Tit Fg jt L, %Wljg pASS 
rgýýAMM, 1, 
_j fi]J IR -A 9 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low:. 1, Please select one number. ) 
x14 pASS (2) eiL 0- f& -* 




In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please sele ct one number. ) 
Eq T 
. ml, 
% pASS r3Wj-WpL%_j r r. 1 j 0, ; rtkggp (3) T 
RP? (l,, x *- a9, A --P JI IM 51k*aII 
9876543 .21 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
-Jtj pnfnI JR IT rpi ttl' PP pASS rMIT5AVý= Wr WJ IT (4) tt ,j 
--PJ FT It 4R -riff0i 9, A --QJ A5 ff It !R 11 1A RO ig - IM VP 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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FOR-DEC rftffMMIII# 
(F) V& (Facts, kLH4, kLjtRj ft N, )ý& ? -What's happening now? ) 
jLM, +,, fflt' '[J FTR , LfR,, (By using the radio to know that No. 
3 and No. 4 could not see I and 2. ) 
(2) Aft , yjy _94 rp. 
(Byusingthe 
radio to know that No. 2 saw one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 o! @4o& with 
same altitude. ) 
VqV,, fR,, (Leader could not see No. 3 and 4. ) 
(4) ýqf 9fXZM rlftrw. (There was a potential risk to collide each other. ) 
(0) ZýR LOptions, What strategies can be selected? ) 
(Having a command to stop training and start to adopt 
safe separation) 
(R) f& #1 Wf *! * (Lbsk & Benefits, Have anyrisk 
and benefits for different strategies? 
q-r±4§fff rAZ[M*,:, (It would be extreme dangerous if 
not stoppmg training and maintain safe separation. ) 
(2) WkýljýftQ)t , ý*L W%jffAWIjý*. (According to training rule, the P- )V+,, IA FRI '04 &-FT, Iff I 
engagement training cannot be done if pilots cannot see each other. ) 
(D) JkjLN (Decision, To selpct the best strategy. ) 
(To stop training immediately. ) 
JAff (Execution, ? fiWftfAjT ? PPf5jf, ? -To execute this le, I 
jw 
strategy and watch out for when, what and how to do it. 
(To command each squad to maintain the 
beginning altitude for separation and the position on the left side. ) 
(2) 11, ý, 
, 
(To command No. 2 to adopt safe 
separation and stop training. ) 
(3) , -N /ý1,4, -1-& -- -IL 
% r: j XffX[ft. (To ask ground controller to RN 
identify each squad's position, guide them to assemble and then continue training. ) 
(C) *JW (Check, To check if each 
operation influences flight the safety. ), 
(1) f9ge-l- F1 AL 2ýZ--ýMFWMILI (To make sure that N o. 2 had 
followed the command to adopt safe separation and stop training. ) 
(2) fgg? t7, H, (To make sure that No. 3 and 4 had adopted heading 
separation. ) 
(To make sure that ground (3) 
controller had identified each squad's position and guided them to assemble for 
continue training. ) 
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A --PJ NE, A5*, xk * !R fl I 
98765.4 321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: . 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
2*44FOR-DEC rM4TýAVMjjjwj rf2- Ij ; mpg lp 
51 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
*Pap (3) FOR-DEC rjWjTW=jj[4., Z rfqr. jiffýj_, 0. 
9 _P_JAý 5,19*6MI I, rFI NM-MI2 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: I. Please select one number. ) 
(4) ýEftNMI: TIJIIU_'%"rP , 
21*44FOR-DEC rjRjTAM7pj, %. j 2 r--, JjTjtj pQfJ? 
95 lt 4R il 1MM-fMR!? - 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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SOAR r'fkffMXljVg , 
(S) tfthl (Situation, WRM., lIff-JR4ý, ffifRFj- ' ZVý RU 11 N N, 
RýOfq ? -What is the situations of 
the aircraft, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) EWM*MPOPE, -VfR. (By using the radio to know that No. .1ý %'% v, L 
3 and No. 4 could not see I and 2. ) 
., LfR 
H FTH-ýWrl+-- T,, ýt)ýaMm A. ft , Yj-75P, 4LrTrP. (By using the (2) 
radio to know that No. 2 saw one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 ezalaek with 
same altitude. ) 





evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. 
(It was unique option to start to adopt safe 
separation and stop training. ) 
(A) (A et -To execute the ja 
best strategy and watch out the surroundings' change. 
(1) (To command No. 2 to adopt safe 
separation and stop training. ) 
(2) (To command each squad to maintain the 
beginning altitude for separation and the position on the left side. ) 
IT! iA7j)ý. (By radio to provide each squad's (3) JVf 1JfV*Nl P FT, 
position for searching and seeing each other. ) 
Opq -fý[Wjj , 
(To ask ground controller to identify (4) ýLtM a 
each squad's position, guide them to assemble and then continue training. ) 
(R) (Repeat, R -Ak 
%ý f-T fR fl M Mý 1EE 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight surroundings and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the best strategy. ) 
(1) (To search each other and evaluate 
operation methods based on the position reported by each squad. ) 
(2) (To search each other based on the position 
information provided by radar site controller. ) 
(3) ý), PEJJ (Being able to see each other is the basic 





AQ fRJ ?( ýk * IR -r'ma'- 9, A T-IJ 40 -`V- 5 
ýk * IR 11 rFI 0 ix - 11 IN -T 
9876 
.54321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
,r 




951, " ? Ix-*! Rr-MU 5RWH- 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
I Ig SOAR rjR4j: MjL% r*rgliff. j 0,1, pof (3) 
RP*AIV? ( Ix 3111 ar 95 
9876 -5 .432 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) SOAR ryRqAWgjjj'*j -J7 
r--, jqj j 
pan? t fj 
-P-J f TT I !R ir'160 9, A --PJ 10 -3z'4 5, 
--PJ ff It !R tflE 111 MM-I IM ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SOAR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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DESIDE r_fRff&MT1JM 
(D) %9, W (L)etect, detect if any unusual c* ondition 
about the surroundings and the aircraft. 
t [I FTiff-, V (1) PNVJLfR, 3k9t , Lft, (By using the radio to know that No. 
3 and No. 4 could not see the leader and NO. 2. ) 
(2) (Byusingthe 
radio to know that No. 2 saw one opposing target approaching on 12: 30 with 
same altitude. ) 
(3) F@Q E, R ". vLfJ,, (Leader could not see No. 3 and NOA) 
(4) LRIA1 r IfRf&r,,, (It could have the risk of approaching 
or collision if not adopting safe separation immediately) 
R J* PfT W 7fRf_Mý t fR 2 ýffi-To evaluate the influence (E) Wit ff_ýstim ate, 
on the flight safety based on flying condition. ) 
(It was deduced that both squads had blind spot. ) 
(2) t All ft. (By using the radio to EWA YROW-EHIANVIRR ±- r1maA. 11 V, _9_9 on deduce that No. 2 had same altitude as No. 3 or NO. 4 and were opposing each other on 
slightly right side. ) 
(3) 4,971, TINTWIN. (It was absolutely unable to continue training 
because the situation had high risk. ) 
(S) & Aigýý [I a (Set Safety Objectives, VvPMWMRý ? -Has anymore 
proper strategy? ) 
A -PP rqý_LLXJJý*, MC%-^, f L (To adopt safe separation, stop training 
immediately, assemble together and then continue training. ) 
(1) Wt,, (identify, time enough to 
collect more information and evaluate strategies? ) 
(To make sure No. 2 followed Leader's 
command and carry out the safe separation. ) 
fu- VJMM (D) fT-M (Do, UVJ]Rfý -Take action. 
gj, t, Uppf&p_[EWJft. (To command No. 2 to adopt safe separation (1) Tý-MRRR_9ýý AL 
and stop training. ) 
(2) tij. (To command each squad to maintain the ; Jý , 
beginning altitude for separation and the position on the left side. ) 
(By using the radio to provide each (3) 
squad's position for searching and seeing each other. ) 
(To ask ground controller to (4) RPU 
identify each squad's position, guide them to assemble and then continue training. 
) 
Tf-,, j mv_ý -To ?h (E) W: R ff,, valuate, 
evaluate the influence after taking action and continue watching for the changes of 
flying 
condition. 
(After stopping YAM I "I 
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training, it was required that each squad carried out the following items and evaluated if 
there were harmful to the flight safety all the time. ) 
(To search each other and evaluate 
operation methods based on the position information reported by each squad. ) 
(To search each other based on the position 
information provided by radar site controller. ) 
(3) Plr/T\K-4ý\Mt? ýLýJ* , Jý)\ (Each squad obeyed the assigned altitude for flight 
safety. ) 
(To evalute all the time if any han-nful factor was occured. ) 
.j 
DESIDE rq4TýAXgjj'* rjR r,,; Tjtj 0, 
?( IA 
ra] 6-. il 1" 95 Ix *- &f9,, 1, ýi IM- -J N, 
987.6.54321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) -: 9*44DESIDE r3RITAMM110i ;L rt, '; N'Ngj rý, 
0 fAl ? 4R r ---1 95, IA 196.; 1, I 
987-654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
rW. CTMg#j 2 r*rgjpgýj., 0, jx'*pQfnj (3) 2"WR44DESIDE 
9 -P-Jlf& 5,1 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
jr lt (4) : 9*44 DESIDE ryRITAMpl, T -j 
PQ fpj 
-JITt A-MiR --RJ IT lt 4R A9, No --Pj 13ý SE 5 MR11 I 55H 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of DESIDE? 
(Very high:. 9, Acceptable: 5., Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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MR : BINGO AWLARK(Unable to land during instrument 
flight in a bingo fuel situation. ) 
AAR 
J/'+ýCMAVI F-5E-00 MOS BFM F-5E 00 §ftV1q-j; M, 




APR W it, 0 rol 00 A ýk MR 44 0; ff Aa1 V2 10 00 
5 '20 43000 -ýA it -Tr,, 
% ýTN Jý- AH ;K --k A, A WIT A J= fill cc 
Zi USS GCA AM ,TW; 
E 4000 OFM MISR -- FLA I OMEý GC AýI k4-Y- I OT-WITHI 
*94% MIFMAVt *MR 5 #' W YIJ I UT 04 1 
1300 %. (After basic fighting maneuver drill in the airspace, one F-5E formation 
requested Air Control Center to guide them to Z- 1 Intense Point for Ground Control Approach 
pattern because of bad weather. From 4000 ft. they began flying in dark cloud and were guided 
by GCA. At 1 mile from runway they were out of cloud but the angle between the flight line and 
the runwar-was too great to land. Hence leader directed only No. 2 to land and he decided to 
go-around, but 5 seconds later No. 2 also called out '2 go-around with 1300 lb gasoline only'. ) 
=, rr3l M: 
MI (What would you do if you were the leader? ) iR 
ro 
(, Please read the questions on the following 5-pages iR 75 
first, and then answer the questions here 
BINGO &OZARL91- 
(1) SHOR, (2) PASS, (3) FOR-DEC, (4) SOAR, (5) DESIDE 
(Which ADM mnemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SHOR r* ftff&MTIJ* I 
(S) 49ja (Stimuliq F1 _tJR4ýZI! 
f-L-A pilot perceives surroundings change. ) 
(1) AKiA)ý906ýý. (Home base weather was worse. ) 
(2) Tj A- UN 600 DR ffil=j Y1 N L'6 ,f (One mile on final with 600 ft altitude 
from runway the formation was out of cloud but the angle between the flight line and 
the runway was too great to land. ) 
(3) (No. 2 could not land and requested go-arround. ) 
(No. 2 had remaining gasoline of 1300 lb. ) (4) 1300 
(Hypothesesg ? -Hypotheses for (H) U7* 85 WM 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? ") 
(1) (It was predicted that home base weather was improper for 
landing. ) 
(2) (No. 2 was inexperienced in operation. ) 
(3) (Ground controller was inexperienced. ) 
(0) -ZM LOptions, Mf&ffft ? 2, ý/Pnfqf& ? -What thing is first priority to do 
now? How to do? ) 
(1) (To land the other base. ) 
(Tore-joinGCApattem. ) 
(R) ffMBZJff, (Response, ny ? PHf5jf& ? fqH4, f& ? yqg5ýq ? ... -To take 
action. What to do? How to do? When to do? Where to go?... 
(It was the safest option to land YU base. ) 
j 
_j 
VNIM SHOR rjRjTAXtjjj' 
?( Ix No 9A 'A 5, *1 *a fE rM 0 ig -IR EP 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) SHOR 
PQ fIll ? !R -01150 9, A --PJ 15c' -ýE 
5, *, Ak 111 1MM-M 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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a -1 
2 TAW 74ý (3) VER&MOORWAVA"UP , 
2WRI4 SHOR W- MILO 
MAW) ? (ýMROE-99 ,A --PJIO-f- 5, I%*-ail I, l'mM-fM*! 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think. about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) WIM144 SHOR ryR4TAXý-Ijp, r-5jjTjt pa ? 
C= "Nil QWT- RJ IT It 4R AM 9 RJ a -f- 5 
lt 4R JE 
98765432 
in this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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PASS r- AffMMIIR* I 
(P) Wt,, rrjijM (Problem identification, PnRA "ffiga , JR4ý)Arrli 'HU 31, fy I-To identi 
surroundings and problems at present. 
(1) *-_I_AjýA4dI%EE AýF, 1049 GCA (The home base weather did not allow 
taking-off and landing with visual flight and had to rely on GCA. ) 
(2) RTPPIRA. (No. 2 could not land so called out "Go Around". ) 
(3) 1300 (No. 2's remaining gasoline, 1300 lb, was 
low amount of fuel. ) 
(4) (Leader and No. 2 were separated and couldn't see each other. ) 
(A) IUf4Mjft (Acquire information, X%IWrjjM; 4rAZI'Rft-To collect information 
concerning problems. ) 
. (Home base was improper for trying to land again. ) 
(2) T, 9=1? 43000UR. (Spare bases, KU and YU, were 
5-mile visibility and 3000 ft ceiling. ) 
(3) WfM3P6q9, A*Wf#QR9'JJ , WTE M IM, 11ý -1 En 
(To evaluate the remaining gasoline 
and No. 2's flight ability, YU would be spare base for landing. ) 
(S) *JRTPlý (Survey strategy, *JVF To survey the 
strength and weakness of strategies for solving problems. ) 
(Go to land YU base. ) 
(S) MMM, * (Select strategy, To choose the most proper strategy and 
take action. ) 
(1) *-'PP3ý-jkLq J4"r4rtM,,. (To call out "Request to land at YU airbase in 2 
elements. ") 
1,4jýt FF Ou m [A - 
no it , 
MQR Lffifa. (To ask ZN Approach to guide to YU with the first priority and inform YU 
those who had low fuel and allowed landing firstly) 
(3) 300 (To indicate No. 2 ; Z: ý 
adjust TACAN frequency to. YU and climb to above cloudswith 300 knots at military 
throttle. ) 
(1) , 
91, *44 PASS r3RITAMM110i ;L rJR RUT-Iti M', lA* 
fl 
11 ? 
98 76 54321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, - Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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j (2), 12, W4 PASS 
*AD fill ?( ýWRRIQ 9A --PJ&A 5 51R*4ft 1,141 Wig-191! 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1. Please select one number. ) 
:g Mg-pg PASS (3) 
?( V*M'12139, A -P-JIOA 5 
9 8,7 654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) ýEft*WTJIFIHAVý PASS rjRffýAXýIjg., Z r--, j4j: jt., paq? 
ý1, 'MjI-fMRT- ) ROD 95 FT I& JE PI 
987654 
.32 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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FOR-DEC i_Aff&MT[JJ# 
(F) (Facts, ? -What's happening now? ) 
(Home base weather was getting worse. ) 
(2) KA-UN 600 URW gziý [I FTiQRL6 , f. FLQA LA)Q. (One mile on final with 600 ft altitude 
-XWX 
1130 C=, Q*, A anup., J --- _--1 --- . was out of cloud in order to take visual of the runway but 
the angle between the flight line and the runway was too great to land. ) 
(3) (No. 2 could not land and switched to go-around. ) 
(4) fflftd 1300 (No. 2's remaining fuel was 1300 lb. ) 
(5) (2 aircrafts were separated. ) 
(0) -2110 (9ptions, ?- What strategies can be selected? ) 
(1) MgjPH, ý, GCA (Re-join GCA flight pattern. ) 
(2) (To land at the other base. ) 
(R) (Risk & Benefits, f5ff-, MH ?- Are there any 
risk and benefits for different strategies? 
(1) `9_ (Weather was worse and remaining fuel was low. ) 
(2) (Both No. 2 and ground controller were 
inexperienced. ) 
(3) l300J9C, #, Af* ftýg-. 21F E; A/- GCA JR JMJI (The remaining fuel, 
1300 lb, was only enough to fly GCA pattern for 3 times which increased pilot's pressure. ) 
(4) gi& (YU was the most proper spare A' 
base for landing for it had the advantages of better weather, shorter distance and more 
familiar surroundings. ) 
(D) 9ýjLN (Recision, To select the best strategy. ) 
(Go to land at YU base. ) 
P, X PHf5JfjW ? -To execute this (E) (Execution, ? ftff ? 
strategy and pay attention for when, what and how to do it. 
(To inform the intention of landing at YU airbaseto No-2 
and Tower. ) 
4-. ýnT" Nt 'L (To ask (2) 55 ý G_ L: _: 3 
TaiTung Approach to guide to YU- with the first priority and inform YU those who 
had low fuel were allowed landing firstly. ) 
gj, . ^*-. (To ask TaiTung (3) AUA "VMMAIKOJý V3 NJ 
9 JILI 
HFU M 
Approach to guide 2 flights with the separation of heading and altitude and assemble 
together above clouds. ) 
JýJ 300 (To direct No -2 (4) ! KIWIF : z: s: 
adjust TACAN frequency to YU and climb to the top of clouds with the speed of 300 
knots at military throttle. ) 
V -w-11- To check 
if each (C) *JM LCheck, 
operation influences the flight safety. 
(To affirm No. 2 followed the VAT 
command to land YU base and avoided consuming fuel for unnecessary operation. 
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(2) jqfVfXLfUj (To , ýffirm ground control would guide No. 2 to land 
with first priority. ) 
(1) MLMRAABUMN FOR-DEC 
AA9 
45ý 97: 5, IA * 4R fl I, PA MI mrr 
ýý 
Ak* 
PQ fill ? 3@01 
98765432 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
r (2) FOR-DEC 
?I -riNg 9, AT tl 9,5 , 
ýk * jR 11 PI A-9 IK! P 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
12, MR44 FOR-DEC 
5 
9876543 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
Wjr -aj IT It j An fnI (4) 21*144FOR-DEC rMjTA'Vgjjj' 
95 It Wflr. - 1,1411 in 
98764321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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SOAR r- 
(S) JWW, (Situation, [A IRMAR W-19RA ? -What are the situations of 
the aircrafts, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) /4: fg)ý94 FT! QkB6,, JCN,: ý, 91fM40 GCA (The home base weather did not allow 
taking-off and landing. with visual flight and had to rely on GCA. ) 
(2) (No. 2 couldn't land so called out "Go around. ") 
(3) fjMAM`PN 1300 Jý9) (No. 2's remaining fuel was 1300 lb that 
was in the low fuel situation. ) 
(4) Afffil, - 1ý= VPTCý+. (Leader was climbing in the dense clouds. ) 
(5) -- 
f%ýRIWý 11 FEWL. (Leader and No. 2 were separated and couldn't see each 
other. ) 
(0) -113R (Qptions, -fyg #& ? jý r__- - "IMMIW-To -ft ý -2rý JI-R- 
evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. 
-A, GC AG CA 
(Although No. 2's fuel was enough to fly GCA pattern for 3 rounds, No. 2 suffered 
higher pressure. ) 
I-A 
gýý%,! RrRAA " 'k 
(After assembling at Ahe top of clouds the flight would land at YU 
airbase where ZN pilots usually practiced instrument flight. ) 
(A) UTM (Act, Rý , JiL/ýj 71, F-l' P, ' 'ý. 
ý7 %! I-h-To execute the I Elk 
best strategy and watch out for surroundings' change. ) 
(1) (To call out "Change landing into YU base". ) fE 
(2) '*%, L71ýý IqflFfA Lfi&, (To inforra No. 2 had low fuel and request HFU 
landing with the first priority. ) 
K (Repeat, (R) I, - R _-i 
b, 
-/ 
tý f-T fllm M 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight surroundings and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the best strategy. ) 
(1) 9ý? rpffi-ý-ýgAff )ýýrfjj L7Krr-]i. (To watch out spatial disorientation when flying inside 
the clouds. ), 
(To avoid consuming fuel for unnecessary operation. ) (2) LP ýA T-, ) 
(3) (To follow the ground controller's direction to operate 
accurately. ) 
243 
SOAR rjRITAXMII, Tit ký'Ix 
9, A-PHOft 5 I5x*&A- I, ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 
(very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
T atxgj SOAR r t, -; o off IT . o, 0"I (2)VEVIRV-93ROMI AlftýP, ZWC Tj Mx 
Mj 




In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
rM4TýW=jj[*j 
_ 
r*r8jWgj M. - I, 110f TN (3) MA"' rP , 2*44 SOAR 2 rij #bg, 
RMAN ? (*xk*W'-3 9, A --PJIOA 5,1 , rFI EM-IMP 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) tiftNURITIVAPP , 
11]"Llig SOAR F3RjTAVRJIj, 4*. j 
-P-J ff it 15 MR3 9, A --PJ tO !k5, --PJ ff It IR 11 'Fl 0M JR R *! ) 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SOAR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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DESIDE r3RffMXIj* , 
(D) %1, jR LDetect, --T-, q-AA-To ,, -1 )QE 
detect if there are any unusual 
condition about the surroundings and aircraft. ) 
(1) 4: 19)ýAWýHFQMLEP* 1 )24- GCA 1% 1300 Jftf-, 3ýWJ=4Z 
GCA 
IN 
r " &t 4, tjCt, )j,, (The home base weather did not allow 
laking-off and landing with visual flight and had to rely on GCA; although No. 2's 
remaining fuel, 1300 lb, was enough to fly GCA pattern for 3 rounds, it increased 





I couldn't land and had low fuel, so it would be safe option to land at the other eoe base 
where the distance was short and pilots were familiar with. ) 
(E) W-jif LE stimate, rU ==r,! Tft7JA9ýZ-! AwJ-T6 evaluate the influence 
on the flight safety based on flying condition. ) 
(1) GC A A-- ffif $q 'ff ý 14 g )J Jý=J T-, fA ? 
(NoTs remaining fuel was enough to fly GCA pattern for 3 rounds, but both pilot's ability 
of instrument flight and controller's expenence were uncertainty. ) 
(2) 9.1, 
_LTA , 
WVAAWýFFýAfto (The fuel was 
enough to land at the other base, yet the determination had to be made immediately to 
avoid unnecessary consumption. ) 
,IL 
LT_ A- 
0 (T he (3 A fR 1,9 S,,,, 1Z3$ tg -EA 
fJ fk V Ll 
determination couldn't be delayed although YU was the airbase where pilots were most 
familier with and the weather. was good for landing. ) 
IN ? -Are there any EH; M (Set Safety Objectives, (S) 
more proper strategy? ) 
(To laiqd at the spare base, YU-) 
-j--M]MMg-Is the time enou to (1) friý; 5t', J, (Identify, gh 
collect more information and evaluate strategies. ) 
(The safest determination was to land YU base. ) 
MMPIýJ-Take action. ) (D) (LDo, U- 
(To call ground controller guiding No. 2 to land at 
YU. ) 
(To ask (2) no Tt'Aflig, HF9 m r-I 
ZN Approach to guide No. 2 to land at YU with the first priority and inform YU 
Approach about No. 2's low fuel condition. ) 
-4-ý 
(To direct No. 2 (3) 1 r, "T, M, fj R "', x no Tt, aa iN Ll ar9 w- ffl W300 
adjust. TACAN frequency to YU and climb to the top of clouds with 
the speed of 300 
knots at military throttle. ) 
M. W? I W-, MR 0ZW -TO (E) Wil LEvaluate, ILIWM! 4ý11S, 
evaluate the influence after taking action and continue watching 
for the changes of flying 
condition. ) 
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(1) JMF)ýýMj AK (To keep a sharp lookout for avoiding spatial disorientation. ) 
(To avoid consuming fuel for unnecessary operation. ) 
(To follow ground controller's direction to operate 
accurately. ) 
; CtEft*-&*RJM-- 3RIT%MI%qq , 
2*44 DESIDE rjqjTA'Vtýjj, *j 2 rjnMg 
5Ix*OfOJ ?( 1x*WAR- 9, M- --PJJO-; f- 5, x1*4MI 1,1§1 fig in -Orr 
987-654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
Wj r t. (2) ýEft*-RARMWTIIII' 41 , 








In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
-j #b (3) rtWIROWUROMPAMI 
,2 
WK44DESIDE rJRIThW=JlMj A rflýrajigýT-j O. 'j, paln 
951 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
r ij (4) DIESIDE r3R4: TAVMIIW-j 2 -ý 
Pit N A' 95 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of DESIDE? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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j?, R : (both generators go out at the same time in the tactical maneuver). 
71A 
J/'WVtX F-5F 000 VVE -r- , 
P-- 1010 *R3R, MAR, '214 
-TK A# )3 ý ý, % Pb AIk301 
2000 - 10000 OR , 1020 : 




V-A It% P9 ý3 (A Lieutenant pilot was in the front seat and a Major 
instructor pilot was in the rear seat flyiong an F-5F to airspace for transition training. When 
they flew the Lazy 8, the master caution light started blinking. Simultaneously, left and right 
generators' alert lights came on even though the switch had been reset. ) 
Z:,, r0l M: 
rm ri 
31*19PONARK? (What would you do if you were the pilot? ) 
(, glAkA- Please read the questions on the following 5-pages 
first, and then answer the questions here 
ý' ý"tyj' 'tE8R%-fR-"K%W-j OMR 
(1) SHOR, (2) PASS, (3) FOR-DEC, (4) SOAR, (5) DESIDE 
tL-Hfl 'Aff_ýAM 
_j 
WIIK)ý-_A C-HIWIZXIIWýA ? ITFW5NNI 
(Which ADM mnemonic is the best approach for this situation? And Why? ) 
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SHOR r5ftfT-&MXjjj#_, 
(S) (Stimuliq TE'J'ATU-10, perceives surroundings change. ) 
(The master caution light was blinking. ) r::: i 
(2) ýEtR% fAYUWRAL - (Left and right generators' alert lights were lit. ) 
(3) %- r9faw ýYmmmiýv1#%EEm ýgYft&,, (It didn't work to reset the switch 
that was identified the problem wasn't simply circuit breaker popped out. ) 
(H) WRQ (Hypotheses, ? -Hypotheses for 
new information (stimulation), for example, "Is anything dangerous? ") 
MMEMRJ-Lýa rffl-Z%- (The 
situation was deduced that left and right generators were out and the battery could only 
provide power for 9 minutes, besides, some equipment couldn't be operated. ) 
(0) -MM (P-ptions, ? 9ý/PHfifff& ? -What thing would be the first 
priority to do now? How to do? ) 
(1) (To stop training immediately. ) 
(2) JWLK4A,, (To ask ground control to locate 
aircraft's position and request- guiding to home base with first priority. ) 
(3) (To economize power with the greatest possibility. ) 
jW Yfflif (R) (Response, fiWfflf, ? PHMN ? MIN ??... -To take 
action. What to do? How to do? When to do? Where to go?... 
(To stop training immediately and 
announce the emergency situation to ground control. ) 
(2) rMJ#T-, ARrffj , Wrp nr (To shut off unnecessary electrical equipment 
for saving battery power. ) 
(3) RK-K& 4a: M_Ltig-. (To join long final straight-in without flaps. ) M_ N-- 
(4) frpa. (To operate landing gear alternate extension when 
necessary. ) 
ZJ%44 SHOR rMITAM-110i 
PQ fRj ?( 'xk jR A9A --PJ 10 
-f- 
5, Ix 111 , 





In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
0 
_j 
2rf. - , "k (2) SHOR rjRff AflZtjjj, jMq&fjj kýýj, 





In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SHOR 
for risk management? 








NO -r-IJ40-f- 5, ýMgil I ? (ýMUOM% 
98764.3 2 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SHOR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) SHOR ryRj-A%RMjj'j#., ; r- -1t T 91 ff -j 
An fnj ? 
ff lt IR A-3 9 No 5, -r-Ij4TJtjRJj 1) 
987654 3- 2 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of SHOR? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low:, 1, Please select one number. ) 
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PASS r- YRffVMNIIN 
(P) Wt,, rAjjM (Problem identification, PnH)j [j 'ffipft , JRJA-l-, )N, r, fy NU gmPNI-To identi 
surroundings and problems at present. -) 
(1) 2ýEt-R%- (Both left and right generators were out of condition. ) 
(2) jj,, W-fFPV, jýftffi, nhM, ME*, n-ft FPU 
pmwýix), cADc, (Thefollowing 
equipment would be failed, including the flaps extension(control), altitude indicator, 
horizontal situation indicator, navigational equipment, damper, engine instruments, trim, 
altimeter(Elect), CADC and aux inletdoor control. ) 
(A) IU%NjIp, (Acquire information, X%ffi., rrJMýfyM Z-M)ý,, -To collect infonnation 
concerning problems. ) 
(1) (It didn't wo rk for reseting the switches. ) 
(2) (All data from electrical equipment couldn't be 
used. ) 
(3) (Spare gyro was the main heading reference. ) 
(4) (The infon-nation provided by ground control was the 
main reference. ) 
fj (S) *JRMPq (Survey strategy, To survey the 
strength and weakness of strategies for solving problems. ) 
(1) O-RP PPILMIR , -F%AJV-ftg=: jVF tj FTiR. (To stop training immediately and descending 
until below clouds. ) 
IR , 
(TO (2) F LK C -T\, L/. Z78%44 
request ground control to locate the aircraft position and guide to home base with first 
priority for avoiding unnecessary consumption of fuel and electricity) 
(S) -XMTPfjý (Select strategy, To choose the most proper strategy and 
take action. ) 
(1) A'LRP (To stop training immediately. ) 
%RrM, Wrp C, - M (To shut off unnecessary electrical equipment (2) rM J# T-, j 
for saving battery power. ) 
(3) ; (To request ground control to locate It NIL, IZ ON 
aircraft position and guide to home base with first priority. ) 
(4) Rj, Lff :: "fA$AWý , (To request ground control to OFU 
, gudde to assemble 
for formation to home base if there was the other friend aircraft 
nearby. ) 
(To adopt long final approach without flaps. ) (5) 
(6) w (To operate landing gear alternate extension when 
necessary. ) 
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PASS rjRrTAXMII* r j Itj fý 
PQ fill ?( ýk * !R -0150 9, A --RJ AA 5, ýk il I, rA N it -fmR! r 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
, 
!; ýý Mo rjRITA, M11 
,j . 
44 PASS Wj (2) VLOMMOUMMIT A113 
W 
* Pn DO ?( Al * !R 310260 9, A --PJ 15ER 5, *; tk * 4R JLX I, Pig M im -fma *ý ) 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think 'about the effectiveness of PASS for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
; rt-kW&V 'La j j, q (3) PASS 
V*W1 I, 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of PASS for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
-11 ýT lt j PQ f (4) : eMmIg PASS rjRýTýAVtjjj, 2r PP 13J 
ag 9 
7ýj I,:, - it ja 
rcil' 
--j ]JI ff it JR 11 ffili NM- JR R 12 
-5 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of PASS? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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FOR-DEC r- 3RfftýMX1j* i 
(F) (Facts, ? -What's happening now? ) 
(The master caution light was blinking. ) 
(2) JR, ' 5X%M%, 1,;. (Both left and right generator caution lights were lit. ) 
(3) wp_mit. (It didn't work to reset the switches. ) 
(4) fAttEt-RX ME-59M. (It could be sure that left and right generators were out of 
condition. ) 
ptions, (0) jNJA (0 -1 TI! ?- What strategies can be selected? ) 
(1) (To stop training immediately and announce a state of 
emergency. ) 
(2) (To request ground control to locate 
aircr4ft position and guide to home base with first priority. ) 
(3) (To request ground control to guide the other friend I r3o 
aircraft nearby to assemble for formation. ) 
(R) f (Risk & Benefits, T-, Mn Tja-fXffi%, M ?- Are there any 
risk and benefits for different strategies? 
ýFLILVPf-_? LWI (After left d ght -L an ri generators were out of condition, the battery could only provide power for 9 minutes 
and the training had to be stopped immediately. ) 
(2) (Flying with high power was improper. ) 
(3) -RmfRffi-ýP, REIS., Aft 
CADC, smmaA rg r9nv. -tc 4, R, fro vim (The following 
. equipment would 
be failed, including the flaps extension(control), altitude indicator, 
horizontal situation indicator,. navigational equipment, damper, engine instruments, trim, 
altimeter(Elect), CADC and aux inletdoor control. ) 
(4) (It was necessary to rel on the guidance by ground R, jQy 
control. ) 
(5) (Owing to lower safety 
factor, it would increase s. afety and operation ref6rence if the other friend aircraft 
nearby could assemble together to return base. ) 
(D) (L)ecision, -To select the best strategy. ) 
AL ining i ediately and announce a state of ai mm _Fj 
(To stop tr 
emergency. ) 
jL/, _aEf - (2) (To shut off unnecessary electrical equipment 
for saving battery power. ) 
IWLFxl r1t. (To request ground control to locate (3) 5FU 
aircraft position and guide to home base with first priority. ) 
(To request ground (4) ffjLrTPH-jf r±ýIaf IN AU Vq AM 
f--\ M 14ffi1-1R*Pr 
control to guide to assemble for formation to home base if there was t4e other friend 
aircraft nearby. ) 
& +V ? PpfqfjW ? Jo execute this (E) 9%ff (Execution, fqn, M? f, f 
strategy and watch out for when, what and how to do it. 
V%j (To stop training A AL 
immediately and shut off unnecessary electrical equipment for saving battery power. 
) 
zm To request ground control to locate (2) UT" P4 IRTAIRf"I tjAfff NIL, UP'UT I W2 -( 
aircraft position and guide to home'base with first priority. ) 
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(3) (To request ground control to 
guide to assemble for formation to home base if there was 416 other friend aircraft 
nearby) 
(4) R: K-H&, 4J, H, M,, IK- LfUg, (To adopt long final approach without flaps. ) 
(5) 1 (To operate landing gear-alternate extension when 
necessary. ) 
(C) 1*0 (Check, 5ýf-_J _, 
Yf Ar7gýýPfi` To check if each 
operation influences the flight safety. 
(1) (The. data provided by ground control was the 
main reference for adjustment and operation. ) 
(2) FPf, 'FYM. (If there were the other friend aircraft for 
formation, it would be the main reference. ) 
(3) WSMIR-)K JfflH, rl' (To count 9 minutes from Ti 4 Al 
-generators' fail for knowing battery's available time. ) 
(1) FOR-DEC rjR4TAVgjjjj r 




In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(2) ti-IM&AP-MON MITIJAII-im"VP , : 
T*44 FOR-DEC rMjTAWljlj, 4*_j Z rt, ',; MW9-j 
0 ý', IX * AQ fnJ ?( IR * 4R NEU 9, A __PJ &, V- 51 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of FOR-DEC for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(3) rfjiltr-ý 




In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of FOR-DEC for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) : M-lW'l%FOR-DEC FRITAMPINJ Z r--pTlTltj pnfpj? 
9, M. --PJ 10 -f- 
5, -PJff It 4R il 5 F4 -5j ff lt JR rlM=a 
987654321 
In this. Scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of FOR-DEC? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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, FT-&Mjjj" I SOAR 3p 
(S) go, (Situation, Ar7JR4k W3Rf-T_fl 'I- RU Mpufiýj ? -What are the situations of 
aircrafts, surroundings and pilots? ) 
(1) tEt-RIR fjY=J-ýMý , MI)fM-ft'tMR-A3ý2% )],, (After left and right generators were 
out of condition, the battery could only provide power for 9 minutes) 
(2) "&jýKYRT7-jffi' mri ALT RU -jj#J] I 
+V (It would be helpful for 
controlling aircraft if the front and the back seat pilots had well cooperation, because 
the pressure on stick was very high due to trimmer fail. ) 
ttff)ýýg' -Q-frF (3) 
PEU , 
CADC,, (Thefollowing 
equipment would be failed, including the flaps extension(control), altitude indicator, 
horizontal situation indicator, navigational equipment, damper, engine instruments, trim, 
altimeter(Elect), CADC and aux inletdoor control. ) 
(The reference for flying was only 
. 
r__ 
- Ixorn ground control or friend aircraft that made a formation with. ) 
(0) 2 iß LO 29ý- Ve * -e UN e ý_e *? »l-, ll- ptionsq ? "IP-MineImm-T0 
evaluate feasible strategies, to figure out the possible results after executeing and to select 
the best strategy. 
(1) 1W L&JR 
. 
(To request ground control to locate 
aircraft position and guide to home base with the first priority) 
(It would increase r, 4 fff t 
safety factor if there were other fiiendly aircraft nearby that can assemble together for 
returning base. ) 
(3) RýAffi&ATJ3R4ý. (The surroundings of instrument flight should be avoided. ) 
(A) LAct, -L-To execute the A; L-: _, Eý JM , 
%:!: I 
best strategy and watch out surroundings' change. 
(1) A'LRPf-! -pjEW[jý*. (To stop training immediately) 
(To request ground control to locate (2) RFU 
. aircraft position and guide 
to home basewith the first priority. ) 
: 'FUJRR'gý (It would be helpful for (3) RI, Lff 
returning to base if there were 4W other friend aircraft nearby that can assemble 
together. ) 
(Repe (R) Wf a t, 
-Repeat evaluation for aircraft, flight surroundings and pilots' condition; select and execute 
the 
best strategy. ) 
(1) WWRIOMMAR, 0X-'IEWJMf'MM. (The data provided by ground control was the 
main reference for adjustment and operation. ) 
(If there were the other friend aircraft for 
formation, it would be the main reference. ) 
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(3) HIT RNI (TO count 9 minutes from 
generators' fail for knowing battery's available time. ) 
(4) fý,, T FH F@Q,; RMq L* fA it Z YE $R" (To evaluate the operation surroundings 
under clouds and calculate the distance to base. ) 
SOAR rj%L*=pjtj ýý, q 
.x 
* PQ fnJ ?( ýk * 4R -r% 9 -1 A --PJ A -f- 5, 
IR * !R A- 1, IIMI- JR R! P ) 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for situation assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
SOAR (2) tt u": m M -ftf-RARUMMIT Fit-Ift"O 
J5 ' 
987654321 
in this scenario, what do you think about the effectiveness of SOAR for risk management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5. Very low: 1. Please select one number. ) 
-ýWmjjpj 2 SOAR (3) IýAf IXI*Pnfj 
( T 
-Eir RP lA*a rrma 9 
9876 54 321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of SOAR for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
? ; tEjHbM3RjTjlFlVAr4' SOAR 
--njff 1VU1220 9, A T-IM-f- 5, --PJff It 1RIVE 
987 65 4321 
In this scenario, what do you thin'- about the overall applicability of 
SOAR? im ab 
(Very. high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
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DESIDE r* XtfT&MTIj" I 
(D) %9,1E (Detect, -To detect if there were any unusual 
condition about surroundings and-aircraft. 
(1) (The master caution light was blinking. ) 
(2) (Both left and right generator caution lights were lit. ) 
(3) (It didn't work to reset the switches. ) 
(4) 
. 
(Instruments couldn't provide correct attitude and heading and the spare gyro was the 
only one reference but it would have slow-moving phenomenon. ) 
(E) W-Ff (Estimate, fRf*p -. 2 - X- ' f-I fTWIVý7-, ATU kjR evaluate the influence 
on flight safety based on the flying condition. ) 
CADC, $MML*-' M-, 
_ILRPf pjLWIJý*j 
including the LFRC. (The following equipment would be failed, 
flaps extension (control), altitude indicator, horizontal situation indicator, navigational 
equipment, damper, engine instruments, trim, altimeter(Elect), CADC and aux inletdoor 
control, therefore it was required to terminate training immediately and return to base. ) 
ftfjt-Yff,, +LýýW , Y,, *, RM ýJTNJ'05! ' I ý9 (2) )Kf* ta, JýJAGMMAPR. 
(The battery could only provide power for 9 minutes, so shutting off unnecessary 
electrical equipment for saving battery power in order to lessen battery's load. ) 
(3) (To rely 
on ground control's guidance was required because the navigation data was no more 
correct after generators failed. ) 
(4) (Owing to 
lower safety factor. for flight, it would increase safety and operation reference if the 
other friend aircraft nearby could assemble together to return base. ) 
(S) (Set Safety Objectives, ? -Are there any L C-3-- - 
more proper strategy? ) 
(1) (To master aircraft's situation for safe landing. ) 
time enough to (1) WE, (Identify, 
collect more information and evaluate strategies. ) 
(To request ground control to locate 
aircraft position and guide to home base with 
first priority. ) 
ON M (It would (2) ffl, Lff 'JKRIRý 
increase the safety factor for returning base if there were the other 
friend aircraft nearby 
that can assemble together. ) 
I 
_t. 
(To identify the possibility to fly under clouds. ) (3) -F FTRiAfj-; 2 -ff 
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(To Stop training immediately. ) 
(2) (To request ground control to locate 
aircraft position and guide to home base with first priority. ) 
(3) 5FU P3 (It would be helpful for 
returning base if there were t4e other friend aircraft nearby that can assemble together. ) 
(E) TF: R (]Evaluate, §EF,: Rr7Ttf4-' -2ý 
IT, 
@ 'Z t-To ,, 
f Mý, N 15- 
evaluate the influence after taking action and continue watching for the changes of flying 
condition. 
I RRAWOMP-11Y. S, f OX"IEW (The data provided by ground control was the 
main reference for adjustment and operation. ) 
(2) Mf'r11T#J,, (If there were the other friend aircraft for 
formation, it would be the main reference. ) 
(To 
count 9 minutes from generators' fail for knowing battery's available time and 
calculating the distance to base. ) 




IX'-VAQ n1l ?( Ix**'rIIE'Or 9,0-1 --PJ 10 5 'Ak *& 111 , 
1551 Mi9-fMVýP) 
.987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of DESIDE for situation 
assessment? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Pleaseselect one number. ) 
't j (2) 2I. N. 44DESIDE ryRIT5A'Vý-Ij, 
AQ fal ?( 15A * 49 02-13 9, NO --PJ 10 -f- 
5, *1 * IR A- IN NO in - im 
TA ýP 
9 8,7 654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the Pffectiveness of DESIDE for risk 
management? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(3) 2*44DESIDt rfff7TW=j, L%j A rfl4r. jqgq_j 
0'9 51 ? 
987654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the effectivness of 
DESIDE for response time? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. ) 
(4) ; 1ý$L*3Rff fill-HR"41 , 
IZ: Ow-444 DESIDE Z r--pjff lt_, Ofqj 
C= --j ff lt fRA. 9, tol --nj gr'., V- 5,1-1-J ff It 
987 .654321 
In this scenario, what do you think about the overall applicability of 
DESIDE? 
(Very high: 9, Acceptable: 5, Very low: 1, Please select one number. 
) 
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Appendix B (Scenarios for Pre-training) 
kl-ýg (Name) : 
T-S(Age) : 
qml WT*R(Flight hours) 
F-5E Xrä TF/BFM 192 1350 1351.14 
RMIGROUR 
,, I&AM; E A/B 
RX"3E 150)MRMIROPPY04 Lead &*AB-R( Scenario I. -F-5E No. 2wingman has to 







79/-ff- ? What would you do if you were No. 2? Arm -A-=M, 
AVAVA 7 fi 7 
4114-Mr-tV. F-5E 
r1jr 0 Mt 
, 
Mi ji &A. ( Scenario 2: F-5E right engine fails as a result of 
V- 
ureign Object Damage (FOD) just as the nose gear leaves the ground at a speed 165 
knots. ) 
ast 
AVATOXMIAD fMqLW-- ? What would you do if you were the pilot 
? 
[ýWVVM F-5E ff GC_l 99V,; M, 1322 1410 
, Rp 
ro] t" ra All 1500 Wgff, ýE$oW*SM41 
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1j, ý LI 4 %taf-%ýe - z= 
w, tAl"Wrow-ARVIO ( Scenario 3: No. 4 in a tactical formation of F-5Es is 
required to make a decision when No. I (Leader) becomes lost in cloud during 
formationflight (3feet distance between wing tips of thefourfighters) 
rr3 WHO ? What would you do if you were the No. 4 ? 
-u rm-m M ME I mm rM 11 rm-u rL--Iu, Imrm in IMEN mom 
ql&-Wt* F-5E AS GCI MUý; L=Vtd, P, 1100 93R-Y- ZE Itil, *Ni 1,2 
C= MAYMIN NO AR It 20M , 3,, 4 
MAIII P PIM AR-13ft 22M , 
tAX 3 iýZrtWfý 2 Me 
SAINAM , RM19IMMINIALK , 1.4 
MIC94 MORRMA 1V2 AN , -fE 
W&NCE 6284,2 V11M 3,4 VIM, 3,4 VtMIZ\*&W; W 
9 WOMM*, 3,, 4 MOWY1143MM 1,2 VFM, 2 VEN 
C= Tf 04 1ý 12 &*FE31 0116 ft 1 #4 WMA PP o( Scenario 4: F-5E leader (No. 1) of 4 A 
aircraft needs to make a decision for the No. 3 and No. 4 aircraft when a 'no joy'call 
(no visual contact with No. I and No. 2) is made and No. 2 calls 'one opposing target 
approaching on 12: 39 o'clock with. same altitude'. This occurs during practice of a2 
versus 2 engagement (Air Combat Manoeuvre 
ffAT7ff; W, A 1 YtMXjt56, affMff--? ( Whatwould you do if you were the leader? ) 
f-5E S TF NRZ: RM , cP 
W-OF tV F-5E 11191 , 0745 
*0 !ý *0- 
-ýE 
ZJ '42-: 401AM-111%, 0830 M11,07"Et-WE9, 
IMMU41OR , OTi-'Rl+, R 
WSM ,4 1ý 
800 Scenario 5: Both the leader and wingman in a formation of 
F-5Es are unable to land at home-base in a 'bingo' qow fuel) situation 
during 
instrumentflight in bad weather ) 
Mnfn'jgl-ff- ?( What would you do if you were the leader ?) 
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RE-110H MMIM MOHMISMIRM-01 E ME 
C= OPW-W-F-tV F-5E ýFýRtallt&fll 8 n: 7-* , 
*916 
p 70 pL 
MAIRORA 
, 
0- A it iARP9MIRM ( Scen a rio 6: When flying an F-5F both left and 
right generatorsfail at the same time during a tactical Maneuver ) 
O'g 
/1970 
Ar, WOPM7ZLIK ?( What would you do if you were the pilot ?) 
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Appendix C (Scenarios for Post-training) 
A-18 (Name) : 
T-#. 'P(Age) : 
Im 149R(Flight hours) 
qIW-M-W-t IN F-5E *IATF/BFM OR [ý=VFM, 1.330 it 





AR P3RO; L7W*o (Scenario 1: F-5E No. 2 wingman practicing 
tactical formation training. During the take off run with the throttles at maximum, 
No. 1 aeader) suddenly slants seriously towards the No. 2. 
rg AV rr3l 
JVEk ? What would you do if you were the No. 2 ? 
PP W MY-19 XF -93 C= -5E P, "I'MRIM-4k, Q4, +&OA94-, 9L14-r-lift 800 OR, Aft 250 
*-MKAR4MRIb; M EGT H)JAIR±ft., $9 
! A'T*o Scenario 2: F-5E solo, afte. r taking off at 500feet, pilot hears two unusual 
sounds from the engines and feels the aircraft shake. Engine EGT (Exhaust Gas 
Temperature) is increased, and RPM decreased. 
ZP- 1313 -EP- I( What would you do if you were the pilot? jR 113J _qIj 
a F% PQ fnj it 
ILV 
? 
J/'+M'9A F-5E PPWftX F-5E P, 0930 *M 0*11*1riv 
MR 
, -- 
R RI W. 5 , -VIErM. 
UWAMSPI 090 ftr%Ful, A 
It 13M , 0935 
)5 3M F31-19- ft, 10110A PP( : R42 No . 5ý-4ýSfOJWTR 
Scenario 3: F-5E leader while 
maintaining easy formation with No. 2 on the left, at 13000 feet, the GC[ (Ground 
Control Intercept) reports an, unidentified aircraft at one o'clock and 5 miles away. At 
the same time No. 2 visuals an airliner in front and head-on 3 miles away with same 
altitude and approachingjast (leader had no orders) 
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MT iMR'lJ*tA=WMSPQfnJAMw? (WhatwouldyoudoifyouweretheNo. 2? ) 
rPWWt* F-5E BFM ) =VVM, 
C= RVI, Iiý 500 9R, QAth§ý 90 ft P M) fL*A*, t (MA480 
&--4fMX; t--PJWVo (Scenario 4: Leader and N6.2 is practicing BFM (Basic Fighting 
Manoeuvres) for a gunshot attack, the distance between No. 2 and the leader is only 500 
fe e t, the angle off is over 90 degrees. The possibility of a mid-air collision is high as 
both aircraft are at 480 knots and same altitude ) 
=5 *Fl 
fFgl 31-g, cI, =V A,, What would. you do if you were the No. 2? ) 
ýPWWUA F-5E IM BFM OR iý , 1040 Eý -61*03RY- ZH 
ý1: 5209 , 1100 
19 R 
t tA, 0- W 4, * P01 Tt- ýý VIA "El" A 
N" 
RP * Ik AA %- A 14 002,0 R*8 )ý X #)R, 11ý- A iý, 3ý XM rk ERA o o 
IMA 
3 
Scenario 5: F-5E is finishing the BFM training, the GCI reports that home base 
weather is worsening. Surplusfuel is down to only 1400 lb. The pilot asksfor weather 
conditions at alternative airports 
MQ 9999m 3000 URVI'klim2-=W 
KU 6000M 1500 uRrL'-, -3. =-2Z; 6000 
ws 500om 15 0 0.5 000 UR W% 
YU 500om 15 00 
gs (What would you do if you were'the pilot? ) 
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OPPM9P. F-5E*STF 9URVIIN, fl=WN, 1120 
tEM, 120039WA, -=A&TR-XV*, 
3to Scenario 6: When an F-5E is lowering the landing gear while on the down-wind 
leg the landing gear shaft warning light illuminates, indicating the nose landing gear is 
abnormal 
IFIRAVIVRIARK? ( Whatwould you do if youwerethe pilot? ) M 
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